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This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. Islamic 
fundamentalism is defined as the return to the foundations and 
principles of Islam including all movements based on the desire to 
create a more Islamic society. After describing the practices and 
beliefs of Islam, this thesis examines the three aspects of universal 
Islamic fundamentalism: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism. It 
analyzes the role of Islam in Indonesia under Dutch colonial rule, an 
alien Christian imperialist power. Following independence in 1945, 
Islam became less influential in national politics. Focusing on the 
current situation, this thesis examines the ways in which Islamic 
fundamentalism could threaten U.S. security interests. It concludes 
that growing Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is inevitable but 
is not likely to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests in the near future. 
Nonetheless, it deserves close attention given Islam's propensity to 
mobilize mass support throughout Indonesia. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, confrontation between Muslim and 
non-Muslim cultures has become more likely, mostly due to the West's fear 
of rising Islamic fundamentalism. Indonesia's 185 million Muslims 
constitute the world's largest Islamic population in a single country. Despite 
evidence of Islamic activism, thus far, Indonesia has insulated its political 
process from these forces. 
The extent to which Indonesia is a Muslim country is difficult to measure. 
Domestic policies prohibit political expression of Islam, forcing tolerance and 
social harmony among all religions. This lack of outward Islamic 
appearances is misleading. Events in Indonesia the last twenty years show a 
trend of rising Islamic fundamentalism. 
This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It examines the 
past, present and future role of Islam in Indonesian politics and society. This 
thesis defines Islamic fundamentalism as the return to the foundations and 
principles of Islam including all movements based on the desire to create a 
more Islamic society. It examines the three aspects of Islamic 
fundamentalism: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism. It analyzes Islam's 
role in Indonesia under Dutch colorlial rule, an alien Christian imperialist 
power, and after independence in 1945. 
Underneath appearances of calm inactivity, Islamic fundamentalism 
thrives in Indonesia, influencing all levels of society. The government 
advocates Islam as a social force, suppressing political Islam. No viable 
xi 
Islamic political parties exist nor are they allowed to form today in Indonesia. 
Unable to promote fundamentalist or political religious dogma, Mus lim 
intellectuals package their ideas under social and educational welfare 
activities. The absence of a strong Muslim political party could prove 
dangerous to future political stability. There exists no political mechanism 
for Muslims to express their views or exercise activism. Radical 
fundamentalism emerges in its worst form in the absence of institutional 
means of expressing dissent. 
The tradition of Muslim extremism exists in Indonesia. While it is 
difficult to gage.their collective force, the potential of radical fundamentalists 
to destabilize the country is readily apparent. Sporadic violent outbreaks 
have occured in the past, threatening national stability. Even today, some 
military officers are not convinced that Islamic radicalism has been 
extinguished. 
Currently, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia has little effect on the 
cooperative pursuit of peace, stability, and prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific 
region. This thesis examines the ways in which Islamic fundamentalism 
could potentially threaten U.S. security interests. It concludes that growing 
Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesi~ is inevitable but not likely to pose a 
direct threat to U.S. interests in the near future. Nonetheless, it deserves 





"If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness, 
he will be able to separate Islam from politics." 
- K.H.A. Wahab Chasbullah1 
On September 12, 1984, Muslim riots occurred in the 
Indonesian province of Tanjung Priok, causing numerous 
casualties. During that year, Islamic activity increased in 
northern Jakarta. Islamic teachers emphasized themes such as 
morality, the importance of following the Shari'a, and the duty 
to fight unbelievers. In early September, Army officers entered 
a prayer house in the Tanjung Priok district looki~g for illegal 
leaflets, reportedly threatening to apprehend people. Several 
alleged Muslim extremists were arrested, inspiring sermons 
calling for the detainees freedom. This culminated in a 
demonstration at the local police and military subcommand 
headquarters with the crowd chanting "Allah is great." 
Government forces fired shots, killing 63 persons and wounding 
another hundred people. Some Muslims accused Christian 
Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) Commander General Murdani of 
instigating events in the interests of the Christians out to 
destroy the Islamic community. 2 
1Quoted in Adam Schwarz, A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia in the 
1990s (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 162. 
2Fred R von der Mehden, "Malaysia and Indonesia," in Shireen 
T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1988), 
p. 250. 
1 
Different stories tell what happened on that day. 3 The 
religious aspects were downplayed despite the government and 
ABRI's inherent fear of extreme "Islamic fundamentalism". 
Throughout history, the role of Islam has caused conflict and 
tension between the Indonesian government and its predominantly 
Muslim population. Tanjung Priok was not an isolated incident, 
rather it was the culmination of a chain of events indicating the 
growing dangers of fundamentalism. The question on everyone's 
lips was: will Islamic fundamentalism ultimately destabilize 
Indonesia as it has rocked the Muslim world from Arabia to 
Pakistan and Iran? 
This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It 
examines the past, present and future role of Islam in Indonesian 
society. This study accepts Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser's 
general argument: 
The role of Islam is likely to grow in the 
internal politics of Muslim countries. Only 
by exposure to and inclusion in the political 
process will Islamic politics eventually lose 
its current attraction and become more normal. 
Because the phenomenon of Islamic fundamen-
talism is being mishandled by a number of 
important Muslim states, the chances of it 
coming to power in one or more [Middle Eastern] 
countries are good. 4 
Thesis research was conducted from July 1994 through March 
3Government sources reported an armed, angry mob of 1500 
rioting and a lower number of people killed. See Susumu Awanohara, 
"A First Warning Shot," Far Eastern Economics Review (September 27, 
1984): 14. 
4 Islamic fundamentalism is used in place of the catch phrase 
"political Islam." Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, A Sense of 
Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1995), p. 4. 
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1995. Most data are based on books, dissertations, monologues 
and periodicals. During the course of research, two weeks were 
spent in Indonesia collecting information. Fifteen interviews 
were conducted while in country with prominent government 
officials, intellectuals, Islamic scholars, and a ''converted~ 
Muslim extremist who was imprisoned from 1984 to 1993. 
Webster's dictionary defines fundamentalism as a movement or 
attitude similar to the early twentieth century militantly 
conservative movements in American Protestantism which opposed 
modernist tendencies and emphasized the inerrancy of the 
scripture (Bible) as fundamental to Christianity. Similarly, 
Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism as: 
the affirmation of religious authority as 
holistic and absolute, admitting of neither 
criticism nor reduction and expressed 
through the collective demand that specific 
creedal and ethical dictates derived from 
scripture be publicly recognized and legally 
enforced. 5 
In general, religious fundamentalists separate themselves 
from surrounding modern society, prefer their theocratic system 
over the acting political government, emphasize the literal 
validity of their scripture, and criticize institutionalized 
religion. They sometimes reject science and modernization but do 
not hesitate to use technology to further their cause. 6 
5Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1989), p. 27. 
6 For example, Ayatollah Khomeini became popular among the 
Iranian masses by distributing tapes (with Islamic scripture 
quotations) to encourage revolt against the Shah. 
3 
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Muslims, particularly scholars, object to the currently 
fashionable use of the term "fundamentalism" in reference to 
Islam. 7 Only Christians proudly identify themselves as 
fundamentalists. Islamic and Jewish fundamentalisms were 
invented by outside observers, in reference to behavior 
reflective of the twentieth century Protestant religious 
movement. 8 Regardless, Islamic fundamentalism has become the 
descriptive label for movements advocating a more Islamic 
society. It represents their desire to return to the religious 
principles on which Islam was founded. As such, Islamic 
fundamentalism is present in every country where Islam is 
practiced. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, confrontation between 
Muslim and non-Muslim cultures has become more likely, mostly due 
to the West's fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism. The 
phenomenon labeled "Islamic fundamentalism" is a Western derived 
concept that incorrectly equates Islam with threat. Selective 
media coverage contributes to this distorted view of Islam by 
providing images of bombings, hijackings, hostage-taking, and 
7 Fundamentalism is considered an improper, Western-derived 
term for concepts both alien and hostile to the Islamic religious 
ethos. See Riffat Hassan, "The Burgeoning of Islamic 
Fundamentalism," in Norman J. Cohen, ed., The Fundamentalist 
Phenomenon (Detroit: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1990) 
pp. 152-4, 160-3. Justification for usage of the term 
"fundamentalism" can be found in Martin E. Marty, ed., 
Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), pp. iv-viii. 
8Labeling some Muslims and Jews as fundamentalist in nature 
runs the risk of "damning the target group". Lawrence, Defenders 
of God, 91. 
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revolution initiated by radical fundamentalists. The "f" and "t" 
words, "fundamentalism" and "terrorism," are linked in the minds 
of many. 9 As a result, the return to the foundational beliefs 
of Islam, commonly termed "resurgence" or "revivalism", is 
predominately viewed as a threat to Western interests. 
This study employs the definition of Islamic fundamentalism 
as the return to the foundations and principles of Islam. In 
this context, Islamic fundamentalism includes all movements based 
on the desire to create a more Islamic society. Therefore, this 
study rejects the Indonesian preference to use the catch phrase 
"political Islam" and the currently fashionable term 
"Islamism" 10 in place of Islamic fundamentalism. 
For purposes of this thesis, "Muslim" describes all who 
believe in and practice Islam or consider themselves to be 
Muslim. When used as an adjective referring to a state or 
country, "Muslim" connotates that the majority population in the 
nation practices Islam. "Muslim" is largely interchangeable with 
the word "Islamic 11 except when referring to the state. An 
Islamic state is a country that officially incorporates Islamic 
law as the legal basis of the nation. 
Chapter II focuses on universal Islamic fundamentalism. It 
9John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 173. See discussion on emotionally loaded 
terms in Hassan, 11 The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism," 157. 
10 Islamism is the modern phenomenon consisting of political 
movements carrying an agenda that goes beyond mere religious goals 
to seek the reform of state and society. Fuller and Lesser, A 
Sense of Siege, 6. See also Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political 
Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 35-46. 
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discusses Islamic religious beliefs in order to provide 
background for the evolution of Islamic reform and fundamentalist 
theology. It also addresses Islamic fundamentalism as a 
phenomenon evident in three aspects: revivalism, resurgence and 
radicalism. Finally, it analyzes the universal aims and methods 
of propagation of groups involved in Islamic movements primarily 
as evidenced in the case studies of fundamentalism in Iran, 
Algeria and Pakistan. 
Chapter III specifically addresses the historical role of 
Islam in Indonesia. It discusses the advent of Islam, showing 
the adaptation difficulties encountered by Indonesians before 
they gained sovereignty as a nation. This chapter underscores 
the problems of colonials of Islamic faith when ruled by an alien 
Christian imperialist nation. It then analyzes the place 
assigned to Islam in the formative years of Indonesia's 
nationhood, describing the various movements that asserted 
themselves up to 1995. 
Although Indonesia holds the world's largest Muslim 
population, Islam was less influential as a national ideology 
than Pancasila. Pancasila was first introduced upon independence 
in 1945 as the five philosophical principles of nationalism, 
democracy, humanitarianism, social welfare, and belief in one 
god. Sukarno articulated these principles to unify the major 
cleavages in Indonesian society. It remains a unifying moral 
framework for Indonesia's diverse population. 
Pancasila forced the Muslim majority to compromise and 
6 
accept the fact that Islam is not central to Indonesia's 
political system. Regardless, those people advocating political 
Islam have undertaken different strategies to promote Islamic 
fundamentalism and the creation of a more Islamic society in 
Indonesia. 11 Other fundamentalists have been forced 
underground. 12 
Chapter IV outlines the current situation. It examines the 
policies the Soeharto government has pursued to maintain 
stability in spite of the challenging power of Islam. It weighs 
the evidence on the future course of fundamentalism and makes 
judgements on the likelihood of the government's c~ntinuing 
ability to keep it under control. 
Chapter V is a discussion of the special concerns of the 
United States regarding the fundamentalist factor in U.S.-
Indonesian relations. It proceeds from the February 1995 
statement of A National Security Strategy of Engagement And 
Enlargement issued by the White House and United States Security 
Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region issued by the 
Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs 
in February 1995. It recognizes that security, commerce, and the 
11Because no official statements can be made advocating negara 
Islam, remaining supporters use different strategies. Methods to 
aspire for the formation of an Islamic state are likely available 
through the channels of education, legislation and the mosques. 
Interview with Ms. Clara Yoewono, Assistant Director for Public 
Affairs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 
January 20, 1995. 
12Small extremist groups emerge periodically and several Muslim 
radicals remain scattered throughout Indonesia. 
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promotion of democracy and human rights are the basic U.S. 
interests in Indonesia as in the rest of the world. Its entire 
effort is to make a correct assessment of Islamic fundamentalism 
to determine U.S. policy toward Indonesia, the largest and 
strongest power in Southeast Asia. 
This thesis concludes that growing Islamic fundamentalism in 
Indonesia is inevitable but will not pose a direct threat to U.S. 
interests in the near future. The lack of outward Islamic 
appearances is misleading. Underneath the appearance of calm 
inactivity, Islamic fundamentalism thrives in Indonesia, however, 
currently it has little affect on the cooperative P.ursuit of 
peace, stability, and prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific region. 
Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalism deserves close attention 
given Islam's propensity to mobilize mass support throughout 
Indonesia. 
8 
II. UNIVERSAL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
"Our religion is our politics, 
our politics is our religion." 
-Mian Tufayl Muhammad13 
Today Islam is the second-most practiced religion, observed 
by approximately one-fifth of the world's total population. In 
1990, over one billion Muslims inhabited areas covering several 
million square miles from China and the Pacific rim to the 
Atlantic, as well as portions of Europe and more recently North 
America. Islam and the Muslim culture exceed geographic 
boundaries. Muslims live in every possible climate and terrain, 
and are represented in almost every race. 14 
Muslims believe Islam teaches man to follow the straight 
path toward a better afterlife. Societal reform is an integral 
part of Islamic teachings, inspiring three types of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements. Effective national security policy 
toward Islamic fundamentalism is difficult to derive without a 
general understanding of Islam. Many U.S. policy makers lack an 
understanding of the basic religious precepts of Islam and 
historic Muslim cultural values. Islam, like any other religion, 
provides people with spiritual guidance. However, compared with 
other religions, Islam spells out the way of life through 
13Quoted in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic 
Revolution: Jama'at-i Islam of Pakistan (California: University of 
California Berkeley, 1994), p. viii. 
14Shaykh F. Haeri, The Elements of Islam (Cambridge: Zahra 
Publications, 1993), p. 121. 
9 
explicit injunctions. This chapter covers Islamic religious 
convictions and duties, fundamentalist theology and movements, 
and case studies to clarify misunderstandings about Islam and 
provide background information for an assessment of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Indonesia. 
A. TRADITIONAL ISLAM 
Muslims follow beliefs and practices which are similar in 
nature to those found in other religions. The prophet Mohammad, 
who lived from 570 to 632 (A.D.) on the Christian calendar, 
revealed the Islamic faith to mankind. The concept of "din," 
commonly translated from Arabic as ''religion", is central to 
Islamic philosophy. The root of the word din relates to 
obedience and following or one who is indebted. 15 The word 
"Islam" means obedience and submission to the will of God in the 
Arabic language. Islamic traditions can be compared to those of 
any other religion with ceremonial and social rituals. Islam 
generally consists of three religious elements: beliefs, 
obligations, and practices. 
Following Mohammad's death, Islam lacked both structure and 
a central figurehead to act as the religious authority. Four 
sources of Islamic religious authority later evolved: the Qur'an, 
the Hadith, the Ijma, and Shari'a. The Qur'an is the recorded 
15 Esposito defines "din" simply as "religion" in the glossary 
of Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991) while Haeri contends that "religion" does not capture the 
full significance of the term "din" which portrays a form of life-
transaction between God and man. For further discussion see Haeri, 
The Elements of Islam, pp. 23, 157; and T.B. Irving, The World of 
Islam (Vermont: Amana Books Inc, 1984), p. 132. 
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divine statement that was delivered directly to the Prophet 
Mohammad. Muslims regard the Qur'an as the "Book of Knowledge," 
similar to the Christian view of the Bible. Mohammad's behavior 
and conduct, the Sunna, represent the ideal standard for Muslims 
to follow. 16 The Hadith, also known as the Traditions, is a 
scholarly account of the Sunna. 17 
A third source of authority is ijma which means general 
consensus. Ijma developed after Mohammad's death to replace the 
loss of his direct guidance in legislative matters. However, two 
kinds of consensus emerged. The consensus of the entire 
community was applied to the religious duties practiced by all 
Muslims. In most other cases, consensus became restricted to the 
community of Islamic scholars and clergy known as the ulama. 18 
Throughout history, Islamic law remained central to Muslim 
identity and practice, providing legal and moral guidance. Thus, 
a fourth source of Islamic authority is the Shari'a. Muslims 
believe the Shari'a is God's universal law and a system of ethics 
which directs what a Muslim ought or ought not do. Legal rights 
and duties are divided into two major categories: duties to God 
such as Islamic rituals of worship, and social duties according 
16Haeri, The Elements Of Islam, 18. 
17By the ninth century, the number of Traditions increased to 
over thousands. As a result, Islamic scholars traveled throughout 
the Muslim world collecting Traditions and gathering information on 
their narrators to authenticate the Hadith. Six collections are 
considered valid: those of Ismail al-Bukhari, Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, 
Abu Dawud al-Nisai, al-Tirmidhi, and Ibn Maja. Esposito, Islam, 
81. 
18The ulama act on behalf of and guide the Muslim communities. 
11 
to penal/ commercial and family law. 
The fundamentals of Islam include the following beliefs and 
forms of ritualistic worship practiced universally among 
Muslims. : 9 Belief in the Islamic creed 1 the shahadah 1 is 
foremost. It is the testimony that there is no god but Allah 
(the One God) and Mohammad is his messenger. A second Muslim 
belief is in divine justice which ultimately prevails in the form 
of reward or punishment either on earth or in heaven. Divine 
justice relates to the Muslim belief in an afterlife following 
the death of the body. The concepts of prophethood20 and 
spiritual leadership comprise the two remaining fundamental 
beliefs. Muslims believe that every society needs to follow a 
leader who has exhibited virtuous qualities like the prophet 
Mohammad. 
The "Five Pillars" of Islam require Muslims to practice the 
creed, prayer/ fasting/ alms and charity/ and pilgrimage. 
Muslims profess their faith by reciting the shahadah. This 
creedal acknowledgement of and commitment to God reaffirms the 
monotheism of Islam and Muslim devotion to din through oral 
19Cited Islamic beliefs and practices compound a comprehensive 
representation of discussions in Esposito, chap. 3; Caesar E. 
Farah, Islam (New York: Barron/s Educational Series Inc, 1968)/ 
chap. 6 1 7; Haeri, The Elements of Islam, chap. 3; Irving, The 
World of Islam, chap. 15; and Mahmud Shaltout 1 "Islamic Beliefs and 
Code of Laws," in Islam- The Straight Path, Kenneth Morgan, ed., 
(New York: Ronald Press Company/ 1958) 1 chap 3. 
20The word prophet is applied more inclusively in Islam than 
in the Judaeo-Christian religions. It is applied to Abraham, Noah, 
Joseph and John the Baptist as well as nonbiblical prophets of 
Arabia like Hud and Salih. Esposito, Islam, 22. 
12 
testimony. A second ritual is the salat which means public 
prayer. Ablutions proceed each prayer to ensure cleanliness and 
purity before approaching God. The salat21 occurs five times 
daily at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and evening. 
Muslims in good health engage in sawm, or fasting, during 
the ninth month of the year, known as Ramadan. 22 This ritual 
requires restraint from eating, drinking, smoking and sexual 
intercourse from sunrise to sunset. A three day celebration 
known as Id al-Fitr breaks the fast, marking the end of 
Ramadan. 23 Similar to the Christian Christmas holiday, many 
Muslim countries declare a national holiday and family members 
gather from near and abroad to celebrate by feasting and 
exchanging gifts. 
Additionally Muslims practice the zakat, or almsgiving. 
Originally a tax levied on a certain quantity of items, the zakat 
developed into voluntary charity. Practicing Muslims generally 
pay around two and a half percent of their income in zakat. The 
final Pillar is the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, during the 
21Performing salat is a ritual in itself requiring various 
actions and movement. Detailed descriptions provided in Haeri, The 
Elements of Islam, 38-39; and William Montgomery Watt, Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology (Chicago: Edinburgh University Press, 
1962) 1 pp. 195-6. 
22Muslims follow a lunar calendar such that Ramadan does not 
coincide with our month of September. Ramadan fell on February of 
this year (1995). 
23Esposito, Islam, 90-92. 
13 
twelfth month of the year. 24 The devout Muslim makes the 
pilgrimage at least once in his lifetime as Mohammad did, joining 
thousands others worshipping in Mecca. The hajj links the 
Islamic masses from various countries together, creating a 
powerful feeling of solidarity among Muslims. 
Jihad, struggle in the way of good, is sometimes referred to 
as a sixth pillar. The Greater Jihad represents human self-
purification and an inner struggle over evils such as lust and 
greed. The Lower Jihad relates to struggle in the outer world, 
culminating in the Muslim's willingness to put his or her life in 
danger when the circumstances demand it. 25 It is this act of 
fighting a war in the name of Allah (Lower Jihad) that the West 
considers synonymous with the word jihad. Despite the fact that 
jihad is not supposed to include aggressive warfare, Muslim 
extremists and radical groups like Afghanistan's Mujaheddin and 
Egypt's Jihad Organization26 employ the term as a declaration of 
war. 27 
24Muslims perform several symbolic acts while in the sacred 
area of Mecca. For specifics on hajj rituals and their religious 
significance see Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 40-42. 
25 Ibid, 43. 
26Members of the Jihad Organization assassinated Egypt's 
President Anwar Sadat. 
27Esposi to, Islam, 94. 
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B. ISLAMIC REFORM 
From early on, Islam encouraged reform. Muslims quickly 
responded to any compromising of Islamic faith and practice. 
Examples include the Shi'i split from the majority Sunni sect, 
the emergence of Sufism, the development of the Shari'a, the 
origin of fundamentalist theology, and the Wahhabi reactionary 
movement. 
Shi'i refers to the followers of Ali ibn Abi Talib who 
represent a minority faction of all Muslims.
28 The Shi'is 
believe Mohammad designated Ali as his heir and successor at 
Ghadir Khum upon his return from Mecca in 632. The Sunnis 
acknowledge an event occurred at Ghadir Khum; however, they 
believe Mohammad made a statement awarding Ali merit rather than 
a political appointment. 29 The basic difference (in 
interpretation) over who was entitled to succession caused 
Muslims to divide into two sects. Shi'is and Sunnis developed 
two different Islamic theologies and histories. After splitting 
from the Sunnis, the Shi'i Muslims centered their history on the 
martyred family of Mohammad, believing that the leadership of the 
Islamic community belonged to his descendants beginning with Ali. 
The fundamental difference between the two sects lies in the 
Shi'i doctrine of the imamate. The imam acts as a political and 
28 The Shi' i do not constitute more than ten percent of the 
total Muslim population; the other 90 percent being Sunnis. Rafiq 
Zakaria, The Struggle Within Islam (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 
p. 143. 
29Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 59. 
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religious guide, leading the community through divine 
inspiration. 30 Sunnis uphold the caliphate in which a successor 
of Mohammad is elected to lead the Islamic community. 31 
Likewise, the espousal of Sufism represented a sort of 
protest. Its doctrine hoped to reform social and political 
abuses by appealing to the religious consciousness of Muslims 
through asceticism and mysticism. Sufi devotional customs 
evolved by the 8th century, 32 emphasizing a lifestyle of 
detachment from the material world to avoid distraction from God. 
Although never fully accepted by Muslim orthodoxy33 , Sufism 
benefited Islam by enabling it to spread. The regions where 
Hinduism and Buddhism were already established (from India to 
Southeast Asia) proved fertile ground for the acceptance of 
Sufism. 34 As a result, Islam flourished in Asia, well beyond 
its origin in the Middle East. 
The development of the Shari'a exemplifies Islamic reform 
30Shi'is believe imams must be direct descendants of Mohammad 
and Ali. 
31Esposito, Islam, 45-6. 
32Meditative and ritualistic practices characterize Sufism. In 
the course of time, it became a religion within a religion with an 
exclusive structure of ideas and obligations. For more detailed 
discussion of Sufi doctrine and practice see Fazlur Rahman, Islam 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), chap. 8. 
33Several Sufi views depart from the orthodox norm of Islamic 
doctrine. See Farah, Islam, chap. 10, and Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: 
The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (New York: Routledge, 1989), 
chap. 2. 
34Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 69. For negative reactions to 
Sufism see Esposito, Islam, 102-3. 
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which addressed the need for a Muslim legal system. Legal 
development in Islam was predetermined either by God's 
revelations to Mohammad or customary law of the Arab tribes. 
Mohammad treated cases on individual merits, addressing legal 
issues virtually without uniformity or a code. Upon the 
Prophet's death, Muslims followed practical precedents derived 
from Qur'anic guidelines and the recorded legal decisions of 
cases made by Mohammad. The Shari'a evolved, encompassing 
legislation from the Qur'an and Hadith to provide uniform legal 
principles for Islamic society. 
Scholars note that Islamic fundamentalism preceded the 1978-
79 Iranian revolution but was not widely recognized as a distinct 
phenomenon. 35 Fundamentalist theology emerged from different 
interpretations of the Qur'an and was originally represented by 
the Sunni Hanbalites. 36 Islamic groups and movements became 
labeled "fundamentalist" after the Iranian revolution by 
association with and comparison to Iran. Without the revolution, 
Muslim activists would be described as dissident radicals. 37 
35Lawrence, Defenders of God, 190. See also Thomas W. Lippman, 
Politics and Religion in the Muslim World (New York: Foreign Policy 
Association, 1982), introduction; and Lawrence Kaplan, 
Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1992), pp. iii-vi. 
36The followers of Ahmad ibn-Hanbal established a separate 
school of thought, strongly followed in Iraq and Syria in the early 
16th century. Hanbalites generally advocated intolerant and 
fanatical views regarding literal adherence to Qur'anic scripture 
and strict religious obligations as defined by the Shari'a. Farah, 
Islam, 193-4. 
37Lawrence, Defenders of God, 232. 
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Prior to 1970, Muslim activists articulated radical concepts 
characteristic more of an intellectual current than a political 
movement. Indian Muslim writers introduced theories claiming 
that Islam no longer existed amidst the secularist and 
nationalist society which emerged in India during the 1930s and 
1940s. This concept was considered radical because the authors 
argued that Islam needed to be recreated. Despite such early 
proclamations, intellectual radicalism did not form a 
comprehensive and activist doctrine until the mid-1950s, in 
Egypt. At this time, Sayyid Qutb articulated an authoritative 
radical ideology which remained confined to Egypt ~nd Syria for 
two decades. Simultaneously, Mohammad Baquir Al-Sadr created his 
own brand of radicalism in Iraq. Thus, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq 
provided the breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism, formerly 
called intellectual radicalism. 38 
The first Islamic fundamentalist movement traces back to the 
eighteenth century. Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab founded and gave 
his name to the movement, seeking a return to Islamic orthodoxy, 
the purification of Islam from innovations, and ending corrupt 
religious practices throughout Arabia. 39 Greatly influenced by 
Imam Hanbal (leader of the Sunni Hanbalites), al-Wahhab 
emphasized the inerrancy of the Qur'an, Hadith and Shari'a. 40 
38 For detailed discussion on the development of radical Islamic 
ideology see Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 70. 
39See Rahman, Islam, 196-201. 
40 Zakaria, Struggle Within Islam, 174-5. 
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His followers helped Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman al-Saud 
successfully conquer the Arabian peninsula by 1927. In effect, 
al-Saud used Islamic fundamentalism, derived from al-Wahhab's 
teachings, to legitimize the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
C. THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
Faith is central to the comprehensive reform of contemporary 
Muslim society. As such, fundamentalism explicitly demands a 
return to true Islam, the Islam of Mohammad and his early 
successors. 41 Essentially, Islamic fundamentalism seeks reform 
through fighting. Fundamentalists are followers of traditional 
Islam who feel threatened. They react by fighting to reform 
society and reasserting their core religious identity. In doing 
so, the fight for a return to traditional Islam or orthodoxy 
materializes. Some fundamentalists remain passive while others 
fight for a changed civil polity or separatism. Islamic 
fundamentalists initiate a fight of some sort, protesting either 
generalized or specific enemies, such as the West or current 
ruling regime. Further, the fundamentalist fight for reform is 
waged in the name of Allah (God) . 42 
41A modern state cannot function on the basis of medieval 
ideas. The Islamic community needs the services and convenience of 
modern technology in the framework of a modern state. Therefore 
the fundamentalist demand to reestablish the early Islamic 
community should not be viewed in a literal sense, rather as an 
attempt to reapply the Qur' an and Sunna rigorously to existing 
times. John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern 
World (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 240. Also see Esposito, 
Islam, 117. 
42Marty and Appleby, eds. Fundamentalisms Observed, iv-viii. 
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John L. Esposito, noted scholar of Islam, summarizes the 
elements present in Islamic fundamentalism in an ideological 
framework consisting of these beliefs: 
1. Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life. 
Religion is integral to politics, law and society. 
2. The failure of Muslim societies is due to their 
departure from the straight path of Islam and their 
following a Western secular path, with its materialistic 
ideologies and values. 
3. The renewal of society requires a return to Islam, 
an Islamic religiopolitical and social reformation or 
revolution, drawing its inspiration from the Qur'an 
and from the first great Islamic movement led by the 
Prophet Mohammad. 
4. To restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic 
social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be re-
placed by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable 
blueprint for Muslim society. 
5. Although the Westernization of society is condemned, 
modernization as such is not. Science and technology 
are accepted but they are to be subordinated to Islamic 
beliefs and values in order to guard against the 
Westernization and secularization of Muslim society. 
6. The process of Islamization, or more accurately, 
re-Islamization, requires organizations or associations 
of dedicated and trained Muslims who by their example 
and activities call on others to be more observant and 
who are willing to struggle against corruption and social 
injustice. 43 
Encompassing those characteristics, Islamic fundamentalism 
emerges as a phenomenon that seeks reform - be it social, 
religious or political. Reformists fall into different 
categories of fundamentalism, advocating the common goal of 
returning to the foundational beliefs of traditional Islam. The 
43Esposito, Islam, 163. 
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three types of Islamic fundamentalism are revivalism, resurgence 
and radicalism. 
Groups and movements of the three types exhibit overlapping 
characteristics of fundamentalist theology, and differ primarily 
in the method of propagation by which their aims are achieved. 
For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and some radical 
groups within Asia and Africa are concerned with seizing 
political power in their respective countries and establishing an 
Islamic state. 44 
"Revivalism" reflects the type of Islamic fundamentalism 
characterized by political passivity, advocating a spiritual 
renewal of Islam. Also referred to as a renewalist tradition, 
Islamic revivalism encompasses three recurring themes: 1) the 
call for a return to, or a strict application of the Qur'an and 
the Sunna; 2) the assertion of independent analysis (ijtihad) of 
the Qur'an and Sunna in this application; and 3) the 
reaffirmation of the authenticity and uniqueness of the Qur'anic 
experience, in contrast to other Islamic sources of authority. 45 
Revivalism also represents a reaffirmation of Islamic identity 
for those who feel threatened by the impact of the West and 
consequent internal changes within Muslim society. 
44Anthony Hyman, Muslim Fundamentalism (UK: Institute for the 
Study of Conflict, 1985), p. 4. 
45John 0. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History," in 
John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), chap. 2. 
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"Resurgence" takes fundamentalist 46 reform a step further 
by attempting to reassert Islam against competing ideologies and 
social forces which threaten the moral integrity or physical 
existence of the Muslim community. It emphasizes Islam as a 
socio-political movement establishing Islamic order, not just a 
collection of beliefs and rituals. 47 Islamic resurgence 
reflects increased emphasis on Muslim obligations (the Five 
Pillars of Islam), the proliferation of religious literature, 
music, television and radio programming, growth of Islamic 
associations, and reassertion of Islam in politics. 48 However, 
Islam becomes defined as much in terms of a political ideology as 
in terms of a religion. 
"Radicalism," or Muslim extremism, advocates a change in 
the governmental system by creating its own order. It espouses 
militancy and heightened political consciousness opposed to the 
state (or ruling regime) and its governmental institutions. 
Islamic radicals fortify their identity by a selective retrieval 
of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from Islam's sacred past. 
46 The terms fundamentalist, revivalist, and Islamist are often 
used interchangeably in Muslim scholarly literature, although 
fundamentalism has assumed a new connotation in the West, meaning 
radicalism. See discussion on the varieties and vocabulary of 
Islamic Revivalism in R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: 
Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences, " in Shireen T. Hunter, 
ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity 
(Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1988), pp. 4-6. 
47 Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," in 
Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam, 222-3. 
48 John L. Esposito, "Islamic Fundamentalism," House Foreign 
Affairs Committee Testimony (June 24, 1985): 1-15. 
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The retrieved fundamentals become modified, acquiring a new 
expression beyond the confines and practices of religion. 
Extremism generally represents the last attempt to establish a 
totalitarian Islamic state. 49 The ideological framework 
employed by radical fundamentalists contrasts that of revivalism 
or resurgence. Extremists share these beliefs: 
1. The West (particularly the United States) 
is pit against the Islamic world. 
2. Establishment of an Islamic system of 
government is not simply an alternative but an 
imperative, based on God's command or will. 
Therefore all Muslims must obey and follow the 
Shari'a (God's law). 
3. Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments 
is based on the Shari'a, governments that do not 
follow it are illegitimate. Those who fail to 
follow Islamic law, governments and individuals, 
are guilty of unbelief. They are no longer Muslims 
but atheists whose unbelief demands holy war. 
4. Opposition to illegitimate governments extends 
to the official ulama, the religious establishment, 
and state-supported mosques and preachers who are 
considered to have been co-opted by the government. 
5. Jihad against unbelief and unbelievers is a 
religious duty. All true believers are obliged 
to combat such governments and their supporters 
whether individuals or foreign governments. One 
is either a true believer or an infidel, saved or 
damned, a friend or enemy of God. The army of God 
is locked in holy war with followers of Satan. 
6. Christians and Jews are unbelievers rather 
than "People of the Book" because their connections 
to Western Christian colonialism and Zionism. A 
Judaeo-Christian conspiracy exists against Islam 
and the Muslim world. Thus, non-Muslim minorities 
are often subjected to persecution. 50 
49Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 12. 
50Esposito, Islam, 164. 
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Radicalism diverges from the precepts of Islam, encouraging 
violence and revolution to enforce these listed 
assumptions. Extremists believe that the refusal of Muslim 
governments to implement Islamic law is repressive, necessitating 
the counter use of violence and armed struggle. Jihad takes on 
the connotation of holy war in contrast to the nonviolent 
interpretations emphasized by mainstream Islamic leaders. 
D. METHODS OF PROPAGATION 
Islam is non-threatening in nature. Islamic radicalism, an 
extreme divergence from the return to the foundational beliefs of 
Islam, poses the ultimate threat to both Western interests and 
the political stability of the host country. Radicals resort to 
using violence or terrorism for achieving political ends. 
However, it is important to note that the Muslim fundamentalists 
who work within their governmental order outnumber the radicals 
who periodically emerge. 
Outward manifestations of a return to Islamic fundamentals 
are found in all Muslim countries. Collective and individual 
Islamic behavior are seen in daily life. The attributes of 
social or spiritual activism include regular mosque attendance, 
stricter adherence to the Five Pillars, upholding a moral 
lifestyle, reading the Qur'an, participation in group activities 
organized by religious societies within and outside the mosque, 
community work, volunteer work for the less fortunate, and 
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wearing distinctive clothing. 51 These actions passively reflect 
the Islamic revival or resurgence of fundamentalist Muslims who 
do not routinely manifest political activism. 
In general, the fundamentalists involved in politics are 
more activist in nature. They exhibit the same behavior and 
attributes of spiritual activism except with greater rigor and 
passion. Public (verbal) expression of Islamic values reflects 
political activism. Islamic resurgence uses political activism 
to motivate efforts such as mosque building, Islamic radio and 
television programming, governmental recognition and celebrations 
of religious holidays, and distribution of religious literature. 
Often the politically active fundamentalists attend mosques that 
cater to their peculiar outlook. Some even attend private 
mosques which are funded by the worshippers, in contrast to those 
funded (supported and controlled) by the authorities. 52 
Radical fundamentalism often degenerates into violent 
terrorism with no countervailing forces ready to check it. 
Extremists regard themselves as the only defenders of Islam, 
justifying their acts of terrorism and violence. Political 
terrorism occurs when a group, within or outside government, 
pursues radical ideological objectives using methods which ignore 
domestic and international law. Success relies primarily upon 
51R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1985), p. 54. 
52 Ibid, 55. 
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the threat or use of violence. 53 
Radicalism and terrorism determine, to an unduly large 
extent, the image of Islam. Unfortunately, sensational media 
coverage aids radical fundamentalists in achieving their aims by 
allowing Western fear (of Islam) to cater to their demands. 54 
The purpose of terrorism, whether national or international, is 
to murder political enemies, deter potential foes, and 
destabilize society. 55 It frequently appears in times of 
political, social or economic crisis. The model for the spread 
of terrorism since the 1960s, both within the Middle East and 
abroad, 56 has been the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The doctrine and practices of the PLO diverge from Islam. 57 Its 
ultimate aim, the establishment of a secular state in Palestine 
is far removed from any Islamic inspiration. 58 
53Noel O'Sullivan, ed., Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution 
(Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books, Ltd., 1986), p. 5. 
54 C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, The Lifestyles of Islam, 
Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1985), p. 244. 
55David Capitanchik, 11 Terrorism and Islam, 11 in 0' Sullivan, ed., 
Terrorism, 115. 
56While the more dramatic incidents of recent decades have 
occurred in the Middle East, terrorism is by no means exclusive to 
that region nor committed by just Muslims. 
57 Inspired from European sources, the PLO first 
emulate the guerilla tactics of the Chinese and the 
Communists, when that method failed it resorted to 
Capitanchik, 11 Terrorism and Islam, 11 129. 





E. CASE STUDIES 
Being a universal religion, Islam is not confined to the 
Middle East and is largely concentrated in the South and 
Southeast Asia regions. 59 Likewise, Islamic fundamentalism 
extends beyond the geographic boundaries of the Middle East. 
From 1830 to 1920, northern India, northern Nigeria, Sumatra, 
Bengal, Libya, Sudan and Somalia experienced revivalist 
movements. 60 Today virtually every Muslim country is 
experiencing, in one form or another, the phenomenon of Islamic 
fundamentalism. However, only three Islamic states exist: Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. 61 Most predominantly Muslim 
countries adopted liberal constitutions and a parliamentary 
system of government following independence from colonialism. 62 
The popularity of fundamentalist ideology as a reaction to 
secular modernism increased in most countries during their post-
independence period. The failure of both liberal and socialist 
paths to development, as pursued by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Reza 
Shah Pahlavi of Iran, Ayub Khan of Pakistan, Gamal Abdel Nasser 
of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia, further strengthened the 
59Muslim communities exist in present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Singapore, the southern Philippines and Thailand, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and India have the largest Muslim populations 
worldwide, respectively in decreasing order of numbers. 
60See discussion in Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 20-3. 
61 Islamic countries are those which declare Islam as the 
national religion (and ideology) and implement the Shari' a as 
constitutional law. 
62Chouieri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 55. 
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appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. 63 Fundamentalism became 
popular because it offered an Islamic cultural identity during a 
period of Muslim identity crisis. It also reintroduced Islamic 
principles into the social, economic and political concerns of 
society. The following case studies of Iran, Algeria, and 
Pakistan represent different examples of politically active 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
1. Iran 
Radical fundamentalists in Iran brought a deeply 
conservative, xenophobic and absolutist government to power in 
the 1978-79 revolution. The Iranian model has not. been emulated 
by other countries. In the eyes of many fundamentalists, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran represents the failure of political 
Islam. The revolution as a whole reflected a specific Iranian 
national character. 64 
Many circumstances that led to the triumph of Islamic 
revolution were unique to Iran. First, it is the only country 
with a predominately Shi'ite population. The Shi'ite concept of 
the imamate created the Iranian inclination to readily accept 
moral leadership by an individual, 65 as reflected in Khomeini's 
63Ahmad, "Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," 462. 
64Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact in Iran, 
Pakistan, and the Sudan," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 
eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1993), p. 121. 
65Shi'is believe the occulted 12th Imam will return to rule the 
Islamic community. Iranians often referred to Ayatollah Khomeini 
using the honorary title of "Imam." Thomas Lippman, Politics and 
Religion in the Muslim World (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 
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relative ease in ousting the shah. Second, the reinterpretation 
of Shi'ism as a revolutionary ideology of mass mobilization was 
uncharacteristically launched by the Islamic intellectuals in 
Iran. Khomeini and a section of the ulama who were willing to 
lead a revolutionary66 movement later employed it to gain 
political power. Third, Khomeini's charisma provided the primary 
source of success. 
From 1953 to 1960, relations between the court and Iran's 
religious establishment were peaceful. In 1960, tensions arose 
when Iran's highest ranking cleric, Ayatollah Husain Burujirdi, 
voiced opposition to the government's proposals for land reform. 
After Burujirdi's death, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as 
the most popular religious figure when he took an increasingly 
militant posture toward the shah. 67 On June 4, 1963, Khomeini 
and some other clerics were arrested, resulting in anti-
government demonstrations in several cities and the deaths of 
hundreds of unarmed demonstrators. After his release from prison 
the following year, Khomeini publically protested a bill 
proposing diplomatic immunity for U.S. military personnel in 
1982) 1 P• 35. 
66Militancy in Iran dates back to the medieval days of several 
radical religious groups, especially the Assassins. After World 
War II, groups combined a new type of Islamic ideology with tactics 
incorporating violence and assassinations. The two most 
influential Iranian fundamentalists were the Fida'iyan-i Islam in 
the 1940-50's and the Mujahidin-i Khalq from the 1960's to present. 
Nikki R. Keddie and Farah Monian, "Militancy and Religion in 
Contemporary Iran," in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the 
State, 517. 
67 Ibid, 517. 
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Iran. He strongly condemned the shah with religious rhetoric, 
and was exiled to Turkey in 1964. 68 
Khomeini's political philosophy evolved dramatically 
beginning with a 1978 book entitled Islamic Government which 
advocated the establishment of an Iranian Republic in place of 
monarchy. Khomeini argued that the idea of separation of 
politics and religion was contrary to Islam, viewing Islam as a 
government of the ulama. 69 During the last months of the shah's 
rule, Khomeini began to call for a revolution. He argued that 
the Islamic revolution would pave the way for an Islamic 
republic. Such an Islamic republic would provide the masses an 
ideal society free of want, hunger, unemployment, poverty, 
illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution, 
corruption, political repression, and class exploitation. 70 
Khomeini promised utopia to the Iranian people. 
In March 1979, a national plebiscite changed Iran's 
political system from a hereditary monarchy to an Islamic 
republic. In August, an elected council of experts drafted a new 
constitution which was approved by another plebiscite in November 
1980. 71 The Islamic leaders of Iran succeeded rapidly. They 
68 Ibid, 517. 
69Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric 
and Reality in the Middle Eastern Connection," Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, vol. 16, no. 1 (1986): 53. 
70 Ervand Abrahamian, "Khomeini: A Fundamentalist?" in Kaplan, 
ed., Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, 121. 
71Hunter, "Islam in Power: The Case of Iran," in Politics of 
Islamic Revivalism, 266. 
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conducted a referendum in favor of an Islamic Republic, 
promulgated a constitution, and held elections to the presidency 
and parliament in a little over one year. 
The large scale political participation from Iranian 
citizens was unprecedented. As a charismatic figure, Khomeini 
became a multi-faceted symbol of the Iranian population's many 
discontents. University students and other educated Iranians 
revered Khomeini as a symbol of Islamic cultural identity as well 
as a symbol of Iranian resistance to foreign domination. For the 
common man, he represented a godly man and the personification of 
all the traditional values violated by the Shah.
72 Islam was a 
means to an end which Khomeini employed wisely. 
Iran experienced profound social and cultural transformation 
since the establishment of the Islamic government. In the 
context of Khomeini's Islamic government, the Shari'a encompasses 
the legal system and sovereignty belongs to God. The government 
rewrote school books, reinterpreted Iran's history, and increased 
religious and Arabic instruction. Political parties function 
provided that they remain committed to the Islamic Republic and 
its constitution. People apply God's laws and live by them. 
University students are systematically screened and accepted on 
the basis of their attitudes toward Islamic ideology and 
knowledge of Muslim history. 73 
72Henry Munson, Islam and the Revolution in the Middle East, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 133. 
73Hunter, "Islam in Power," 268-9. 
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Khomeini argued that since both society and the regime were 
Islamic there was no place for those who were opposed to Islam. 
Under his guidance, Islamic leaders expelled all non-Islamic 
elements from government administration, the military, judiciary, 
public and private enterprises, and educational institutions. 
Further, alcohol and gambling were banned immediately along with 
nightclubs, pornographic films, and mixed bathing. 74 The U.S. 
embassy takeover and hostage situation in Tehran by militant 
students on November 4, 1979 indicated the Islamic revolution's 
shift toward an anti-American phase. 75 Iran focused its efforts 
on expelling the remaining vestiges of the American influence 
which dominated over the shah's actions as head of government. 
Iranian politics changed significantly since the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War in August 1988 and Khomeini's death on June 3, 
1989. The clergy has less political visibility and less direct 
influence over day-to-day Iranian politics. The Ayatollah Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has emerged as Iran's dominant political 
figure, proving to be a more pragmatic leader than Khomeini. The 
Ayatollah Ali Hoseini Khamenei replaced Khomeini as a charismatic 
figure in the religious leadership of Iran. 76 Khameini takes a 
more hard-line public stand on most issues than Rafsanjani and 
74 James Piscatori, "Iran: Revolutionary Fundamentalism in 
Power," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: 
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), p. 178. 
75 Ibid, 179. 
76Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From the 
Northern Gulf (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 22. 
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acts as the voice of anti-Western orthodoxy, but he rarely seems 
to challenge Rafsanjani directly on any major issue. 77 
Regardless, Iran's ideology and politics remain hostile to 
the West and its Arab allies, and secular Islamic regimes. Only 
some of Iran's actions and rhetoric have moderated since the 
death of Khomeini. Iran remains a revolutionary Islamic society 
with a repressive government that often takes extremist 
positions. Iran rejects Israel's right to exist, strongly 
supports extremists in civil wars, and advocates terrorism 
abroad. It provides ideological support and alleged funding for 
infiltration of other countries. 78 
Iran has not given up attempting to export its particular 
brand of Islamic fundamentalism which translates into 
radicalism. 79 As Iran's campaign of exporting Islamic 
revolution intensified in the early 1980s, its paramilitary 
force, known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), 
formed a special Liberation Movement unit, directed by Mehdi 
77Rafsanj ani and Khamenei sometimes take different public 
positions but have cooperated in crucial instances such as the 
selection of candidates for Iran's parliament in 1992. The 
relative position of Rafsanjani and Khamenei in terms of strategic 
and military power is difficult to assess. Khamenei has nominal 
control over the armed forces, but Rafsanjani has exerted practical 
authority as the leader of the Supreme Council for National 
Security. There are few signs of active feuding between them. 
Ibid, 23. 
78 Iran provided support for fundamentalist groups in Sudan, 
Algeria, and Egypt, and encouraged Shi' i te extremist groups to 
launch attacks against the Lebanon Army in southern Lebanon, in an 
attempt to penetrate into Israel. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 116. 
79 Ibid, 28. 
33 
Hashemi. 80 This unit initiated ties with militant groups active 
in Lebanon and Iran's neighboring countries. 81 As a result, 
Iran still maintains a large number of IRGC cadre in Lebanon and 
Syria. Iran provides training, funds and arms to Palestinian 
extremist groups that attack Israel. 82 Various militant 
movements in other countries have also received support. 83 
Finally, despite intense nationalism, the Islamic revolution 
has brought little happiness to the Iranian people. Economic 
discontent and profound disappointment with the conditions of the 
country, fifteen years after the Shah's fall, plague society. 
Internationally isolated and without strong allies, Iran hardly 
presents an attractive model of an Islamic fundamentalist 
government. 84 
80Hasemi was a student activist in the 
had strong family and political ties with 
successor, Ayatollah Husain-Ali Montazeri. 
"Militancy and Religion," 526. 
Khomeini movement who 
Khomeini's designated 
Keddie and Monian, 
81The emergence of a pro-Iranian Shi'i movement in Lebanon was 
the greatest success of Iran's campaign to export its revolution. 
Ibid, p. 527. 
82 Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 33-4. Although there is little 
evidence, Iran's past and active support of terrorist groups 
substantiates the probable existence of a formal terrorist network. 
83 Iran extended funding and sometimes explosives to groups in 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt and Turkey. Ibid, 34. 
84 James Wyllie, "Iran- The Edge of the Precipice," Jane's 
Intelligence Review (April 1994): 177. 
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2. Algeria 
Fundamentalism in Algeria evolved from the various brands of 
Islamic radicalism which have developed in the Mashreq (the Arab 
East) in opposition to secular nationalist regimes. The 
prejudices of Islamic radical movements and hostility toward 
secularism have also been adopted among the Algerian public. 85 
The first Islamic movement started when Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis 
established the Algerian Ulama Association in 1931. 86 Badis 
introduced the teachings and reformist ideas of Mohammad Abduh in 
Algeria. The French colonial administration prevented expansion 
of Islamic reform because it stirred nationalist sentiment among 
the Muslim population. Later the Front for National Liberation 
(FLN) adopted an ideology mixing politics, culture and Islam 
during Algeria's war of independence from France. 
After independence, Algeria experienced an Islamic reformist 
movement. Despite Islam's revival, Algerian President Boumediene 
implemented a secularly-oriented government in 1966. During his 
leadership, he controlled Islamic movements by using two 
strategies. First, the activities of extremist movements were 
limited. Secondly, the government arrested demonstrators to 
prevent violent rallies. Simultaneously, the government 
encouraged overt Islamic religious practices. Mosques were built 
in cities and small villages, and Friday replaced Sunday as the 
85Hugh Roberts, 11 A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism, 11 
Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, 139. 
86Mohammad Arkoun, "Algeria, 11 in Hunter, ed., Politics of 
Islamic Revivalism, 172. 
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official day of rest. Religious teaching was officially 
introduced in all schools along with Islamic radio and television 
broadcasting. 87 
Despite these efforts, tension and confrontation grew 
between the Islamic and secular (governmental) forces. In 
response, the Algerian government dominated over political 
opposition, manipulating Islam as a source of authority. 88 It 
has countered opposition by using religious dogma to gain social 
consensus for its policies since the early 1980s. The government 
discredited other interpretations of Islam in order to enhance 
its own. As a result, people began resenting the state's control 
over the language of Islam. 
Constitutional liberalization in February 1989 allowed 
fundamentalism to grow. The introduction of political pluralism 
allowed fundamentalists to expand their popular constituency and 
establish numerous organizations. The Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) remains the largest and most influential political party 
today. Founded in 1989, it emerged as a major force capable of 
mass mobilization, possessing impressive national organization 
and appeal. While the FIS supports the government's policy of 
liberalizing the economy, it is first and foremost a 
fundamentalist movement that seeks to reconstitute the Algerian 
polity on the basis of the Shari'a and ijima in place of the 
87 Ibid, 173. 
88 Ibid, 180. 
36 
Western concept of representative democracy. 89 
The country's current troubles began in 1990 when FIS won 
the bulk of the districts in the local elections. The following 
December (1991), FIS consolidated its position by winning the 
first round of the general election. The military leadership was 
so stunned by the FIS victory that they took over the government. 
In effect, the Algerian Army, commanded by strongly nationalist 
officers, decided that the preservation of Algeria's national 
sovereignty could not be entrusted to the increasing influence of 
the Islamic leadership. 90 
On February 9, 1992, a state of emergency was·declared. 91 
Further, the military canceled elections to prevent another 
fundamentalist or FIS political victory. Since then, political 
terrorism under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism haunts 
Algeria. Neighboring countries fear that the formation of an 
Islamic state in Algeria, like Iran, would provide a source of 
arms and funding for militants in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and 
elsewhere. 92 
FIS splintered into a number of violent extremist groups. 93 
89Roberts, "A Trial Of Strength, 11 135. 
90 Ibid, 152. 
91Jane's Defense Weekly. "Global Update: Algeria," (1994): 3-5. 
92Todd Shields, "The Battle of Algeria, 11 U.S. News & World 
Report (August 22, 1994): 44. 
93 It must be pointed out that numerous other fundamentalist 
groups that are not radical exist in Algeria. For example, the 
revivalist Movement for an Islamic Society (HAMAS) , evolved from a 
previously non-political Islamic association in 1990. It contrasts 
37 
The FIS armed wing is known as the Salvation Army which is 
rivalled by the hard-line Armed Islamic Group (GIA) . 94 The 
Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) represents another faction that 
controls the area behind Algiers while GIA bases its operations 
around the capital. Unlike GIA, MIA considers dialogue a method 
of negotiating with the regime. 
Terrorist tactics first entailed use of urban violence but 
have since changed to rural insurgency nationwide. 95 
International terrorism more recently entered the Algerian 
radicals' repertoire. One of its more dramatic terrorist 
actions, GIA claimed responsibility for the Decemb~r 1994 Air 
France hijacking. 96 The GIA has effectively discredited and 
destabilized the Algerian government. It is credited with 
terrorism directed against foreigners since 1993. With no 
apparent end in sight, the civil war between secular and Islamic 
forces continues. Foreign nationals and Algerian intellectuals 
remain the primary targets of radical fundamentalists in Algeria 
today. 
FIS in its emphasis on societal reform through Islamic missionary 
activity. Additionally, the Movement of the Islamic Renaissance 
(MNI), like HAMAS, is close in spirit and outlook to the Muslim 
Brotherhood although not organizationally linked to it. The MNI 
strongly opposes liberal economic reforms unlike the FIS and HAMAS. 
See Roberts, "A Trial Of Strength," 137. 
94Jane' s Defense Weekly, 4. 
95 Ibid, 4. 




Pakistan is the second largest Muslim nation in population, 
after Indonesia. Unlike countries with centuries of pre-Islamic 
history, Pakistan began its nationhood as an Islamic state in 
1947. It was created by the Muslims of India who advocated the 
formation of a separate nation because of their religion and 
culture. To many Pakistani intellectuals, Islam constitutes the 
raison d'etre of statehood and the only justification for a 
separate existence from India. The Jama'at-i-Islami, the largest 
fundamentalist organization in Pakistan, emphasized the essential 
relationship between Islam and Pakistan by stating: ~Pakistan 
came into being in the name of Islam and it could exist in the 
name of Islam alone. ~ 97 
The core fundamentalist ideas of Jama'at-i-Islami are the 
restoration of the original teachings of the Qur'an and Sunna, 
and the recreation of the socio-religious system established by 
Mohammad and his first four successors. The Jama'at criticizes 
the conservative ulama for reducing Islam to the five pillars of 
faith. Its members interpret Islam as a way of life which covers 
the entire spectrum of human activity be it social, economic or 
political. They also seek to replace the folk and popular 
practices of Sufism with the rituals of orthodox Islam. 
Compared with its Iranian counterpart, Islamic 
fundamentalism in Pakistan has been accommodationist in its 
ideological orientation. The Jama'at-i-Islami has upheld 
97Ahmad, ~Pakistan," 232. 
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constitutional and legal methods to achieve its Islamic 
objectives. At the outset, it advocated a policy of peaceful 
transition to achieving an Islamic state and publicly disapproved 
the violent methods adopted by some Middle Eastern fundamentalist 
groups. 98 While the government has been against both the right 
and left wing radicals that periodically emerge, it has never 
been as repressive as the Iranian regime. As a result, religious 
political groups in Pakistan generally pursue normal political 
activities over those radical and violent in nature. 
Additionally, Pakistani Islamic groups do not exist on the fringe 
but are very much in the mainstream of Islamic religious 
thought. 99 
Finally, Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan has followed the 
philosophical positions of Mohammad Iqbal and Abdul al-Ala 
Mawdudi, founder of the Jama'at-i-Islami, rather than those of 
Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini. Mawdudi's and Iqbal's major 
targets of attack were the Muslim kings, the ulama and the Sufis 
not the West. They hoped Islamic fundamentalism would better 
educate people and ultimately triumph in the creation of a moral 
democracy. The prospects for a permanent and lasting Islamic 
society could then be achieved through gradual and balanced 
change. Mawdudi also taught that the intellectual, scientific 
and technological progress of the West represented an extension 
98 Ibid, 239. 
99 Ibid, 240. 
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of the principles first propounded by Islam. 100 Thus, compared 
to Iran and Algeria, as a whole Islamic fundamentalism in 
Pakistan does not appear to have a destabilizing effect on the 
country's political stability. 
100 Ibid, 241. 
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III. ISLAM'S HISTORICAL ROLE IN INDONESIA 
"Islam did not construct a civilization, 
it appropriated one." 
- Clifford Geertz101 
Indonesia's approximately 185 million Muslims constitute the 
world's largest Islamic population in a single country. The 
nature and political role of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia 
is affected by the country's historical, cultural, and 
sociopolitical characteristics rather than by universal Islamic 
principles. While Indonesians share common beliefs with the 
Muslims in the Middle East, Islam is not the central feature of 
Indonesia's political system. For President Soeharto and his New 
Order government, Pancasila has always acted as the ideological 
tool of legitimacy. 
A. HISTORICAL HERITAGE 
Islam was drawn to Indonesia by trade expansion and it 
spread relatively peacefully through the country. 102 From the 
eleventh century, or possibly earlier, merchants introduced Islam 
along the coasts of Java and Sumatra. 103 Starting in northern 
101Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1968), p. 11. 
102Although there is no evidence of foreign military 
expeditions imposing Islam on Indonesia, it spread to some areas by 
warfare within. See M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia 
(Indiana: Bloomington University Press, 1981), chap. 1. 
103 Islam may have entered Indonesia as early as the 7th or 8th 
century. See Uka Tjandrasasmita, "The Introduction of Islam and the 
Growth of Moslem Coastal Cities in the Indonesian Archipelago," in 
Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. Due Marchie Sarvaas, eds., Dynamics 
of Indonesian History (New York: North Holland Publishing Co, 
1978) 1 PP• 141-3. 
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Sumatra, Islam spread as far as the spice-producing islands of 
East Indonesia. It firmly planted itself in the areas along the 
early international trade routes: the Sumatran shores of the 
Straits of Malacca, the Malay peninsula, the northern coast of 
Java, Brunei, Sulu and Maluku (Moluccas) 104 Thus the Muslim 
traders from Arabia, Persia and India played a significant role 
in the spread of Islam. 
The Indonesians found Islam acceptable as long as it mixed 
with their old religious practices and beliefs. In Aceh, the 
early Muslims established small villages without encountering any 
strong central power hostile to I slam. 105 By the end of the 
thirteenth century, many Muslims resided in Sumatran ports, 
maintaining close contacts with other trading posts and Indian 
Muslims. The Javanese began converting to Islam in the 
fourteenth century . 106 Sufism easily combined with the 
animistic, indigenous religions of Java. In the non-Javanese 
areas, Islam remained largely confined to the coastal areas. 
Upon the decline of Hindu-based kingdoms in Indonesia, 107 
104Ricklefs, History Of Modern Indonesia, 8. 
105Abdurrahman Wahid, "Developments 
Asia," Indonesian Quarterly vol. 14, no. 1 
of Islam in Southeast 
(Jakarta, 1986): 131. 
106The first clear evidence of Javanese Muslims is provided by 
the gravestones of aristocrats Trawulan and Tralaya on East Java, 
dated 1368. Ricklefs, "Islamization in Java," in Raphael Israeli 
and Anthony H. Johns, eds., Southeast and East Asia: Islam in Asia, 
vol. 2 (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 11. 
107The fall of the Madj apahit kingdom, in particular, allowed 
Islam to better establish itself. By mid-14th century, Madjapahit 
included the islands between Java and New Guinea, Sumatra, Borneo, 
Sulawesi, West Molucca and most of the Malay peninsula. Reuven 
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the Sufi version of Islam easily filled the power vacuum. A 
small group of religious activists in the upper classes of 
village society began practicing Islam. This spread to large 
groups of economic and judicial peddlers who utilized Islam to 
serve the interests of a coalition between merchants and local 
rulers . 108 As a result, Islamic mysticism made a considerable 
impact on the Indonesians. Sufis were highly regarded and 
honored. In northern Sumatra, the most respected religious 
scholars were mystics. Likewise in Java the Islamic theologians 
and jurists of Middle Eastern origin took second seat in 
influence to the Sufis . 109 
Islam spread to the local population through educational 
institutions called pesantrens. Pesantrens are similar to 
military academies in the sense that those taking part in it 
experience total immersion. 110 Scholars, teachers of Islam 
(kyais) and religious leaders in the community were educated in 
pesantrens, and often established their own (pesantrens) using 
the vehicles of Sufism to introduce Islam. 111 Further 
Kahane, "The Unique Pattern of Indonesian Islam," in Israeli and 
Johns, eds., Southeast and East Asia, 175. 
108 Ibid, 181. 
109Mystics and Sufis were most influential in these areas 
during the last half of the 16th century. Howard Federspiel, 
Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 2. 
110Abdurrahman Wahid, "Principles of Pesantren Education," 
Seminar Paper, Berlin (July 9-12, 1987), p. 1. 
111Tjandrasasmita, "Introduction Of Islam," 151-3. 
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dissemination of the Islamic faith occurred primarily through 
intermarriage between Muslim merchants and the Indonesian women. 
Before marriage the women were converted to Islam which often 
encouraged (the woman's) family members to also convert to 
Islam. 112 
When Europeans first arrived in Southeast Asia during the 
1500s, Islam had not yet gained mass appeal among Indonesians. 
The establishment of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial rule 
in the region, shortly after the introduction of Islam, severely 
impacted the new religion. In 1619, the Dutch East India Company 
established an outpost at Batavia113 , becoming a preeminent 
political force and overtaking Indonesia's overseas trade. The 
increasing penetration of Dutch colonialism accelerated the 
diffusion of Islam throughout Java and Sumatra. Muslim 
conversions increased in reaction to the threat posed by 
Christianity and the European missionaries who opposed Islam. 
Islam served as a rallying point against the foreign invaders, 
unifying the Indonesians through revolts and uprisings against 
Dutch colonization. 
Despite the commonality of faith, Muslims in Indonesia and 
the Middle East remain a divided community. 
u2p. A. 
Morgan, ed. , 
Hoesein Djajadiningrat, "Islam 
Islam - The Straight Path, 381. 
113Java's present-day Jakarta 
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In principle, all 
in Indonesia," in 
Indonesian Muslims are Sunnis who follow the Shafi'i114 school 
of law. However, Indonesian Islam has more in common with Asian 
Hindu-Buddhism than with Middle Eastern Islam. The Javanese 
absorbed Islamic concepts and practices in the same fashion that 
Asian folk religion absorbed Indian influences. 115 The 
Sundanese who occupy the western third of Java are much more 
orthodox in their Islamic beliefs. The Indonesians themselves 
usually say the most observant Muslims are found in Aceh 
(northern Sumatra) and in southern Sulawesi. 116 Likewise, the 
Muslims in Sumatra believe they practice a more pure Islam than 
what is found in Java. 117 The remainder of the population is 
devoted to local spirits, domestic rituals and charms which vary 
from group to group and geographic location. Indic religious 
traditions continue, stripped (except in Bali) of its ritual 
expression but not of its roots in Javanese culture. 118 
1140ne of the four orthodox schools of traditional Islam, 
founded in the Middle East during the late 8th and early 9th 
centuries. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 160. 
115Geertz, Islam Observed, 13. 
116Keith Loveard, "Journey Through Magic," Asiaweek (June 9, 
1993): 39. 
117The word "orthodox" denotes a negative connotation when used 
in regard to Indonesian Islam. A better description would be the 
phrase "pure Islam" which describes a different level of devoutness 
found in every individual. Dras. Sri Minda Murni, M.S., Lecturer at 
Medan University and Idjah, M.A., Lecturer at University of North 
Sumatra. Interviews in Medan, Sumatra, January 22, 1995. 
118Geertz, Islam Observed, 66. 
47 
--- ----------------------------------.,-
Javanese cultural legacies such as the wayang119 and the Hindu-
Buddhist literary classics are practiced in Indonesia even 
today. 120 
B. ADAPTATION OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA 
The common Indonesian has superficial knowledge of the 
fundamental beliefs of traditional Islam covered in Chapter I. 
The Islamic belief in good and evil affords the opportunity for 
pre-Islamic Indonesian beliefs in invisible beings and spirits to 
continue. For example, the Javanese believe in the guardian 
spirit of the village who dwells in a tree while the Sundanese 
worship Lady Dewi Sri, the personification of a ri~e kernel, to 
ensure a rich harvest. 121 Virtually everything in Java is 
hedged by superstition rooted in ancient fables . 122 Some 
119An integral part of Indonesian life, theatrical performances 
in "wayang wong" played by actors, "wayang golek" using puppets, or 
the most popular "wayang kulit" as a shadow-play with two-
dimensional puppets. Figures from Hindu epics share the stage with 
ancient Javanese kings and wicked foreign invaders. Current issues 
are also addressed in some plays. Benjamin with Jean Higgins, in 
Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones (New Jersey: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, 1963), p. 41. See also Bill Dalton's 
descriptions in Indonesia (Illinois: Passport Books, 1989), pp. 93-
5. 
120Ricklefs, "Islamization in Java, 11 11-12. 
121Djajadiningrat, 11 Islam in Indonesia," 386. 
122 For example, Indonesians believe that it is bad luck to 
visit the lOth century temple of Prambanan with your fiancee. The 
daughter of King Boko, Loro Jaonggrang, tasked her suitor to build 
1, 0 0 0 temples in a single night before she agreed to wed. The 
suitor, assisted by spirits, successfully completed 999 when the 
resourceful princess ordered servants to prepare rice. Seeing 
breakfast prepared and assuming it was dawn, the roosters crowed, 
scaring away the daylight-fearing spirits. The suitor was unable to 
finish; however, Prambanan was one of the temples built. Visit to 
Prambanan Hindu temple. Central Java. January 27, 1995. 
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Muslims believe that the air is full of djinns, or genies. 
Organizers of a major Muslim rally in Jakarta in March 1992 
claimed that 2,500 djinns acted as spiritual policemen to 
maintain control over the crowd. 123 
Traditional Javanese beliefs are called Kejawen, 124 but 
have not been recognized as a religion in Indonesia since the 
1970s. 125 Kejawen accommodates the animistic beliefs that 
prevailed before the arrival of Buddhism. Dewi Sri is balanced 
by Popo Okoso, father of heaven, who together create 
fertility . 126 Javanese mystics considered orthodox Islam 
inferior to their type of Islam, and introduced a doctrine which 
departed from traditional Islam. They regarded the world as 
unreal, and to understand it distinctions between God and man 
could not exist. 127 Javanese Muslims therefore associated man 
and God as "one" whereas traditional Islam teaches that God is 
transcendent and untouched by man (his creation) . 128 
Of the Five Pillars of Islam, the salat is probably the most 
practiced by Indonesians. Throughout Indonesia at any of the 
five allotted times for prayer, Muslims can be seen in mosques 
123Loveard, "Journey," 41. 
124Javanese beliefs are also known as kebatinan. 
125Loveard, "Journey," 38. 
126 Ibid, 44. 
127Ricklefs, "Islamization of Java, " 21. 
128 Ibid, 18. 
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performing salat together. 129 Fridays and special services 
during Ramadan are particularly crowded. Concerning zakat, 
Indonesians primarily give to the poor during the festival 
following Ramadan. 130 As in other countries, sawm during the 
month of Ramadan is only observed by the devout. 131 Regardless, 
nightly religious meetings at the mosques during Ramadan are 
often attended by those not participating in the fast. Over the 
years, the hajj has become increasingly important. Indonesia 
sends the most pilgrims out of all Muslim countries. 132 Next to 
the salat, this is an obligation all Indonesian Muslims try their 
best to fulfill. 
The advent of Islam and the formation of the (universal) 
Muslim community in Indonesia, known as the Ummat Islam, took 
over six centuries. In the seventeenth century, the Javanese 
Muslims considered Ummat Islam to mean universalism via trade and 
use of the Arabic language. At the end of the nineteenth 
129The people of Lombok, the island beyond Bali, belong to a 
sect that requires the ritual prayers to be performed only three 
times a day. Djajadiningrat, "Islam In Indonesia," 385. 
130The donor buys the amount of rice which is determined for 
each person and presents it as zakat to a religious teacher, 
usually the teacher of his children. Today, committees are 
organized in the big cities to collect money from families and 
distribute gifts to the poor. Ibid, 386. 
131Some deliberately fast only on the first day, referred to by 
the Javanese as "fasting like the bedug," which is a drum covered 
only on one side. Others fast on the first and last day similar to 
the skins covering both sides of a kendang drum. Ibid, 386. 
132 In May 1995, a quota of 194, 000 was filled at a cost of 
$1000 per Indonesian. Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious 
Affairs. Jakarta interview, January 19, 1995. 
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century, the definition of Ummat Islam became narrower and 
confined to those Muslims who spoke Malay. In contemporary 
Indonesia, Ummat Islam can be identified in five ways: those who 
regard themselves as adherents of Islam, practice the Five 
Pillars, have knowledge of Islamic teachings, conform their 
behavior to suit Islamic teachings within society, and regard 
Islam an ideological basis. 133 
Once introduced to Indonesia, Islam became full of 
heterodoxy and heresy. This diversification of traditional Islam 
was largely due to ignorance. As technological advances in the 
nineteenth century made travel to Mecca less arduo~s, the number 
of pilgrims significantly increased. Indonesians then 
encountered orthodox Islam in the Arabian peninsula, and became 
acquainted with reformist ideas such as those of Egyptian 
modernist Mohammad Abduh. 134 He founded Islamic modernism which 
advocated breaking free from the domination of the four Sunni 
schools of law and returning to the original authoritative 
sources of Islam. 135 In doing such, Abduh reasoned that the 
scientific advances of modern (Western) learning, combined with a 
purified Islam, could raise the Islamic world out of its 
133Rohani Abdul Rahim, Muslims in Indonesia and the Notion of 
An Islamic State (Jakarta: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991), p. 20. 
134Manning Nash, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and 
Indonesia," in Marty and Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, 
716. 
135As discussed in Chapter I, these four religious sources are 
the Qur'an, Hadith, Sunna, and Shari'a. 
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decline. 136 
As a result, Java experienced increasing conflict between 
Indonesians returning from the hajj and the Dutch rulers. Muslim 
zealots considered Dutch domination over Indonesia the result of 
Islam's decline, observing a widespread need for reform. 
Consequently, the relative unity of the Muslims disintegrated. 
They divided themselves into two groups: those of the santri and 
the abangan. Santri are the devout Muslims or firm believers 
while the majority Indonesian Muslim population prefer the less 
devout attitude and lifestyles as abangan. The santri sought the 
purification of Indonesian (abangan) Islam. 137 The melding of 
Islam with pre-Islamic religious practices led to a rift between 
the syncretic abangan and devout santri. 
The Dutch distrusted Islam and attempted to restrict hajj 
pilgrimage traffic to Mecca. Around 1902 Dutch policy changed to 
accept Islam as a religious doctrine and encouraged the hajj . 138 
136Ricklefs, History Of Modern Indonesia, 160. 
137Santri and abangan classifications were derived from 
Clifford Geertz' s anthropologic research in the early 1960's. 
Present day Muslim scholars in Indonesia argue that these 
classifications no longer apply. Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali, Member 
Supreme Advisory Council and former Minister of Religious Affairs 
and Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi, Director of Center for Political and 
Religious Studies, LIPI Indonesian Institute of Sciences. Jakarta, 
January 18 and 20, 1995, respectively. 
138Dutch scholars VanDeventer and Snouck Hurgronje's work on 
the role of religion and custom in Indonesian society liberalized 
Dutch policy with the "Ethical Policy" in 1899. Once implemented, 
it encouraged some aspects of Islamic religious activity, such as 
the hajj and educational programs since they increased orthodox 
religious belief. Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in U.S. 
Department of the Army, ed., Indonesia: A Country Study (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 28. 
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The Dutch reasoned that closer adherence to Islamic orthodoxy 
would lessen the chance for fanatical religious beliefs inimical 
to their rule. 139 However, Muslim law became unacceptable on 
the grounds that judicial administration should rest on the local 
mores and Indonesian customs (adat) of the area. The Dutch 
favored adat over the Shari'a, and remained wary of Islam 
appearing as a political force. 
C. EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN POLITICS 
Indonesian politics reflected a constant struggle between 
two political cultures: political Islam versus Pancasila. 140 
Islam became the focus for politics entering the t~entieth 
century, corresponding with the rise of nationalism. 
Historically, Muslims take pride in the fact that the first 
national mass movement in Indonesia was spearheaded by Sarekat 
Islam141 under the leadership of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto in 
1912. This Muslim party originated from the many local social 
and economic organizations, stemming from the Islamic Trading 
Organization of 1911. Upon uniting into a single political 
party, Sarekat Islam protested Dutch colonialism and imperialism, 
and successfully rallied people under the banner of Islam for a 
139Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 8. 
140Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: 
A Study of Indonesia's GOLKAR (Ohio: CSIS, 1989), p. 72. 
141Sarekat Islam is translated into English (from Indonesian) 
as "Islamic Union" in Fazana Shaikh, ed., "Indonesia," Islam and 
Islamic Groups: A World Reference Guide (UK: Longman Group UK, Ltd, 
1992) 1 P• 101. 
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short duration. 142 In a later phase of national consciousness, 
the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia combined with other 
nationalist parties to adopt the principle of "non-cooperation," 
inspired by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. 143 
Legislative or political cooperation with the Dutch was rejected. 
Consequently, Islam did not have a voice in the government until 
Japan took over Dutch rule. 
Islam's position was strengthened under Japanese occupation 
with the provision of an official organization known as Masjumi. 
The Japanese recognized the importance a religion could have on 
society, such as their own which is imbedded with Confucian, 
Buddhist and Shinto values. As a result, they encouraged the 
formation of Masjumi as a nonpolitical Muslim organization to 
avoid religious confrontation with their rule over Indonesia. 144 
142Sarekat Islam's downfall was caused by fragmentation. After 
the Russian revolution, the leadership split into factions on the 
issue of socialism versus Islam. Many members formed a more 
militant and radical organization known as the Sarekat Islam Merah 
(Red Union) which eventually became the Communist party in 1921. 
Rosihan Anwar, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia, 11 Robert 0. Tilman, 
ed., Man. State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (New 
York: Praegar Publishing, 1969), p. 117. 
143W. F. Wertheim, 11 Indonesian Moslems Under Sukarno 
Suharto: Majority with Minority Mentality, 11 B.B. Hering, 
Studies On Indonesian Islam (Queensland: University of 




144The Japanese, like the Dutch, discouraged the wedding of 
Islam and politics. However, of note, the highest non-Japanese 
position in the military administration went to Dr. Hoesein 
Djajadiningrat, a Muslim who later became the first head of the 
Bureau of Religious Affairs in 1943. His appointment helped shape 
a favorable Muslim response to the Japanese occupation, giving 
great symbolic significance to the role of Islam in Indonesia. 
Anwar, "Islam and Politics," 118. 
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In 1945, after the Japanese surrender, Masjumi transformed into a 
political party. However, the most experienced politicians, like 
Sukarno, were secular nationalists. 145 
Western (Dutch) thinking influenced the formation of 
Indonesia's current political system which separates religion 
from government. The Constitution of 1945 instituted a 
republican and unitary political system. It established 
legislative, judicial and executive branches of government with 
the presidency as the central focus of power. The president is 
selected for a five year term by the Madjelis Permusjawaratan 
Rakjat (MPR), the Indonesian Congress or People's Consultative 
Assembly. A parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rajkat (DPR), also 
exists. 146 In theory, the MPR acts as the highest national 
power. 147 In practice, the Indonesian president holds ultimate 
governmental authority. 
Far from being an Islamic or religious state, Indonesia 
bases its constitution on a national ideology known as 
Pancasila. 148 Pancasila's five principles of nationalism, 
145Tensions between the Communists and Muslim groups culminated 
in the Madium rebellion of 1948, resulting in many casualties 
between the two groups. Wertheim, 11 Moslems Under Sukarno and 
Suharto," 115. 
"
6William R. Liddle, Power, Participation and the Political 
Parties in Indonesia (Cambridge: MIT Center for International 
Studies, 1974), p. 185. 
147Rinn-Sup Shinn, 11 Government and Politics," in U.S. Dept of 
the Army, ed., Indonesia: A Country Study, 180. 
148Pancasila originated from the two Sanskrit (Hindu) words: 
panca and sila. Panca means five, while sila means moral 
obligations. Kirdi Dipoyudo, 11 Pancasila the Morality of Indonesian 
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humanitarianism, democracy, social welfare, and belief in one god 
provide a unifying moral framework for Indonesia's diverse 
population. Such principles were created to unify the major 
cleavages in Indonesian society: Islam and Christianity, 
aristocracy and peasantry, nationalist and Communist, commercial 
and agrarian, Javanese and outer island groups . 149 
Of the world religions, Islam insists upon a direct 
relationship between religion and government. So much so, that 
traditional Islam does not differentiate between religion and 
political power. The question of religion's role in Indonesia 
was originally addressed on June 22, 1945 by the Jakarta Charter 
which declared: 
The constitution of the Indonesian state which 
is to exist in the form of the Republic of 
Indonesia, and to be based upon the sovereignty 
of the people, is founded on the following 
principles: Belief in one God, with the moral 
obligation for adherents of Islam to practice 
Islamic law, the principle of righteous and moral 
humanitarianism; the unity of Indonesia, and 
democracy led by the mutual deliberations of a 
representative body which will lead to social 
justice for the entire people . 150 
However, the Jakarta Charter was abandoned after Indonesia 
People," Indonesian Quarterly, vol 15, no. 4 (Jakarta, 1987): 579. 
149Cited in Allan A. Samson, "Concepts of Politics, Power, and 
Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," Political Power and 
Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University California Press, 
1978), p. 37; originally taken from Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as 
a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent 
(New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 68. 
150Anthony Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in 
John L. Esposito, ed., Islam in Asia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p. 210. 
56 
formally declared independence on August 17, 1945. In 
particular, the phrase "with the moral obligation for adherents 
of Islam to practice Islamic law" was deleted from the 
constitutional text to the dismay of the devout Muslims . 151 
In place of the Jakarta Charter, the preamble to the 1945 
Constitution established Pancasila as the philosophical basis of 
independent Indonesia on August 18, 1945. This was done after 
much debating and careful deliberation by the Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesia's Independence152 who represented the 
entire Indonesian population. 153 The general debate over the 
identity of the new nation was between three groups favoring 
different solutions. The santri wanted an Islamic state; the 
nationalist Muslims supported a multi-religious state based on 
Pancasila; and the Christians (also in favor of Pancasila) sought 
religious freedom and a separation between religion and state. 
Ideology was disputed primarily by the Muslim factions with the 
Christians intervening when their religious freedom seemed at 
stake. Pancasila offered a middle road to reconcile the 
differing opinions, and was discussed until unanimously approved. 
151To view the constitution's text see Gerald A. McBeath, 
Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Indonesia (New York: 
Ocean Publications, Inc., 1973). 
152Founded in March 1945, it included delegates representing 
the outer islands of the archipelago (not just Java) . Also 
referred to as the Investigating Committee for the Preparatory Work 
for Indonesian Independence. Seekins, "Historical Setting," 41. 
153Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Pancasila the State Basis and View of Life 
of the Indonesian People," Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4 
(Jakarta, 1987): 538. 
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The first president, Bung Sukarno, personified Indonesia's 
aspirations as the father of Indonesia and creator of Pancasila. 
From the 1920s, he became the articulator of an evolving 
Indonesian identity, striking a responsive chord among the 
masses. Sukarno stood for independence from the Dutch, 
liberation from Japanese occupation, and resistance against the 
Dutch who tried reasserting control over the archipelago from 
1945 to 1949. As president, he enjoyed widespread support among 
all levels of society. Acclaimed Indonesian author Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer remembers Sukarno as "the one person in history who 
united a country not by blood, but just by his spe~ches. "154 
Under Sukarno's leadership, parliamentary democracy existed 
from 1950 to 1957. During this time, the military enlarged its 
political role. The ABRI institutionalized "dwi fungsi" (dual 
function) as a national concept which legitimized its role as 
both a military and a sociopolitical force in Indonesia. 155 In 
July 1959, Sukarno introduced an authoritarian regime called 
Guided Democracy. Under this system, parliament's power declined 
along with the role of the political parties. Nevertheless, the 
Communist Party (PKI) increasingly played a more significant 
political role. The PKI, Sukarno and the Army constituted the 
three major national influences in Indonesia by the early 
154 Keith Loveard, "Sukarno: A Fallen Hero's Legacy," Asiaweek 
(June 29, 1994): 36. 
155For detailed discussion of dwi fungsi see M. Kharis Suhud, 
LTGen, ABRI And Democracy In Indonesia (Jakarta: Department of 
Information, 1988), pp. 1-30. 
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19 60s. 156 
Sukarno's attitude toward Islam was somewhat ambiguous. He 
interpreted Muslim scripture and law in a manner alarming to 
orthodoxy and the ulama of traditional Islam. Like Ataturk in 
Turkey, he advocated the establishment of a secular rather than 
Islamic state. In a 1941 speech, Sukarno advocated the mixing of 
three 11 isms 11 : Islamism, nationalism, and Marxism. 157 The method 
in which the abangan culture absorbed Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, 
and Western ideas into a unique synthesis provided a model for 
Sukarno to shape Pancasila as the Indonesian national 
philosophy . 158 Sukarno' s immense popularity allowed him to 
develop a political system that absorbed three philosophical 
traditions: Islam, Javanese mysticism of the Buddhist-Hindu past, 
and Westernization derived from his Dutch schooling. 159 
After sovereignty in 1949, the Muslims supported Pancasila 
as the symbol of Indonesian national unity. However, by 1953 
Islamic leaders began expressing distinct political interests 
such as replacing the civil codes and adat with the Shari'a. Two 
basic viewpoints prevailed among the Muslims regarding how 
Islamic principles and behavior should be placed into practice in 
156Wertheim points out that "during the period of Guided 
Democracy, two big forces were contending for power, the Army and 
the Communists" with Suharto acting as a third powerful factor to 
keep the balance, "Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto," 117. 
157Seekins, "Historical Setting," 37-8. 
158Ricklefs, History of Modern Indonesia, 173. 
159Loveard, "Sukarno, " 3 0-1 . 
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Indonesian society. The revivalist Muhammadijah movement felt 
that a society based on Islamic principles and practices was of 
utmost importance, and such a society would eventually develop an 
operative Islamic system of law. 160 The resurgent Nahdatul 
Ulama (NU) movement believed that the declaration of an Islamic 
state must proceed the creation of an Islamic society. 161 
Regardless of which view they supported, most politically active 
Muslim groups were falsely convinced that the ultimate 
establishment of an Islamic state (negara Islam) could be 
achieved by democratic means in the Republic of Indonesia. 162 
Heated debates on Islam's role continued well into"1959. 
As Indonesian Muslims began advocating more orthodox 
practices, heterodoxy began to evaporate. 163 Education and 
closer adherence to Islam of the Middle East brought about the 
birth of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. Fundamentalism 
traces back to the colonial period from 1900 to 1942, beginning 
16
°Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 164. 
161NU constituency was more Javanese culture-oriented and anti-
foreign, an outlook largely determined by peasants, rich 
landowners, and small traders in Central and East Java. Wertheim, 
"Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto," 116. 
162The Muslim groups also incorrectly expected Masjumi, 
banished during the last years of Sukarno' s regime, would be 
revived under Soeharto's New Order. Finally prior to the 1971 
elections, Soeharto approved the creation of a new Muslim party, 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi or PMI), under the condition 
that former prominent Masjumi leaders were prohibited from playing 
an active role. Ibid, 118. 
163See Clifford Geertz, "Tradition, Modernity, and Social 
Change," in Robert 0. Tilman, ed., Man. State. and Society in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Praegar Publishing, 1969), 
p. 204. 
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with Islamic revivalism. Revivalism coincided with Middle 
Eastern modernist movements. At the turn of the century, several 
Indonesian Islamic scholars introduced reformist ideas 
emphasizing the importance of educational and social movements. 
These ideas advocated teaching orthodoxy, essentially reviving 
the traditional Islamic faith in the daily lives of Indonesians. 
At the same time, modernity was introduced to the education 
sector. Modernized teaching methods employed a system of 
classes, tuition, the use of desks and an organized curriculum, 
complementing the study of Islam in schools. 
Indonesia began experiencing a reassertion of:Islam in 
politics characteristic of the fundamentalist movement known as 
Islamic resurgence. This movement coincided with a new wave of 
activism beginning in the 1970s to present, reflecting increased 
Muslim religious, social, and political awareness. Activities 
included Quranic study circles and back-to-the-mosque movements. 
After a decrease in the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of 
Muslims traveled the hajj again in the 1980s. 164 Close to every 
one Indonesian in a thousand165 now travels the pilgrimage. 166 
Other indications of Islamic resurgence include the birth of 
Islamic groups in many mosques, propounding a range of political 
164Nash, 11 Islamic Resurgence, 11 726. 
165A substantial number considering the total population of 
Indonesia exceeds 200 million. See CIA, The World Factbook 1994 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 157. 
166Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs. 
Jakarta interview, January 19, 1995. 
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ideas and sharply criticizing governmental policy. Additionally, 
the number of Islamic boarding schools and mosques during the New 
Order period increased. 167 Today women are more likely to wear 
conservative Islamic dress than in the past, and Muslims are 
becoming conscientious about the foods they consume. 168 
The Muhammadijah, the most important institutional 
expression of Islamic thought in Indonesia, was established in 
Jogj akarta on November 18, 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. 169 It 
dedicated itself to spreading Islam among the population and 
promoting social services. Dahlan disliked the way Islamic 
ritual and teaching had been impregnated with Javanese custom and 
wanted to restore Quranic purity. As a result, Muhammadijah 
advocated better education with a distinct Islamic spirit. 170 
Avoiding politics, the Muhammadijah established educational 
institutions, mosques and Islamic publications. By 1920, 
branches were established through Java as well as the outer 
167 In Jakarta alone there were about 400 mosques in 1965 which 
increased to 1,600 by 1989. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129. 
168Nash, 11 Islamic Resurgence, 11 726. 
169The founders of the Muhammadij ah were predominately santri 
kraton (holy men of the Javanese courts) . These were the men who 
served as religious officials in the traditional Javanese courts in 
Jogjakarta and Solo. Following the advent of Islam, the Javanese 
priyayi or aristocracy always retained santri officials to perform 
religious duties in their courts. All the founding fathers of the 
Muhammadijah bore the distinguished title of 11 haji 11 meaning that 
they performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Indonesia Human Rights 
Campaign (TAPOL) , Indonesia: Muslims on Trial (Jakarta: TAPOL, 
1987) 1 p. 3. 
170 Ibid, 4. 
62 
islands. 171 
Islamic revivalism in its Indonesian context has had two 
goals pursued the most effectively by the Muhammadijah movement. 
First, revivalism seeks to purify the religion by returning to 
the four sources of Islam. This goal seemingly divides the 
Muhammadijah from the modernist Muslims by linking Indonesian 
Islam more closely than before to the intellectual and political 
currents in the Middle East. 172 
Second, the Muhammadijah also advocates a closer 
relationship between Islam and the state. Although seldom 
politically activist in nature, the Muhammadijah contributed 
ideas to the Masjumi party in the 1950s and was strongly 
associated with its commitment to creating an Indonesian Islamic 
state. 173 When Masjumi was banned in 1960, Muhammadijah ceased 
even indirect political activity. 
In 1926, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) formed in response to the 
Muhammadijah's reformist movement under Hasjim Asjari's 
leadership. It represented a conservative reaction to the 
growing strength of reformism and the rapid spread of 
Muhammadijah schools posing a threat to the village-based 
171Within the next two decades, Muhammadijah' s popularity 
increased. It reported 852 branches with over 250,000 members, 
1,774 schools, and two medical clinics in 1938. Additionally, it 
maintained 834 mosques and 31 public libraries. Deliar Noer, The 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p. 83. 
172William R. Liddle, Politics and Culture In Indonesia (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988), p. 11. 
173 Ibid, 12. 
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pesantrens. NU Muslims labeled themselves traditionalists, 
believing that reform undermined the traditional authority of the 
ulama. The core constituency consists of rural pesantrens found 
primarily in East and Central Java. 
NU formed to protect the existing Islamic way of life in 
Indonesia which combined devoutness with narrow political 
horizons. Unlike Muhammadijah, its history of Islamic political 
activism makes it resurgent in nature. NU was initially in 
Masjumi but it broke away in 1952, establishing itself as a 
political party. NU supported Sukarno on issues, believing that 
it could increase its political influence and gain representation 
among the political leadership. 174 It remained in politics 
until 1984 when its leaders decided to shift goals and focus on 
the purely social and educational aspects of Islam. Regardless, 
NU remains active behind the scenes in both partisan and 
bureaucratic politics today . 175 
Islamic radicalism in Indonesia characteristically revolved 
around two movements known as Persatuan Islam and Darul Islam. 
Islamic revivalists founded the Persatuan Islam movement on 
September 12, 1923 in Bandung. It was an effort by several 
Muslims to encourage Islamic religious study and activity . 176 
174 In reality, Nahdatul Ulama was easily controllable and 
taken for granted. Allan A. Samson, "Army and Islam in Indonesia," 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 1971-72): 548. 
175Liddle, "Politics and Culture," 12. 
176These Muslims were Sundandese, the dominant ethnic group in 
the West Java region. Initial membership was less than 20 persons 
with Muslims representing both the NU and Muhammadijah factions. 
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Persatuan Islam's discussions centered not so much on actual 
religious teachings as on the new reformist ideas that were then 
considerably popular in Sumatra and Java. 
Joining the movement in 1924, Ahmad Hassan introduced 
ideological structure and individuality to Persatuan Islam. 
Hassan emphasized that man's relationship with God depended on 
the correct interpretation and implementation of Islamic 
religious law. In 1926177 , Persatuan Islam formally adopted a 
fundamentalist ideology, basing the propagation and instruction 
of Islam on the Qur'an and Sunna. Fundamentalist thought in 
Indonesia, as expressed by Ahmad Hassan and later Isa 
Anshary178 , also stressed the establishment of an Islamic state 
(negara Islam) . Fundamentalist zeal in seeking the establishment 
of negara Islam and Persatuan Islam's intemperate style was 
viewed as a radical departure from governmental views and 
intolerant toward Pancasila as a national ideology. 
Darul Islam (DI), the first group of Muslim fanatics to 
emerge in Indonesia, drew its political and military strength 
from Islamic values and outlook. During the first few years 
after the proclamation of independence, the ABRI and (Masjumi) 
Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 13. 
177At this time secessionist group emerged who advocated the 
madhhabs (ummah) as chief guide for religious life, forming a rival 
organization known as the Permoefakatan Islam. Ibid, 14. 
178When the Persatuan Islam was formally reconstituted in April 
1948, Mohammad Isa Anshary became general chairman and continued in 
that position until 1961. During his tenure as chairman, Anshary 
provided leadership and a point of view just as Ahmad Hassan had 
done in the pre-war years. Ibid, 124-5. 
65 
paramilitary units warred against Dutch forces. In an attempt to 
bring about peace, the 1948 Renville Treaty restricted the 
territories of the Republic of Indonesia in Java, granting the 
Dutch a state called Pasundan and military forces in West Java. 
Darul Islam was born shortly after the conclusion of the Renville 
agreement, consisting of guerilla units which refused to be 
withdrawn from West Java . 179 
Initially, the Darul Islam represented a radical, 
nationalist movement that fought against the Dutch. However, in 
late 1948, the Indonesian Republic became its principal target. 
In 1949, Darul Islam leader Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo 
proclaimed Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) , or an Islamic state, in 
Cisayong. Such a proclamation not only posed a threat to 
Pancasila but was vehemently opposed by the government. The 
Darul Islam became a central concern to both the Indonesian 
government and military. 
Between 1950 and 1957, Darul Islam activities occurred 
throughout West Java. DI troops operated from the mountains, 
with occasional incursions from the Banten region and across the 
eastern border with Central Java. They controlled vast areas in 
southeastern Priangan and were especially influential in the "de 
facto NII territories" of Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis . 180 
179Compliance with the Renville agreement required the ABRI to 
withdraw its forces from West Java. 
18
°For more detail on Darul Islam strongholds within villages 
see C. Van Djik, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam (Netherlands: 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, 1981), pp. 102-4. 
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Darul Islam activities generally peaked in August with the 7th 
and 17th as two important historical dates. August 7th 
commemorated the birthday of the Islamic State of Indonesia while 
the 17th marked Independence Day for the Republic. Sometimes 
Muslim holidays would also inspire intensified campaigns. 181 
In general, the local population experienced village raids, 
looting, robberies, attacks and kidnappings. Until 1961, more 
than 1, 500 people were killed annually . 182 The villagers 
supporting the Darul Islam and those supporting the Army behaved 
differently. In the Army-controlled villages, people were afraid 
to stay in their homes at night, sleeping in the fields or in the 
mountains. On the other hand, Darul Islam-affiliated villagers 
left their homes during the day when Army patrols conducted 
raids. 
The Army had some successes but was in stalemate with Darul 
Islam until the mid-1950s. The regions under government control 
experienced hit-and-run tactics employed by DI militants. The 
guerillas occupied villages for a few hours, attacked isolated 
military posts, and retreated into the forests and mountains 
before the Army was able to react. 183 The rural areas remained 
unsafe and military units travelling through them were subject to 
DI ambushes. In West Java itself, the civil war was fought 
181Dj ik cites Lebaran, the end of Ramadan fasting, as another 
date that provoked increased Darul Islam activity. Ibid, 121. 
182 Ibid, 105. 
183 Ibid, 121. 
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largely in rural areas. 
By 1957, successive military operations pushed back and 
isolated Darul Islam militants to the Garut area. The Army used 
techniques such as forming a civilian advancing line, known as 
"the human fence" or "human shield," and forced the rebels to 
surrender by cutting off food (rice) supplies. Despite the 
overall effectiveness of the Army, the Darul Islam continued to 
pose a serious security threat as evidenced in the near 
successful 184 kidnapping of Khrushchev in February 1960 and May 
1962 assassination attempt on then-President Sukarno. An 
intensive military, anti-Darul Islam campaign in West Java led to 
the capture of Kartosuwirjo and his wife two years later. The 
majority of the Darul Islam members surrendered and swore 
allegiance to the Indonesian Republic at that time. In September 
1962, Kartosuwirjo was executed, along with four other DI members 
involved in the Sukarno assassination plot. 
Darul Islam was not confined to Java. It branched out to 
other islands in the 1950s. Kahar Muzakkar led operations in 
southern Sulawesi while Daub Beureueh operated in Aceh. 185 
184The militants dressed in Army uniforms and attempted to 
kidnap the Soviet ruler on his way from Bogar to Bandung. The 
Darul Islam frequently conducted raids or ambushes along that road 
traveled from Jakarta (via Bogar) to Bandung. Ibid, pp. 125, 103. 
185Anwar, "Islam and Politics, " 121. In addition to the Darul 
Islam-affiliated movements in South Sulawesi and Aceh, a relatively 
minor uprising occurred in South Kalimantan from 1950 to 1963. 
Discussion regarding Kalimantan is excluded because the rebels 
never controlled a large area nor a great number of troops in 
comparison to the Darul Islam in Sulawesi and Aceh. For detailed 
discussion see Djik, Rebellion, chap. 5. 
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However, the contacts between the Darul Islam factions in South 
Sulawesi and West Java were not very close. Muzakkar initially 
refrained from using the movement's name for his troops which 
were called Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (People's Liberation 
Army). Only four years after Kartusuwirjo's proclamation of NII 
did Muzakkar announce his movement in Sulawesi and the rest of 
East Indonesia as merging with the Islamic State .
186 
Muzakkar's guerillas adhered to the principles of "moment 
operasi" and avoided battle when circumstances were in favor of 
the ABRI. As a rule, the Army's only successful operations were 
those carried out along the coast in coordination with the other 
services. In 1953 and 1954 joint operations (involving Army, 
Navy and Air Force units) focused on large-scale attacks against 
Darul Islam units in the swamps to the north and east of 
Ujungpandang . 187 The situation improved for the ABRI after 
1955, when its operations became more successful. Muzakkar began 
negotiations in mid-1960 as he gradually lost ground. The South 
Sulawesi Darul Islam rebellion ended when Muzakkar died in an 
Army ambush in February 1965. 188 
Darul Islam-affiliated rebellion in Aceh erupted in 
September 1953 when followers of Islamic leader Daud Beureu'eh 
186 In August 1953, Muzakkar in fact proclaimed Sulawesi part of 
the Islamic Republican State of Indonesia (Negara Republik Islam 
Indonesia) , reflecting the low frequency of contacts with Darul 
Islam in Java. Ibid, 189. 
187 Ibid, 207. 
188 Ibid, 217. 
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attacked and seized control of towns and rural areas in northern 
Sumatra. As early as 1939, an Islamic Scholars' Association, the 
Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA), was founded and 
carried much influence in Aceh. Aceh Besar was the center of 
Muhammadijah activity during the era of Islamic revivalism in 
Sumatra. The climax of reformist enthusiasm in Aceh since the 
1920s resulted in PUSA. 189 The Islamic association later 
developed into a nationalist organization, opposing colonization 
and aiding the Japanese in fighting the Dutch. 190 Acehnese 
Islamic scholars remained a strong force during and after 
Japanese occupation. Upon Indonesia's independence, Darul Islam 
extended its ties to Beureu'eh, founder and former leader of 
PUSA. 191 
The relationship between the central organization in Aceh 
and the NII in West Java was strained. Tension, rather then 
cooperation, dominated the relationship between the two 
189Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), p. 25. 
190PUSA' s adoption of an anti-Dutch policy coincided with the 
extension of Japan's hegemony in Southeast Asia. PUSA found an ally 
in Japan and planned an anti-Dutch rebellion on the eve of the 
Japanese landings in Indonesia. Aceh was the only area in 
Indonesia where Japanese invasion drew active armed support from 
the local population. See Djik, Rebellion, 270-3. 





unclear whether Beureu' eh initiated 
to join the ranks of Darul Islam. 
of Aceh into the Islamic State of 






movements. 192 The Acehnese leaders disagreed with the Darul 
Islam's implementation of a military system in West Java. They 
believed that even though Negara Islam Indonesia was in constant 
war it should apply the sound principles and functions of a 
state. 193 
Contrary to the other DI-inspired revolts, the Aceh 
rebellion ended peacefully through negotiations instead of 
military defeat. The central government gave in to the Acehnese 
demand for special provincial status (autonomy) in the fields of 
religion, adat and education. 194 As a result, Beureu' eh ceased 
his resistance in May 1962. Aceh remained relatively quiet until 
1977, 195 when Darul Islam activities coincided with Islamic 
resurgence in Java and other parts of Sumatra. 
Since the Darul Islam movement, Indonesia has experienced a 
series of violent acts carried out by generally isolated Muslim 
organizations. The most well known was Komando Jihad, led by 
Faried Ghozali. It functioned as an underground network using 
diverse terrorist tactics in the rural areas of Java and Medan 
192Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the 
Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1985), p. 230. 
193 Ibid, 233. 
194 Ibid, 269. 
195Hasan Mohammad Tiro once again proclaimed Aceh an 
independent state as leader of the Free Aceh Movement, which did 
not gain much momentum. Ibid, 339. 
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area of Sumatra. 196 Komando Jihad bombings of churches and 
theaters plagued the late 1970s. In June 1977, government 
authorities arrested 700 alleged members of Komando Jihad . 197 
Many of the detainees were former Darul Islam supporters. 
Several years later during their trials, some of the arrested men 
argued in vain that they were intelligence agents (hired by the 
Army) and denied the existence of a Komando Jihad. 198 At least 
a hundred individuals with ties to Komando Jihad remain scattered 
throughout Indonesia today, indicating radical fundamentalists 
have not garnered enough popular support for an underground 
movement since Komando Jihad. 199 
Despite periodic mass arrests, there have been numerous 
violent incidents throughout Indonesia carried out by radical 
fundamentalists. In 1981, Garuda Airlines was hijacked by the 
Muslim extremist Imran group. In October 1984, banks, shopping 
centers and factories were bombed. A month later fires were set 
to businesses in Jakarta. The Borobudur Hindu temple was 
partially destroyed from a terrorist bomb in 1985. 
196Nasir Tamara, Indonesia in the Wake of Islam (Malaysia: 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 19. 
197TAPOL, Muslims On Trial, 15. 
1980ne theory hypothesizes that Komando Jihad was a government-
initiated concept created to publically link Muslim activism to 
alleged terrorist activities, intimidating the Ummat Islam as a 
whole. Ibid, 15. 
199Sunardi indicated that about 100 radical fundamentalists of 
the Komando Jihad flavor are scattered throughout Indonesia. 
However, he was quick to point out that these individuals do not 
appear to belong to a large-scale, organized movement. Sunardi 
interview, Jakarta, January 19, 1995. 
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The most disturbing event to authorities was the Tanjung 
Priok riots in 1984. Muslims began demonstrations after several 
soldiers defiled a mosque by entering without removing their 
shoes. 200 The motive behind the Muslim anger was economic 
deprivation and political impotence under the Pancasila ideology 
which erupted into rioting after provocation by government 
troops. 201 Soldiers resolved the unrest by shooting the Muslim 
protestors. 
200Adam Schwarz, A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s 
(San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994) p. 173. See also Susumu 
Awanohara, "A First Warning Shot," FEER (September 27, 1984) : 14-6. 
201Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 173. 
73 
74 
IV. CURRENT ROLE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
"Is Islam-phobia possible in a country 
where most of the people are Muslims?" 
- Nasir Tamara202 
Army General Soeharto took over the presidency following 
Sukarno's questionable involvement in a 1965 Communist coup 
attempt. In the wake of the coup attempt, the government 
returned to a limited democracy called the New Order with the 
military as the major political actor. Muslim groups expected to 
be rewarded for helping the military eradicate the Communists and 
toppling Sukarno. Anti-Communist Islamic groups actively 
participated in the military's campaign to purge all Communist 
influence and massacre PKI members. Instead, Soeharto 
consolidated his power by integrating the ABRI under a single 
operational command and structuring political parties under a 
government (military-sponsored) party known as Sekretariat 
Bersama Golongan Karya ( GOLKAR) . 203 
The achievement of political stability has been the keynote 
of Soeharto' s domestic policy since he assumed power. 
204 His 
obsession for stability fostered paranoia over political Islam. 
202Taken from (quoted in) Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 162. 
203Harold Crouch, "The Trend to Authoritarianism," in Harry 
Ave ling, ed. , Development of Indonesian Society: The Coming of 
Islam to the Present Day (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), p. 
195. 
204 K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 61. 
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With the PKI eliminated, only Islam had the mass support and 
organizational foundation to challenge the government. The 
military government did not want any rival political power that 
could threaten national security. The trauma of Darul Islam was 
far from forgotten with its radical fundamentalists destabilizing 
the government and creating disunity among the people. 
Consequently, President Soeharto's attitude toward Islam has been 
one of cautious tolerance. As long as Islam is not mixed with 
politics, it will be tolerated. 205 Soeharto's view that Islam 
should be separated from political ideology dominates in 
Indonesia today. 
A. GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF ISLAM 
Since the Soeharto government perceived political Islam as a 
threat to Pancasila-based Indonesia, various laws were enacted to 
combat the growing strength of political Islam. In 1973, 
Soeharto banned all parties based on religion. The four Islamic 
parties which held seats in the national parliament were united, 
by law, under the Partei Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). The same 
year, a draft marriage law spurred the New Order's first serious 
clash with Islamic fundamentalism. 206 Muslim youth gathered to 
protest the law outside the parliament building. Eventually, the 
government changed the law to appear less secular in nature, 
205Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129. 
206While the draft bill allowed marriage for each religion to 
be regulated by separate laws (in accordance to religious beliefs), 
it required a Muslim man to appear before civil court for divorce 
before marriage between two people of different religions could be 




appeasing Muslim sentiment. 207 
A year later, Muslim student demonstrations turned into 
rioting bearing a distinctive anti-Christian tone. In January 
1974 during Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, Muslims 
rioted targeting Chinese businesses and properties. Since the 
1950s, Muslim resentment of the ethnic Chinese has plagued 
Indonesia because of their shrewd business sense and economic 
clout. Further, the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia is 
associated with Christian affluence even though many Chinese 
practice Buddhism and Confucianism. 
These incidents underlined Soeharto's increased concern over 
the development of Islam and the need for a national ideology, 
prompting the government to emphasize the doctrine of Pancasila. 
As a result, the government directed schools to include 
"Pancasila Morality" into curriculums. The MPR and a committee 
known as "Team P4 11 undertook further measures in 1978 to promote 
Pancasila through Indonesian society. 208 This was a large-
scale, national program in which members of the elite from every 
section of society participated to include bureaucrats, political 
leaders, businessmen, students and religious leaders. 209 
Finally, the government's 1984 decision to require political, 
religious and social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their 
207Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 172. 
208 In light of the political situation in Iran, the government 
intensified efforts to promote Pancasila, hoping to counterbalance 
Islamic ideology. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 91. 





sole ideological basis directly conflicted with Islam. For many 
Muslims, the Qur'an provides the sole ideological basis. 
Implementation of the single ideological principle, or "asas 
tunggal," remains a source of tension between the government and 
Islamic fundamentalists today. 210 
To maintain control over Islamic activity, the Indonesian 
government created a bureaucratic ministry. All religious 
matters in Indonesia are officially handled through the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs. Despite the fact that over 90 percent of 
the Indonesians consider themselves Muslim, the constitution does 
not identify Islam as the national religion. Therefore, the 
ministry administers all five religions recognized in the 
constitution: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism. 211 It does this by pursuing 12 formal goals: 
(1) To realize to the greatest extent possible the 
principle of the Oneness of God; 
(2) To ensure that every inhabitant enjoys the free-
dom to choose his own religion and to perform services 
according to his own religion and convictions; 
(3) To guide, support, maintain, and develop sound 
religious currents; 
(4) To provide, guide, and supervise religious educa-
tion in state schools; 
(5) To guide, support, and supervise education and 
training at madrasah (modernized religious schools) 
and other religious schools; 
(6) To organize training for religious teachers and 
religious judges; 
210Liddle, Politics And Culture, 30. 
211Deliar Noer, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 1978), p. 8. 
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(7) To take care of everything related to the spiritual 
teaching of members of the armed forces, and those in 
hostels, prisons, and other necessary places; 
(8) To arrange, perform, and supervise all questions 
related to marriage, divorce, and reconciliation of 
Muslims; 
(9) To give material support for the repair and main-
tenance of places of worship (mosques, churches, etc.); 
(10) To organize and supervise religious courts and the 
Supreme Islamic Court; 
(11) To carry out investigation into matters related 
to waqf (property donated for religious/community use), 
to register waqf institutions and supervise their 
management; and 
(12) To promote people's intelligence and skills in 
social and religious life. 212 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs is unique to Indonesia. 
Its two main functions are: to encourage duty to religion and 
inter-religious harmony. The ministry was started solely for 
Islamic affairs shortly after independence to protect the 
governmental interests of religious harmony and an integrated 
nation. It provided a venue for the government to influence 
popular Muslim religious leaders and, in turn, the people. Since 
1970, it has also enjoyed a monopoly in administering the hajj. 
A specific directorate within the Ministry of Religion exists to 
manage the Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It requires four 
to six months of preliminary work covering immigration, passport, 
bank, accommodation and airline travel issues. 213 
212Cited in Noer, taken from Peraturan Pemerintah (Indonesian 
Government Regulation) No. 33/1949 and No. 8/1950; Peraturan 
Menteri Agama (Regulations of the Minister of Religion) No. 5/1951, 
in Kementerian Agama dan Parleman (Jakarta: Kementerian Agam, 
1951) 1 PP• 91-93. 
213Taher interview, Jakarta, January 19, 1995. 
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Development of the Ministry's organizational structure began 
in 1946. Originally consisting of eight divisions, by 1972 the 
structure increased to a bureaucracy of six directorates 
administering Islam, Hajj, Secretary General, Protestant, 
Catholic, and Hindu-Buddhist. The existence of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs provides an institutional form of the 
compromise between an Islamic and secular state. The seemingly 
tolerant current of Indonesian society allows religious pluralism 
to exist as formally induced by the Ministry. 214 
The ABRI and Islam have harbored a deep animosity since the 
early years of independence. Suspicion and distrust exist 
between the two, partly due to history. Muslim armed units 
clashed with the Army during the hectic period between 1945 and 
1949. 215 Later, the military became increasingly concerned with 
Islamic muscle-flexing when in 1974 Muslim groups organized 
unprecedented demonstrations in Jakarta against the government's 
draft legislation regarding Muslim marriages. The same groups 
went on to play a leading role in student protest movements of 
1978. Cultural factors also promote the military's distrust of 
Islam. The ABRI is predominately Javanese in origin, composition 
214 Indonesian tolerance for religious pluralism may be due to 
Soeharto's careful selection of individuals to head the ministry. 
For example, the first Minister of Religion was Haj i Mohammad 
Rasjidi. Well-known and respected by Muslims, he was not only an 
important figure in Muhammadijah but a 1938 graduate of the 
reputable Al-Azhar University in Cairo. 
215As discussed earlier, the Darul Islam movement brought about 
many uprisings. For additional discussion on clashes, see TAPOL, 
Muslims On Trial, 2-3. 
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and orientation. Java and the Javanese, the people who originate 
from Central and East Java, have always occupied a position of 
dominance in Indonesia since the early beginnings of the 
nationalist movement. As a result, resentment fostered among the 
ethnic groups living in the outer islands where Muslim orthodoxy 
is stronger than in Javanese heartland where Islam is far less 
universally orthodox. 216 
Many military officers who cherish the Javanese cultural 
tradition remain suspicious of Islam as a rival culture. They 
believe political Islam flourishes at the expense of Javanese 
culture. Few officers have a santri background. Of those who 
do, or are close to Islamic organizations, few have been given 
positions of strategic national command or large influence. The 
ABRI leadership believes devout Muslims discourage Indonesian 
nationalism by mixing religion with politics. As a result, pro-
Islamic sentiment within the ABRI remains unarticulated. The 
majority of its officers may affirm Islam as their religion but 
are opposed to intense devoutness. 
In general, the ABRI views Islamic fundamentalism as an 
obstacle to its current political supremacy. As a universal 
religion, Islam offers a powerful alternative to historic 
Javanese rule. In the past, the military regarded the Masjumi-
oriented Muslims as extremists because of Masjumi's widespread 
support among the santri masses. Accusations of Muslim extremism 
in Indonesia were largely based upon the potential threat Islam 
216 Ibid, 1. 
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posed to the political domination of a Javanese-oriented 
m i l i t a ry . 217 
Today confrontation between Islam and the Army still exists. 
The military fears a resurgence of Muslim extremism to the likes 
of the Darul Islam movement. Particularly after Islamic 
resurgence in the Middle East, the Muslim faith, or military-
perceived Islamic threat, was taken more seriously in Indonesia. 
The 1984 Tanjung Priok riots confirm the military's fear of 
Muslim discontent and unrest. The excessive military force used 
in responding to Tanjung indicates a deep-seated official fear of 
Muslim extremists and any expression of Islamic fundamentalism 
continues in Indonesia. 
Although Islamic revivalism, resurgence and radicalism 
emerged during varied time periods, elements of each phenomenon 
remain imbedded in society. Indonesia has not completely 
suppressed political Islam or extinguished Islamic 
fundamentalism, much less its occasional radical expressions. 218 
For this reason, the government has shown itself willing to 
compromise on a number of issues from the marriage bill 
controversy of 1973 to the refusal of Indonesian Catholic 
requests for a visit by the Pope. 
President Soeharto recognizes his New Order government 
fostered much Muslim resentment by effectively limiting Islam's 
217 Ibid, 563. 
218Nash contends that "any state where the scriptural religions 
have a hold on a sizable population can never fully expunge 
fundamentalist tendencies," 730. 
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political power. While the ABRI continued to carry out military 
and intelligence operations against Muslim groups in the early 
1980s, Soeharto adopted a more positive attitude towards Islam. 
The government became more tolerant of Islamic religious 
practices, emphasizing Muslim obligations to traditional Islam. 
To be explicitly Islamic became socially respectable. 219 
Additionally, following the Tanjung incident, high-ranking 
military officers, including former ABRI Commander General Try 
Sutrisno, visited Muslim communities throughout Java. They went 
as far as wearing sarong and kopiat (the traditional Indonesian 
cap associated with Islam) as they prayed with the people in the 
mosques. 220 
Today the government funds the building of mosques by the 
tens of thousands, sponsors an official biennial national Qur'an 
reading competition, gives assistance to Muslim schools, and 
consults regularly with Muslims in the Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(Indonesian Teachers' Assembly) and council of Islamic 
leaders. 221 Soeharto is well aware of the fact that Indonesian 
students and youth hold the forefront of Islamic movements today. 
If these young people win middle-class backing or mass organized 
219For example, government officials are expected to lead the 
prayers during Ramadan, and first class hotels in Jakarta have made 
designated areas available for Muslims to pray in. Both Actions 
unthinkable in the past. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129. 
220An action meant to reassure the Muslim community that the 
government was not anti-Islamic in its policies. Tamara, Wake Of 
Islam, 19. 
221Liddle, Politics And Culture, 30-1. 
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support, a major political upheaval could result. 222 But for 
the moment, it appears that the government is not seriously 
threatened. 
B. FUNDAMENTALISM ON THE HORIZON 
The extent to which Indonesia is a Muslim country is 
difficult to measure. Rigid adherence to Shari'a is not found 
nor officially encouraged. Throughout Indonesia, traditional law 
based on adat takes precedence over strict Islamic customs. 223 
Muslim courts exist specifically for the determination of marital 
and inheritance disputes which do not concern the United States. 
Domestic policies prohibit religious politics, forcing tolerance 
and social harmony among all religions. However, the lack of 
outward Islamic appearances is misleading. Events in Indonesia 
the last 20 years show a trend of rising Islamic fundamentalism. 
Underneath the appearance of calm inactivity, Islamic 
fundamentalism thrives in Indonesia, influencing all levels of 
society. The government advocates Islam as a social force, 
suppressing political Islam. No viable Islamic political parties 
exist nor are they allowed to form today in Indonesia. Unable to 
promote fundamentalist or political religious dogma, Muslim 
intellectuals package their ideas under social and educational 
welfare activities. The absence of a strong Muslim political 
party could prove dangerous to future political stability. There 
222Nash, "Islamic Resurgence," 729. 
223 Cecilia Albin, "The Politics of Terrorism: A Contemporary 
Survey," in Barry Rubin, The Politics of Terrorism (Washington 
D.C.: John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989), p. 183. 
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exists no political mechanism for Muslims to express their views 
or exercise activism. Radical fundamentalism emerges in its 
worst form in the absence of institutional means of expressing 
dissent. The case of Algeria reflects the danger of limiting 
pluralism and excluding fundamentalist groups from the political 
process altogether. 
The tradition of Muslim extremism exists in Indonesia. 
While it is difficult to gage their collective force, the ability 
of radical fundamentalists to destabilize the country is readily 
apparent. Several bombs exploded in Jakarta's Chinatown in 
October through November 1984, targeting Chinese-affiliated 
businesses and banks. 224 Sporadic violent outbreaks continued 
well into the late 1980s, threatening internal stability. 
Further, contemporary military officers are not convinced that 
Islamic radicalism has been extinguished. The Army's heavy 
handed treatment of Muslim protestors during the 1984 Tanjung 
Priok affair was followed by the 1989 Lampung incident in 
southern Sumatra. The Army blamed both incidents on Muslim 
extremism, highlighting the ABRI' s phobia of Islam. 2
25 
Unlike Darul Islam, the chain of violent events Indonesia 
224 See Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown," FEER (October 
18, 1984): 18-9, and Manggi Habir, "The Chicken Noodle Bomb," FEER 
(October 25, 1984): 27. 
225Later investigations reveal that social discontent in 
Lampung was due to land tenure problems not religious fanaticism. 
Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order. 
Development and Pressure for Change (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 
128. See also Vatikiotis, "The Social Factor," FEER (March 9, 
1989) : 25. 
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experienced prior to and following Tanjung Priok seem isolated 
and short-lived. Increased government-funded religious education 
solved the problem of people turning to charismatic Islamic 
leaders for political leadership. Currently, all licensed imams 
pass through a government Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) 
before being allowed to preach. 226 Islamic leaders mistrusted 
by the government are banned from mosques. Since the Tanjung 
riot, tight restrictions are imposed on the activities of Muslim 
preachers. Not only is criticism of Pancasila considered 
subversive, but advocacy of strict implementation of Shari'a is 
considered a threat to national interests. Leaders of the jemaah 
usroh, 227 a network of Islamic studies groups which urged strict 
implementation of Islamic law, were arrested or imprisoned on 
suspicion of subversive activities. 228 
The government also closely monitors Islamic studies to 
maintain religious tolerance. Muslim students who return from 
Middle Eastern countries tend to advocate a more radicalized view 
of Islamic fundamentalism. 229 As a result, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs has encouraged more academic exchanges (for 
Islamic studies) in western countries rather than the traditional 
226Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 127. 
227Usroh, the Arabic word for family, is associated with 
militant Muslim activities in Indonesia. Many of the arrested 
Usroh activists were active Muhammadijah members. 
228Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 125. 
229Prof. Dr. H. Mohammad Koesnoe, Director of Middle Eastern 
Studies Center, Islamic Studies Institute, Surabaya interview, 
January 28, 1995. 
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centers in the Middle East the past 10 years. Its intentions are 
to allow a mixture of ideas to align the Ummat Islam with 
"moderate" Islamic views. 230 Soeharto' s secular-oriented 
policies draw support from Muslim intellectuals with a western 
education and close ties to the Javanese culture. 231 
Inter-religious relations in Indonesia are usually 
considered excellent. 232 So much so, that former Minister of 
Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali claims that Indonesia provides 
a model to the rest of the Muslim world. 233 The more recent 
Islamic radicalism appears to have been rooted in disaffection 
with the government rather than intolerance. Muslim protest has 
originated from the pulpits of mosques, Islamic meetings or 
rallies and religious study groups. Many failed politicians have 
escaped into the sanctuary of the mosques due to the New Order's 
lack of political pluralism. Similarly, young people interested 
in politics are active in their community mosques. 
There is a constant undercurrent of Muslim activism looking 
for avenues of expression. 234 University Islamic study groups 
230 Islamic studies abroad were primarily conducted in the 
Middle East and with the Arabs. Minister of Religious Affairs 
Taher claimed that today Arabs now have "marginal influence." The 
ministry's present efforts encourage scholars to pursue studies in 
Pakistan, Canada, the U.S. and Europe. Jakarta interview, January 
19, 1995. 
231 Ibid, 127. 
232Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 126. 
233Jakarta interview, January 18, 1995. 
234See Michael Vatikiotis, "Islam's Hidden Warriors," FEER 
(February 23, 1989): 10-11. 
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and mosques have become hotbeds of radical fundamentalism. 235 
In the 1980s, the preaching of Immaddudin, a fiery Muslim 
intellectual with distinct leanings toward Iranian Islamic 
theology, inspired students at Salman Mosque. 236 As a result a 
spirit of militancy cultivated among university students. 
Essentially, intelligent Indonesian youth who feel that their 
talents are being wasted have become more politically involved 
and adopted radical views since 1985. 
Thus far, Soeharto has demonstrated skill in pacifying 
Islamic fundamentalism. His efforts to garner support under the 
banner of Islam have been successful beginning with the 1990 
creation of an Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals' Association, 
known as Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se- Indonesia ( ICMI) . 237 This 
unification of Muslim intellectuals under a single organization 
has historic precedent. ICMI is headed by Minister for Research 
and Technology B.J. Habibie, a personal friend and advisor of 
Soeharto. 238 Although ICMI claims no political agenda, 
235See Awanohara, "A First Warning Shot," and "The New Call to 
Prayer," FEER (January 24, 1985): 26-30. 
236 Salman Mosque is attached to the prestigious Bandung 
Institute of Technology. 
237For many Muslims, the president's act was merely the latest 
in a series of overtures the government has made over the past few 
years to the umma. To others, the creation of ICMI seemed to 
represent a dangerous departure from secularism. Robert W. Hefner, 
"Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the 
Indonesian Middle Class," in Audrey Kahia, ed., Indonesia, no. 56 
(October 1993) : 1. 
238Habibie' s close personal relationship with Soeharto began as 
a boy while he lived near the Makassar military headquarters in the 
beginning of the 1950s. Crouch, Army And Politics, 123. See also 
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Habibie's influence and the launching of a Muslim newspaper and 
think tank make this hard to believe. 239 Several prominent 
leaders and intellectuals in Muhammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama do 
not support ICMI due to the implied political manifestations and 
controversy surrounding political Islam. 
Soeharto seems to be playing the Muslim card to counter 
stirrings of an increasingly disillusioned military. 240 The 
ABRI represents the largest political organization and root of 
national stability. It is intensely devoted to the dwi fungsi 
doctrine. 241 Additionally, it has played an integral historic 
role, holding the key to political stability since the 1965 
Communist coup attempt. Military influence also extends into 
Indonesia's economy. Many state enterprises are run by military-
dominated boards. Soeharto also allows the manipulation of 
export credits and awards numerous state contracts to ABRI. 242 
Political issues in 1993 revolved around Soehart0 1 S 
relationship with the ABRI and presidential succession. While 
Soeharto seemed to be promoting a process of civilianization 1 it 
Colonel Colin East 1 "Who Is Dr. Habibie?" Asia-Pacific Defence 
Reporter (October-November 1994): 7-9. 
239 ICMI 1 s Center for Information and Development counters the 
Christian-led think tank known as the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
240See Vatikiotis 1 Politics Under Suharto 1 132. 
241The ABRI is the only military in Southeast Asia with a legal 
and ideological basis (dwi fungsi) for its role in civilian 
affairs. 
242Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto 1 71. 
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appeared that military officers began positioning themselves to 
play a dominant role in the post-Soeharto era. In March 1993, 
Soeharto was reelected unanimously for a sixth presidential term. 
Concern regarding a successor arose among the elite political 
circles. ABRI leaders were particularly worried about the a 
succession crisis if Soeharto suddenly fell ill or died without a 
broadly acceptable candidate in place as vice president. 243 
Although most military officers respect Soeharto for maintaining 
political stability since 1965, the prospect of the presidency 
passing to someone not closely identified with the ABRI concerned 
them. 244 
C. LOOKING AHEAD 
Indonesia has not experienced presidential succession in a 
normal political climate. It also lacks established and viable 
socio-political institutions, other than the military, to ensure 
that the nation's fate is not dependent upon a single individual. 
According to Javanese tradition, the president becomes the 
absolute ruler, succeeded by a self-appointed individual. He is 
viewed as God's vicegerent to conduct both worldly and celestial 
affairs of the people. 245 Soeharto's successor is expected to 
possess the personal qualities of being a military man, a Muslim, 
243 In 1988, the military planned to summon a special session of 
the MPR to elect its own candidate as Soeharto' s successor if 
crisis occurred. The military leadership disliked acting Vice 
President Sudharmono. Ibid, 123. 
244 See Crouch, Army and Politics, 122-3. 
245Syamsuddin, The Republican Revolt, 17-8. 
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and a Javanese. Many Indonesians feel that these are the 
prerequisites a leader must possess to successfully lead their 
diverse nation. 246 
Indonesia's political history under Soeharto's tight rein 
raises doubt over the smooth transfer of power. The new 
government must be able to cope with complex economic and 
developmental problems along with the basic need to secure human 
rights for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Muslims will likely 
question governmental legitimacy once a successor is named. The 
current political climate harbors resentment toward the 
government in light of the lack of plurality and ABRI tendency to 
overreact to public expressions of dissension. Islamic 
fundamentalism has succeeded in providing Indonesians a sense of 
purpose and spiritual belonging. It acts as a powerful creed on 
university campuses, especially at the Bandung Institute of 
Technology and the Bogor Agricultural Institute in West Java. 247 
Campus mosques at both institutions are well-known centers of 
Islamic study where a new breed of religiously devout leaders are 
emerging. While not yet in direct opposition (with the 
government) 1 their political attitudes are antagonistic toward a 
government viewed as hostile to Islamic fundamentalism. 248 
Islam in Indonesia primarily affects domestic policy by 
acting as an integrative force. In the cases of the Wahhabi 
246 Ibid 1 18. 
247Liddle, Politics and Culture 1 13. 
248 Ibid 1 13. 
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movement and Khomeini's revolution, Islam instilled a sense of 
mission among the fundamentalists. 249 Islamic fundamentalism in 
Indonesia emerges in several forms. It is usually characterized 
by political passivity except when led by radical elements or an 
external hostile source. As a whole, the fundamentalism found 
within represents a heightening of Islamic consciousness among 
the masses, emphasizing identity and ideology. It represents the 
desire to return to the religious principles on which Islam was 
founded. 
The potency of Islamic fundamentalism within a country 
reflects the depth of the government's ineffectiveness to reform. 
A causal relationship exists between social crisis and Islamic 
fundamentalism. 250 Lack of socioeconomic justice, official 
corruption, and governmental repression against activists are 
crisis conditions that contribute to the fundamentalist cause. 
Political stability becomes an issue only when extremists or 
radical fundamentalists emerge from within the group of devout 
Muslims. Thus far, Indonesia's government has functioned well 
under Soeharto. The teachings of the Qur'an are influenced by 
local custom, historical circumstance, and the passive nature of 
Islamic leadership. Indonesian Muslim intellectuals favor 
democracy and abide by the principles of Pancasila. Radical 
fundamentalism acts on the fringes of politics. Fundamentalism 
249Adeed Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Syndicate Press, 1983), p. 4. 
250 Ibid, 8. 
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found in middle class populated, urban areas reflect a moderate 
approach toward Islamic politics and society. In contrast, rural 
areas housing the uneducated and poor foster favorable conditions 
for extremist tendencies. 
The evolution of Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism depends 
on the quality of its political and intellectual leadership and 
governmental legitimacy. Fundamentalism acts as a venue of 
protest against socioeconomic inequalities and political 
injustices. Given the long term propensity of crisis conditions 
ranging from unchecked population growth to maldistributed 
economic wealth, the trend of rising fundamentalism, particularly 
the resurgence of political Islam, will continue in Indonesia. 
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V. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS 
"Islam is not one hundred percent democracy, 
neither is it one hundred percent autocracy. 
Islam is ... Islam." 
-Mohammad Natsir251 
U.S. national security interests all over the world 
significantly changed after the threat of Communist expansion 
disintegrated with the collapse of the Soviet Union around 1990. 
Although a single over-arching threat to international security 
no longer exists, countless dangers remain: ethnic cleansing, 
religious extremism, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and other military technologies, and drug trafficking. 
Facing an increasingly diverse and unpredictable threat 
environment, America aspires to aid developing nations and newly 
established democracies through its political and military 
leadership. In turn, the successful promotion of democracy and 
political stability abroad are mutually supportive of advancing 
U.S. economic prosperity. This chapter focuses on Islamic 
fundamentalism as it affects U.S. interests in Indonesia. 
The National Strategy as published by the White House 
specifies U.S. major global interests as security (peace and 
stability), prosperity (equal opportunity for American commerce 
in free and open markets), and promotion of democracy and human 
rights (as judged in the eyes of America) . This chapter gives an 
overview of U.S.-Indonesian relations as a framework within which 
251Quoted in John Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 285. 
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to analyze the American interest in the rising tide of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Indonesia from these three standpoints: as a 
challenge to mutual security, a threat to mutual prosperity, and 
an obstacle to the spread of democracy and human rights in 
Southeast Asia. As a result, this study provides the groundwork 
for conclusions and recommendations for U.S. policymaking. 
A. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS 
Indonesia gained its independence as a result of World War 
II, leaving a relatively short record of relations between the 
United States and the newly emerged nation. U.S. relations with 
Indonesia were neutral following World War II when Allied control 
over Indonesia was transferred to the British. During this time, 
the Dutch engaged in a four year struggle from 1945 to 1949 to 
reestablish colonial rule over Indonesia. Although the U.S. 
wished to appear neutral in the conflict, its provision of arms 
and funding to the Dutch was common knowledge among the 
Indonesians. Ultimately, the U.S. backed Indonesia's bid for 
independence and sovereignty, pressuring the Dutch to cease 
hostilities in 1949. 
At the outset in 1949, Indonesia manifested foreign policy 
unmarked by Islamic influences. 252 Accordingly, the religious 
element of Islam had no effect on U.S. relations throughout 
252While Indonesia did not recognize the state of Israel, it 
extended support to the Palestinians on the principle of the right 
to national self -determination. Michael Leifer, "The Islamic 
Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional 
Ambiguity," Dawisha Adeed, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Syndicate Press, 1983), p. 151. 
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Indonesia's Guided Democracy. Rather, the pursuance of an 
independent and active foreign policy during the Cold War 
troubled the previously friendly relations between the U.S. and 
Indonesia. Indonesia did not want to side with Western countries 
nor be hostile to the few remaining Communist countries. 253 The 
1955 Sukarno-led Asian-African Conference in Bandung, in. 
particular, displeased the U.S. government because it initiated 
the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
U.S.- Indonesian relations 'continued on a downward spiral 
when Indonesia launched a campaign to regain West Irian from the 
Dutch. In 1958, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
supported a rebellious movement known as the Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) to counter 
Sukarno's expansionist policies from within. Although a 
compromise was reached with the Dutch by 1962 under U.S. 
auspices, Indonesia somewhat resented U.S. involvement in what it 
perceived as an internal issue. Additionally, the West Irian 
issue planted the seed of paranoia over CIA involvement in 
Indonesia's internal affairs. 
In 1963, Indonesia opposed the British plan to transfer 
control of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo to Malaya 
which, together with Singapore, would form the new state of 
Malaysia. Indonesia withdrew from the UN to protest Malaysia's 
seat on the Security Council. Sukarno's blatant ideological 
2530. Sutomo Roesnadi, 11 Indonesia's Foreign Policy, 11 Yong Mun 
Cheong, ed., Trends In Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1972), p. 65. 
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leanings toward socialism and a pro-China stance increased 
tension with the United States. In 1964, Sukarno identified a 
leftist third force in the international community called the New 
Emerging Forces (NEFOS) that aligned Indonesia with China, North 
Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia. 254 He also launched a 
military campaign targeting Malaysia. "Confrontation" with 
Malaysia tested the last of any U.S. patience toward Sukarno. 
Backing Malaysia, the U.S. ceased all military aid while the 
Soviets and Chinese provided arms to Indonesia. 
The 1965 coup attempt against Sukarno represented a landmark 
event in Indonesia's political history and bilateral relations 
with the United States. Indonesia experienced a sudden surge of 
anti-Communist sentiment and growing hostility toward China 
leading to the convergence of interests with the United States. 
The defeat of Communism, known as the Gestapu affair among 
Indonesians, served U.S. strategic interests and created what 
appeared to be the beginning of a pro-Western posture in foreign 
relations. As a result, Indonesia's warming of relations toward 
the U.S. after 1965 enhanced military ties between the two 
countries. 255 Indonesia began to send officers for training and 
specialization to the U.S. under the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program and also obtained hardware 
254 Josef Silverstein, "The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma 
and Indonesia," Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 3 (March 1982): 284. 
255Heavy military representation in senior diplomatic posts and 
within the higher echelons of the Foreign Ministry reflect that 
Indonesian foreign policy is ultimately sanctioned by the ABRI. 
Leifer, "Islamic Factor," 150. 
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through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures. 
However, relations between the two countries could not 
become intimate as long as the United States was mired in Vietnam 
and preoccupied with the Cold War. Indonesia was thoroughly 
engrossed in its own modernization program and concerned with its 
problems with Australia and Cambodia. It was only after the 
events of Tiananmen that the two nations launched a positive 
program for better understanding. 
B. MUTUAL SECURITY 
Internationally, Indonesia's stature was enhanced following 
Soeharto's 1992 election as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) 
chairman, signifying its reemergence as a leader of developing 
countries. 256 The chairmanship has enabled Indonesia to take 
initiatives which would normally be difficult to pursue. Of 
interest to the United States, Indonesia's sensitivities to its 
predominately Muslim population made it difficult to extend 
diplomatic relations to Israel. However, Soeharto recently met 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin under his capacity as NAM 
chairman. 257 The government considers it a great honor to lead 
NAM, the second largest international organization after the UN, 
256NAM was established in September 1961 as a response of a 
large number of developing countries to escape the bi-polar 
structure of the Cold War. The founding fathers were Tito of 
Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Nkurumah of Nigeria, 
and Sukarno of Indonesia. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's Foreign 
Policy After the Cold War," Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), p. 155. 






and takes such responsibility seriously. 258 As such Indonesian 
foreign policy goals include: fostering friendly relations with 
all nations regardless of ideology to promote international 
peace; avoiding conflict with neighboring countries; achieving 
national economic development and political stability absent of 
internal or external disturbances; and strengthening ASEAN to 
ensure future regional stability. 
The only period in which Islam served as a positive element 
in Indonesia's foreign policy occurred during the struggle for 
independence. 259 Indonesia hoped to secure recognition and 
international endorsement for its republic by soliciting support 
from the Arab League nations. In 1947, it successfully concluded 
treaties of friendship with Egypt and Syria while securing 
recognition from Iraq and Lebanon. 260 Since then the government 
has restricted involvement in Islamic issues, but international 
issues could not altogether be excluded. When the Camp David 
agreement was reached in September 1978, Indonesia sought to 
sustain a neutral position in response to appeals from Egypt and 
Jordan. Regarding Iran, it refrained from making official 
statements when the shah was ousted or upon the release of 
American hostages. 261 When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 
1980 1 Indonesia chose to stress its support for a fellow non-
258Anwar 1 11 Foreign Policy After The Cold War 1 11 156. 
259 Ibid 1 150. 
260 Ibid 1 150. 
261 Ibid 1 155. 
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aligned state rather than an Islamic country. Today, the 
government continues refusing PLO requests to open an office in 
Jakarta in contrast to Malaysia which accords it full diplomatic 
status. 262 
Although limited in nature, both militaries have a good 
record of cooperation. As such, the status of ABRI interests the 
United States given Indonesia's valuable geographic location 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and China's near vicinity. 
Indonesia is modestly armed for a nation of its size. By 1993, 
it was the twenty-third largest military establishment and ranked 
120th in military personnel per 1,000 people. 263 However, a low 
level of combat readiness is maintained. Only a few naval ships, 
light tanks and APCs remain operational. The Air Force operates 
with minimal offensive capability, devoting most of its assets to 
counter-insurgency operations. As a general rule, Indonesian 
arms purchases have been tailored for specific military 
requirements, avoiding over-reliance on any single supplier. In 
the 1980s, Indonesia bought small quantities of new equipment 
including 12 U.S. F-16 fighters, separate orders for three and 
four Dutch frigates, two West German submarines, British jet 
trainers and air-defence systems, and anti-ship missiles from the 
U. s . and France. 264 
262 Ibid, 156. 
263Aaron Karp, "The Pattern of Military Modernization in 
Southeast Asia," K.S. Sandu and Sharon Siddique, eds., The ASEAN 
Reader (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), p. 405. 
264 Ibid, 405. 
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While Indonesia's military poses little offensive threat, 
recent acquisitions generate U.S. interest regarding the 
direction of its development and ABRI security capabilities. The 
Navy ordered a new Type-209 submarine from Germany and expanded 
its surface fleet when the first shipment of acquisitions from 
the former East German Navy arrived in late 1992. 265 The 3 9 
second-hand ships consisted of 16 Corvettes, 14 tank-landing 
ships (LSTs), and nine minesweepers; none of which are regarded 
as naval threats by regional neighbors or the United States due 
to their coastal missions. 266 Indonesia also recently signed a 
deal with British Aerospace for the purchase of 24 Hawk fighters 
to be used in a counter- insurgency role. 267 
Militarily, within ASEAN Indonesia works closest with 
Malaysia. Defense cooperation between the two countries boils 
down to the basic conviction of wanting a reliable partner on the 
other side of its frontier. Contact between political and 
defense establishments is frequent along with presidential and 
ministerial dialogue. In addition to conducting regular joint 
military operations, both countries have considered implementing 
joint arms procurements and production proposals. 268 In 1985, 
Indonesia and Malaysia began developing a joint telecommunica-
265Harold Crouch, "An Uncertain Outlook, 11 Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1994, 141. 
266 See Asiaweek. "An Instant Armada," (June 2, 1993) 34-5. 
267Crouch, "An Uncertain Outlook," 141. 
268 James Clad, "Strength and Security in Family Cooperation, 11 
FEER (April 18, 1985): 25. 
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tions venture involving the use of Indonesia 1 S Palapa B2 
satellite. 269 Palapa A2 handled ASEAN traffic, served ABRI 
(intelligence) needs, and was eventually taken over by Palapa 
B2. 270 Reading between the linesr a joint satellite indicates 
the likelihood of shared satellite intelligence. Further, both 
countries share an instinctive fear of long-term and long-range 
Chinese ambitions, a sure sign that intelligence collection 
targeting China is exchanged between the two countries. Finally/ 
Indonesia and Malaysia swap information/ regarding drug smuggling 
and piracy/ twice a year at meetings of the General Border 
Commit tee. 271 
Both the U.S. and Indonesia are geographically situated in 
the Pacific region. Indonesia 1 s threat perceptions and concerns 
largely affect U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia. The 
past 25 yearsr Indonesia has contributed greatly to regional 
economic development and political order - vital U.S. security 
interests. Soeharto helped establish the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. 272 His commitment to 
regional cooperation persuaded both neighboring countries and the 
269Clad, "Ringing in the Changes 1 " FEER (July 25, 1985) : 47. 
270Susumu Awanohara, "A Blind Eye in the Sky," FEER (February 
23 1 1984): 65-6. 
271 Ibid, 66. 
272 In the interests of regional security, ASEAN was created by 
a single joint declaration in Bangkok signed by the foreign 
ministers of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. Despite initial speculation, a Europe-type security 
role has not been sought and political cooperation does not extend 
to include defense cooperation. 
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international community that Indonesia planned to contain its 
considerable potential as a military power. 273 By the close of 
the 1980s, Indonesia began to play an active regional role. It 
acted as mediator for regional policies regarding Vietnam and 
hosted numerous rounds of negotiations involving Cambodia's 
warring factions. In August 1993, it hosted an informal 
conference on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. 274 
1. Military Doctrine And Intelligence 
While Islam has yet to exercise perceptible influence on 
Indonesia's international outlook or dictate rhetoric in national 
security affairs, 275 considerations of its religious elements 
must enter U.S. calculations for a comprehensive security 
strategy. The ABRI began viewing Islam as a potential threat to 
Indonesia's stability and internal security in light of its 
capacity for mass mobilization and violence demonstrated by 
Muslim participation in the purges against the PKI. In the wake 
of Gestapu, Islam began affecting domestic policy as inspired by 
the protagonists of universal Islamic fundamentalism. Soeharto 
faced greater requirements to contain and take account of 
domestic Muslim opinion and developed ABRI's role in national 
273With only 450, 000 in the ABRI and police combined, Indonesia 
will not become a military power anytime soon. Asiaweek, "From Big 
to Great," (October 6, 1993): 30. 
274The informal conference was the fourth in a series with 
participants from ASEAN and the six claimant countries of the 
Spratly's: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Brunei. 
275Leife_r, "Islamic Factor," 148. 
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security accordingly. 
The military acts as the primary arbiter of political power 
and Soeharto's arm for restoring order in Indonesia. As 
president, Soeharto is the Commander-In-Chief of the ABRI. 
Administratively, the Minister of Defense and Security falls 
second in command; however, the operational chain-of-command 
grants the ABRI Commander ultimate authority over military and 
intelligence operations. Comprised of the three military 
services and national police force, 276 the ABRI developed three 
doctrines which remain in use today. 
The doctrine of "national resilience" integrates the 
ideological, political, economic, social, and military forces of 
Indonesia. In upholding the principles of national resilience, 
the military aids societal development and manages socio-
political problems, remaining especially watchful of Islamic 
activities. Military officers believe the ABRI functions as a 
"mediator" of the "frictions" that exist between the government 
and the people. 277 A second doctrine reiterates national 
resilience and, as discussed in Chapter III, is called "dwi 
fungsi," or dual function. This doctrine legitimizes ABRI 
276 Indonesian citizens neither fear nor respect the police 
because they are known to be corrupt and influenced by bribery. 
Military officers, particularly those in the Army, command respect 
and easily exercise authority over Indonesian people. In the event 
of social disturbances such as rioting or ethnic violence, the Army 
quickly disperses personnel to the scene to restore law and order. 
277This perception was shared with me during an interview with 
RADM R. M. Sunardi, Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs, 
Ministry of Defense and Security, Jakarta, January 19, 1995. 
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involvement in both civil and military operations. Developed 
during the war for independence, the third doctrine requires ABRI 
to operate using a territorial structure parallel to the civilian 
administration. 
Intelligence developed in accordance with military doctrinal 
goals and threat perceptions under both ABRI and Ministry of 
Defense and Security jurisdiction. Security surveillance 
overlapped between three organizations predominately manned by 
ABRI personnel. 278 The Operational Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) conducted operations and 
collected intelligence data, focusing on internal matters. The 
central domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering body was the 
Badan Koordinas Strategis Nasional (BAKIN) while the Special 
Operations Service (OPSUS) 279 compiled political intelligence. 
On October 10, 1965, then General Soeharto created KOPKAMTIB 
as a special agency to purge Communist influence from the 
country. KOPKAMTIB functioned in a similar capacity to the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) but enjoyed extra 
constitutional powers. 280 By 1969, KOPKAMTIB's mandate covered 
all internal security matters and national political life. It 
278 KOPKAMTIB personnel primarily consisted of active duty 
military officers and selected police. Below the central (Jakarta) 
headquarters level, Army commanders implemented KOPKAMTIB policies. 
2790PSUS represented a network of operatives that gathered 
domestic political intelligence and conducted political liaison in 
service of the president. 
280Essentially, the acceptable parameters of ABRI intervention 
in society were undefined when KOPKAMTIB existed. Michael 
Vatikiotis, "Mission Completed," FEER (September 22, 1988): 18. 
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exercised unrestricted powers of interrogation, arrest and 
detention. 281 KOPKAMTIB missions further evolved into two main 
tasks: to defend against subversives and safeguard governmental 
interests. 282 It collected intelligence on and directed 
security operations against separatist groups, Muslim activists, 
Communists and any groups that could be influenced by 
subversives. The agency's domain also covered all political 
prisoners and detainees in Indonesia. 
Three major organizations exist today: Badan Koordinasi 
Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (BAKORSTANAS) , BAKIN, and 
the Badan Inteligen ABRI (BIA) . KOPKAMTIB disbanded shortly 
after the February 1988 resignation of ABRI Commander General 
Benny Murdani. BAKORSTANAS replaced KOPKAMTIB in August, 
functioning as a coordinating body for national security. 
BAKORSTANAS advises the president on political stability and 
stimulates government institutions to function properly, leaving 
arrests and prosecutions to the police. 283 
BAKIN can best be described as similar to the CIA. It 
replaced Sukarno's dissolved Central Intelligence Board in 1967 
281KOPKAMTIB involved itself in nearly every aspect of 
Indonesian life from screening political candidates to surveillance 
of demonstrations. 
282Anyone opposed to the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila or the 
government's views were considered subversives. Melinda W. Cooke, 
Indonesia: A Country Study, 263. 
283 C. Van Djik, Political Development. Stability and Democracy: 
Indonesia During the Last Decade (Great Britain: Hull 
University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 23-4. 
107 
as a quasi-civilian agency with a communications network outside 
of the defense ministry and ABRI. Although nominally superior 
than the other two intelligence organizations, BAKIN itself is 
under ABRI control. BAKIN acts as the principal national body 
for centralizing and coordinating domestic and foreign 
intelligence gathered by other agencies. It concentrates on 
internal security and depends on friendly links with intelligence 
agencies abroad for the majority of its outside knowledge. 284 
More specifically, Indonesia depends heavily on ASEAN partners, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the U.S. for foreign 
intelligence. 285 
BIA, formerly called the Badan Inteligen Strategis (BAIS), 
evolved from Army intelligence. BAIS was created by Murdani 
early in his tenure as ABRI Commander with the intention of 
remaining outside of BAKIN' s domain. 286 BAIS primarily 
implemented departmental intelligence functions for the military, 
conducting activities and collecting information relating to 
external defense and internal security. Today BIA acts in 
284 BAKIN has relatively few resources to conduct direct 
intelligence gathering. For internal issues, it relies on 
BAKORSTANAS and other government departments with intelligence 
collection capabilities such as the police, immigration, customs, 
Foreign Ministry and the Attorney General's Office. See Tai Ming 
Cheung, "Elusive Threat," FEER (April 22, 1993): 26. 
285 Indonesia maintains close intelligence-exchange 
Ibid, 26. relationships with Singapore and Malaysia. 
286Murdani' s differences with the 
lack of cooperation between agencies. 
for Indonesian Intelligence, " Jane's 
1989): 1209. 
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Head of BAKIN resulted in 
Robert Karniol, "Shake-up 
Defence Weekly (June 17, 
similar capacity to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency but 
devotes its assets primarily to domestic matters. Structurally, 
BIA and BAKORSTANAS fall under the defense ministry while BAKIN 
by-passes the ministry with a direct link to the president. ABRI 
Chief of General Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, two largely administrative positions, head BIA and 
BAKORSTANAS, respectively. In practice, each agency answers to 
the ABRI Commander to ensure intelligence operates efficiently in 
response to the requirements of the military commanders. 287 
2. Threats To Stability 
The majority of Indonesia's military missions·focus on 
internal unrest rather than external aggressors. National 
resilience and dwi fungsi adhere to ideologies that strongly 
emphasize nationalism and unity to ensure social and political 
stability. Perceived internal threats come from two main 
sources, identified as the extreme "left," the Communists, or 
"right," radical Islamic fundamentalists. The ABRI believe that 
foreign or external threats consist of activities perpetrated 
from the outside, such as infiltration or subversion, which can 
lead to war or revolution within. International terrorism and 
foreign-funded insurgencies fall in this category. 
The Army's resources for internal security have been 
strained due to ongoing insurgencies. Three small insurgent 
287When Murdani served as ABRI Commander, he acted in a dual-
hatted intelligence capacity as the Head of KOPKAMTIB and BAIS and 
retained his hold even after becoming Defense Minister in February 
1988. In late 1988, Soeharto forced Murdani to hand over control 
of both intelligence organizations to ABRI Commander Sutrisno. 
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groups exist: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN), Aceh Merdeka, and Free Papua Organization. They 
operate in East Timor, northern Sumatra, and Irian Jaya, 
respectively. The ABRI expends considerable personnel and 
material resources in containing these movements with no apparent 
end in sight. Despite this, the intelligence community continues 
to be well-funded with the bulk of its resources allocated to the 
B IA and BAKORSTANAS. 288 
Soeharto implements extensive use of intelligence to address 
potential security problems and political stability. Domestic 
issues that contribute to instability range from vfolent criminal 
acts to what the Indonesians call 11 SARA 11 problems. SARA is an 
acronym for the Indonesian words: suku (ethnicity), agama 
(religion), ras (race) and antar-golongan (inter-group 
rivalries) . 289 SARA problems could escalate into severe 
internal security threats, resulting in armed rebellions similar 
to what Indonesia experienced in the past. 
In the 1950s, the most serious threat to internal security 
was radical Darul Islam. The Army's Siliwangi Division 
eradicated this threat by engaging 40 percent of its troops in 
288 Cheung, 11 Elusive Threat, 11 26. 
289Dorodj a tun Kuntij oro-Jakti and T .A.M. Simatupang, 
11 Indonesia: Defense Expenditures in the Period of the New Order, 
1967-85, 11 in Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), p. 112. 
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intelligence operations. 290 Army personnel earned the people's 
allegiance then engaged them in anti-terrorist activities. 
Siliwangi Division appointed officers from each territorial zone 
to liaise with villagers and police, ultimately initiating 
psychological warfare against Darul Islam. Army operatives cut 
off Darul Islam's popular support with a campaign that convinced 
local Muslims it was a God-opposing movement. 291 
With so many overlapping functions between its agencies, 
Indonesia boasts a highly effective internal intelligence 
network. BAKORSTANAS' first test occurred in Lampung province of 
Sumatra. Lampung province, like much of Sumatra, fs a devout 
Muslim area. However, since Darul Islam was eradicated in 1962, 
Sumatra has been free of radical Islamic activity. On February 
7, 1989, the Army launched an assault against the Muslim 
extremist group Kommando Mujaheddin Fisabilillah in response to 
the murder of an Army intelligence officer. 292 Occurring soon 
after BAKORSTANAS' formation in late 1988, the Lampung incident 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the ABRI and its intelligence 
290Ulf Sundhaussen, Social Policy Aspects in Defence and 
Security Planning in Indonesia, 1947-1977 (Queensland: James Cook 
University of Queensland, 1980), p. 24. 
291 Ibid, 26. 
292The extremists operated out of the village of Talangsari 
where they built several houses and a small mosque. Lampung 
territorial intelligence (staff) marked the group for surveillance. 
The Army officer was murdered while conducting an investigation of 
the Mujaheddin's activities. See Vatikiotis, 11 The Social Factor 11 
FEER (March 9, 1989): 25. 
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mechanisms to respond to insurgent activity. 293 
Regarding national defense, ABRI policy objectives are two-
fold: to safeguard the unity and development of the nation, and 
maintain a security posture capable of surmounting all 
threats. 294 After Dutch withdrawal in 1949, the military 
assessed that Indonesia could not possibly defend its territory 
by conventional means against future foreign aggressors. Aware 
of its minimal defense capabilities against external threats, the 
ABRI adopted a strategy based on its revolutionary experience. 
This strategy allows invaders to land while the military retreats 
to mobilize popular support. 295 The ABRI would then initiate 
guerilla warfare against the foreign aggressor until the enemy 
withdrew due to the costly price of occupation. 
First and foremost, ABRI perceives China as an external 
threat to stability. Overseas Chinese make up a large minority 
population in Indonesia, which the government believes is 
susceptible to the influence of the Chinese government. 296 As a 
293 BAKORSTANAS not only proved its worth in dealing with local 
unrest but also emphasized the importance of maintaining continuous 
contact with the local population. See Vatikiotis, "Islam's Hidden 
Warriors," FEER (February 23, 1989): 10-11. 
294 Purnomo, R.H. MGen. Defence and Security Capabilities of 
the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 
Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1975), pp. 2-3. 
295 To make full use of this strategy, the ABRI organized itself 
along territorial rather than functional lines. As previously 
mentioned in this chapter, Indonesia's civilian, military and 
intelligence administrations still align themselves according to a 
territorial structure. 
296A large number of the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia 
still claim Chinese citizenship. 
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result, the ABRI directs its external defense efforts against 
China, focusing on influence extended to Indonesians as well as 
upon potential client states in the region. 297 BAKIN even 
created a special directorate called the Chinese Problems 
Coordinating Agency, using operatives trained in Taiwan298 to 
watch Chinese citizens who are regarded as "potential fifth 
columnists. "299 
The military's attitude toward the Chinese generally 
improved the past ten years. Currently, Indonesia believes that 
China is a threat to be dealt with in the future, explaining the 
military's emphasis on and resource allocation toward internal 
security. 300 The assimilation of ethnic Chinese into mainstream 
Indonesian society is now regarded a domestic problem separate 
from problems surrounding Jakarta-Beijing relations and the 
overseas Chinese problem. Regardless, BAKIN remains wary of 
Beijing-inspired dissidence. For example, BAKIN requires its 
stamp of approval before Indonesians are permitted to travel to 
China. Along the same lines, the Indonesian government and 
military monitor travel to the Middle East with the aid of 
297 In light of China's occupational claims to several of the 
disputed Spratly Islands and its past support for the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia, the ABRI has just cause for suspecting Chinese 
interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. 
298The only evidence found that could correlate to ongoing 
HUMINT operations abroad. 
299Vatikiotis, "Another Step Closer," FEER (November 30, 1989): 
36. 
300The ABRI are best equipped to fight domestic rather than 
foreign enemies. 
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Malaysian intelligence. 301 
Soeharto acts cautiously when dealing with the Middle 
East. 302 Following the Iranian revolution, rising Islamic 
awareness preoccupied the Soeharto government and ABRI. As a 
result, Indonesian intelligence also devotes assets to the threat 
of radicalism provoked by the Middle East. The extent to which 
Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Libya, actively 
encourage Muslim extremism in Indonesia is unknown. However, the 
mechanisms exist for outside funding to Muslim radicals who seek 
it. 303 The Islamic holy city, Mecca, resides in Saudi Arabia 
where thousands of Indonesians travel for the hajj: Individuals 
who return from travel to the Middle East, particularly after 
academic exchanges, often adapt a more radical view of Islam. 
As a result Soeharto created a special directorate within the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs to handle administrative details of 
the Islamic pilgrimage while the defense ministry and ABRI units 
monitor the behavior of individuals upon return. 304 
301When questioned about the possibility of Middle Eastern 
support for Muslim extremists, Sunardi stated that Kommando Jihad 
extremists were known to have received training in Libya, traveling 
there via Malaysia. This comment suggests that Indonesian 
intelligence maintains a working relationship with their Malaysian 
counterpart. Jakarta, January 19, 1995. 
302See Awanohara, "Staying at Arms Length," FEER (August 9, 
1984): 24. 
303 Indonesian intelligence assesses that the Kommando Jihad 
extremist group have received weapons and training from Libya. 
Sunardi interview. 
304These assessments were made from interviews with RADM 
Sunardi and Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs. 
Jakarta interviews, January 19, 1995. 
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Additionally, four departments are authorized to control and 
monitor citizen travel abroad: the Justice and Finance 
Ministries, Attorney General's Office (regarding sentences and 
trials) , and the BIA. 305 
3. Middle Eastern Ties 
Foreign policy toward the Middle East developed from the 
efforts of Indonesian exchange students living in Egypt, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia. They formed committees to lobby for independence, 
urging the Foreign Ministers Council of the Arab League to 
recognize the Republic of Indonesia. When the sovereignty issue 
was taken up at the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the 
Arab nations strongly supported Indonesia's independence. 306 In 
turn, Indonesia took sides with the Arab nations in the Arab-
Israeli dispute, supporting the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs 
to regain national rights. Ties with the Middle East were 
further enhanced when Indonesia supported Egypt's nationalization 
of the Suez Canal in the UN. Conversely, the Middle Eastern 
countries strengthened their solidarity to Indonesia by favoring 
the liberation of West Irian. 307 
Soeharto maintained good relations with Middle Eastern 
countries, gaining economic investments and political alliances. 
305See Suhaini Aznam, "Passport Control," FEER (March 26, 
1992) : 19-20. 
306Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Indonesia's 
Middle East And Africa," vol. 13, 
(1985): 476. 
307 Ibid, 4 77. 
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In 1975, Iran extended a loan of $200 million for the 
construction of a urea fertilizer plant in West Java. Indonesia 
obtained Saudi money for development projects and the expansion 
of a fertilizer plant in Palembang. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi also 
extended aid in the form of small loans. In 1977, Soeharto 
visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates to obtain support on the East Timor 
issue. 308 
In matters of substantive political interest, the government 
exercises pragmatic caution. It implements cautious engagement 
in Arab-Islamic issues to secure international support over 
matters vital to Indonesian interests. 309 The Iranian 
revolution drew a silent reaction since a formal statement from 
the government may have disrupted political stability amidst the 
Islamic resurgence (movement) in Indonesia. Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East has fostered radical splinters 
which seek to exclude Western influence while Indonesia remains 
firmly committed to religious tolerance within and also 
throughout the ASEAN region. 
International Islamic issues closer to home than the Middle 
East engage concern. Islamic fundamentalism varies widely within 
the region. An uneven distribution of the Muslim population 
constitutes a majority in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, but 
308 Ibid, 484. 
309Fora used by Indonesia to strive for its national interests 
are the Islamic Conference Organization, OPEC, and UNCTAD. 
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only five percent of the population in Thailand, 10 percent in 
the Philippines and 17 percent in Singapore. 310 Regardless, 
each country has experienced a noticeable resurgence in Islamic 
activity either as an agent of governmental legitimacy or popular 
rebellion. 311 Muslim-based insurgencies exist in Thailand and 
the Philippines. Indonesia does not want to appear supportive of 
the separatist movements yet it faces domestic pressure to remedy 
the grievances of fellow Muslims, especially in the case of the 
Philippines whose proximity is closest. The Philippines 
presently faces rebellion on the part of Muslims including 
radical fundamentalists in the south. Separatism among the 
Muslim population of southern Thailand has reduced significantly 
as a result of Thai and Malaysian joint military initiatives. In 
turn, Islam based-insurgencies in Indonesia (Aceh) and the 
Philippines (Mindanao) have become far more active. 312 
310Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 24. 
311 In Brunei, the ruling monarchy projected a new basis of 
legitimacy in 1992 with its adoption of the concept of "Malay, 
Muslim, Monarchy." In contrast, rising Islamic fundamentalism in 
Malaysia has been projected in a more radical vision by several 
groups. Ibid, 24. 
312CSIS, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
cs Is I 19 9 3) I p. 19 . 
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C. MUTUAL PROSPERITY 
Economic growth, rising standards of living and 
technological development in Indonesia are powerful influences 
favoring eventual democratic change. In turn, progress spurred 
by trade and investment liberalization is important to the 
stability of the Southeast Asia region as a whole. Increasing 
U.S. attention placed on Asia-Pacific security affairs is due to 
economic investments and trade interests. The 17 member Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum builds on and 
contributes significantly to the economic transformation of 
Southeast Asia. Indonesia figures prominently in APEC dialogues, 
dictating the need for closer economic cooperation on the 
America's part. 
Beginning in 1966, Soeharto's government initiated pragmatic 
economic policies, attracting substantial foreign investment. 
Indonesia was made as open to international influence as other 
developing countries and has reacted by increasing worldwide 
interactions, particularly with countries in the Pacific 
region. 313 As a result, the U.S. and Japan took the leadership 
in a consortium called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
(IGGI) which coordinated international aid and loans. Trade 
expanded with Asia, Japan the U.S., Singapore and Western-
313Sukanto Resohadiprodij o and Sun M. Kahng, "Indonesia and 
United States Economic Relations," The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 
13 , no. 4 ( 19 8 5) : 4 8 7. 
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Europe. 314 The commodities exported to the U.S. consist of non-
oil and gas products such as rubber, palm oil, plywood and 
textiles. Numerous other international trade and direct 
investment opportunities in Indonesia were made attractive to 
U.S. firms, particularly those specializing in industry, commerce 
and finance. 315 
With an economy expanding by six percent or more a year, the 
World Bank estimates that Indonesian per capita income is likely 
to reach $1000 by the 2000. 316 Indonesia's economic development 
over the past 30 years is matched by few developing countries due 
to its extensive human resources. Today Indonesia-is 
concentrating efforts on developing a vibrant manufacturing 
sector and larger middle class which offers growing markets for 
the U.S. 317 Indonesia's dynamic growth presents excellent 
opportunities for U.S. businesses primarily in infrastructure 
projects such as power plants, aerospace and telecommunication 
development. 
314 Ibid, 486. 
315By 1984, direct U.S. investment in Indonesia equaled 754.9 
million dollars, falling third after investment from Japan and Hong 
Kong. Ibid, 506-7. 
316Thomas c. Hubbard, 11 Indonesia and the United States: 
Building A New Pacific Community, 11 .:=U~·-==S::..;·:..-....:D~e:::.p=a~r..::t:.:.:m~e::.::n~t:::...__o=f-.:::S""'t'""a:::..:t::.::::.e 
Dispatch (April 25, 1994): 233. 
317 Ibid, 233. 
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D. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Widespread democratic values influence U.S. stature 
worldwide both advantageously and sometimes unfavorably. Like-
minded nations generally develop mutual foreign policy interests 
and cooperate, fostering trust and friendship. As a result, the 
United States actively like-minded allies, advocating a new world 
order based upon democratic principles. In the post-Cold War 
era, Indonesia's support for the U.S. remained lukewarm as 
American concern over democratization and human rights increased, 
particularly under the Clinton administration. Excluding the 
anti-Communist purge campaigns, East Timor has been consistently 
condemned by the United States as the worst blot on Indonesia's 
human rights record. 
East Timor is an Indonesian Christian enclave with an 
approximate population of 750,000. 318 When the Portuguese 
government decolonized its overseas holdings in Southeast Asia, 
East Timor was unprepared for self-governance and erupted into 
civil war between three groups. FRETILIN sought the creation of 
an independent Marxist state; another group advocated integration 
into Indonesia; and a third group supported a gradual 
decolonization process. 
Portugal's then leftist government abruptly withdrew in 
August 1975, providing weapons to aid a FRETILIN victory in East 
Timor. Indonesia invaded in December to prevent the declaration 
318U.S. State Department Dispatch, "East Timor, Indonesia and 
U.S. Policy," (March 16, 1992): 213. 
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of an independent Marxist state. The military's anti-insurgency 
campaigns killed civilians in the crossfire. FRETILIN insurgents 
continued operations through the 1980s, provoking increased human 
rights violations by the Army. As a result, East Timor has been 
an unending source of human brutality. In 1992, the U.S. 
Congress terminated IMET funding of approximately $2.3 million to 
Indonesia, protesting against the government's failure to 
initiate stronger measures regarding human rights abuses. 
Additionally, UN resolutions continually denounce Indonesian 
aggression despite extensive diplomatic measures regarding human 
rights. Indonesia is deeply offended by such acts. 
Although Timorese armed rebellion has been tamed, the 
problem remains unresolved because resistance to governmental 
rule remains strong. Soeharto's government claims that only a 
tiny percentage of the Timor population rejects national 
integration. However, the November 1991 Dili event questions his 
statement. 319 U.S. interests lie in helping ensure governmental 
and military accountability are realized regarding both the Dili 
massacre and further human rights abuses occurring in Indonesia. 
U.S. interests do not demand firm judgement regarding the 
correctness or wrongness of Indonesia's actions in Timor. In 
fact, Indonesia views any American criticism as interference in 
its internal affairs. Indonesia also objects to continuous 
American criticism of the government's attitude toward child 
319Several thousand unarmed Timorese demonstrators were fired 
upon by soldiers, killing at least 50 people and wounding more. 
See Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 215-8. 
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labor, minimum wages, and freedom of the press. It is noted that 
Islam is in no way related to any of these domestic problems. 
Whatever policy the U.S. decides to pursue with respect to Timor, 
labor, or freedom of the press, it can not justify or condemn 
using the basis of religious content. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
"Do not underestimate public opinion in Indonesia. 
If neglected, it will be cultivated by extremists. " 320 
The Islamic factor in Indonesian foreign policy has become 
more significant the last 15 years because of a widespread rise 
in Islamic fundamentalism. Soeharto has carefully maintained a 
balance where Islamic issues are concerned, fearing widescale 
international resurgence. 321 He prefers to keep the Arab-Islamic 
world at a distance because Islam remains a divisive force 
within. As a result, Indonesian priorities centralize around the 
regional environment without an identifiable Islamic component. 
Islam does not contribute to the promotion of ASEAN regional 
relations particularly since fundamentalism generally seeks to 
exclude undue involvement of Western powers. Likewise, 
Indonesia's economic policy is governed by criteria of 
development rather than Islam. 
320A senior diplomat made this statement which was cited in 
Leifer, "The Islamic Factor," 157. 
321Modernization fueled much of the Islamic resurgence in 
Indonesia. With improved technology and communications capability, 
rural people see political leaders practice questionable morals and 
life-styles. Media reports covering Khomeini's ascension to power 
in Iran inspired the frustrated Indonesian Muslims to renew efforts 
to gain political power for Islam. Simultaneously, the 1970s 
Indonesian oil boom led some Muslims to believe that Allah rewarded 
them with an economic advantage over the West. Fred R. von der 
Mehden, Religion And Modernization In Southeast Asia (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 257. 
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A. INDONESIA'S INTERESTS IN THE U.S. 
Western countries and capitalism have always been very 
important in Indonesia's foreign economic relations since the 
beginning of the New Order to present. 322 Economic 
contributions from Japan and the U.S. via capital investments and 
foreign assistance have been substantial. 323 Japan's growth as 
a global economic power should enable it to give more aid to 
Indonesia and lesser developed countries. Indonesia plans on 
improving relations to make full use of capital, Japanese 
technological expertise and development experience. 324 
Indonesia also regards the U.S. as an important source of 
technical assistance, capital, technology and skill for its 
national development programs. It desires continued access to 
American markets and military procurement privileges under FMS. 
Financial aid to Indonesia given through the IGGI and IMET have 
favorably influenced (Indonesian-U.S.) bilateral relations. 
Indonesia moved toward closer defense ties with the U.S. in 
1990, beginning with joint military exercises. Its interests lie 
in ensuring some sort of American security umbrella exists. The 
increased importance of keeping Americans involved in the region, 
322A. R. Sutopo, "Indonesia Between East And West, " vol. 13, no. 
4, Indonesian Quarterly (1985): 462. 
323Japan permits its national oil company to explore and 
exploit hydrocarbons directly in Southeast Asia and has established 
numerous private fishery-joint ventures in Indonesia. Mark J. 
Valencia and St. Munadjat Danusaputro, "Indonesia: Law of the Sea 
and Foreign Policy Issues," vol. 12, no. 4 Indonesian Quarterly 
(1984): 489. 




following the Philippine base closures and rising Chinese threat, 
laid the foundation for an informal alignment with America by the 
end of 1992. 325 A U.S. military role in Southeast Asia has the 
balancing effect which prevents Japan from becoming directly 
involved in regional security issues. Japan's dependence on 
foreign sources for raw materials and markets to sustain its 
economy makes Indonesia uneasy. Memories of Japanese occupation 
and the current reality of Tokyo's economic power in the region 
threaten to gain over the Indonesian economy itself. China's 
growing power and international assertiveness also haunts the 
strategic horizon. ABRI leadership is concerned over the 
possible extension of China's influence southwards through a 
consolidation of its claims in the South China Sea. 326 
Indonesia therefore strongly advocates a continued U.S. presence 
to counter possible threats arising from the growing strategic 
reach of East Asian powers. 
A regional response to the new world order has been guided 
by Indonesian proposals to intensify intra-ASEAN security 
measures. 327 Southeast Asia feels challenged by the emergence 
325Huxley, Insecurity In ASEAN, 24. 
326 Indonesia's maritime claims marginally overlap China's. 
327Mindful of sensitivities to the fact that Indonesia is the 
largest country in Southeast Asia, Soeharto stresses political 
stability and economic development policy in achieving regional 
security. Indonesia's willingness to be treated as an equal 
alongside regional neighbors contributes to ASEAN success. In 
turn, it expects member countries to extend the same goodwill and 
demonstrate their commitment to the association. Anwar, "Foreign 
Policy After The Cold War," 148. 
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of China, Japan, and possibly India, as military powers. 
Indonesian intelligence estimates view the Chinese threat, for at 
least the next decade or two, in terms of support for domestic 
dissidence. 328 However, Indonesia holds a viable concern that 
China's economic development might prompt the development of 
extensive power projection capabilities in the long run. 329 To 
address this threat, Indonesia seeks more structured military 
relations among the ASEAN members, short of a pact. 330 It 
discredits the effectiveness of a regional military pact in light 
of weakened national identities and defense capabilities. 
Soeharto advocates overcoming threats by achieving.political 
stability within and building individual national self-reliance 
and resilience. 331 However, he recognizes that the exchange of 
military information and joint training enhances ASEAN capability 
to address external threats and resolve security problems. 
Previously discussed, the Indonesian Navy's small size and 
limited capability prevent it from being a maritime power of 
great consequence. Naval missions encompass patrolling waters to 
prevent illegal activity while protecting offshore installations; 
controlling sea lanes and chokepoints; assisting the Singaporean 
and Malaysian Navies to control the Malacca-Singapore Straits; 
328Harold Crouch, "No Enemy In Sight," FEER (February 14, 
1985): 32. 
329A shared concern of all Asian countries, particularly Korea 
and Japan, and more recently Australia. 
330Anwar, "Foreign Policy After The Cold War, " 152. 
331Roesnadi, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," 67. 
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and contributing naval units to an allied ASEAN force in the 
event of conflict arising with a common enemy. 332 Fast attack 
and patrol craft could seal the Malacca Strait if the government 
desired. However, closing the strait is an easier task than 
keeping it open when a determined foe wants it closed. The vast 
geographic area to be covered by the Indonesian Navy is near 
impossible given the lack of well-dispersed bases. 333 
As a result, ABRI values joint Indonesian-U.S. naval 
exercises tailored to its threat environment. While in the past 
initiatives between the two countries have been largely symbolic, 
a great amount of Asian social value or "face" has·been attached 
to relations. The ABRI respects the U.S. military's 
professionalism and combat superiority. IMET naturally plays a 
crucial part in military cooperation, serving as an unnecessary 
irritation point the past few years due to the U.S. decision to 
cancel funding. The recent influx of high level visits by U.S. 
military leadership has helped rejuvenate ABRI's faith in 
American commitment to mutual regional interests and somewhat 
restored loss of face from IMET cancellation and 1993-94 arms 
332Straits under Indonesian jurisdiction act as important 
chokepoints. The most critical is the Malacca-Singapore route used 
extensively by tankers carry crude oil from the Middle East 
through the South China Sea to Japan. Interference with shipping 
in the Strait of Malacca could disrupt the flow of trade not only 
to the nations in Southeast Asia but to Japan and the U.S. as well. 
Valencia and Danusaputro, "Law Of The Sea," 484. 
333The principal naval base is at Surabaya while a western base 
exists at Tanjung Priok. 
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sales restrictions. 334 
The U.S. position on the Convention of the Law of the Sea is 
at odds with Indonesia. Some 157 nations have accepted the 
convention's maritime traffic restrictions, ratifying it while 
the u.s. rejects it. 335 Despite relatively good relations, 
differences between Indonesia and the U.S. exist which should be 
lessened or eliminated. Geography requires all maritime traffic 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans to pass somewhere through 
waters under Indonesian jurisdiction. The shorter of the two 
major thoroughfares follows the Malacca and Singapore Straits 
into and through the South China Sea. An alternate route exists 
through the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, the Celebes Sea, and 
south of Mindanao out into the Pacific to Japan. Eastbound 
traffic proceeds through the Malacca and Singapore Straits from 
the Arabian Gulf. Ships then continue through the South China 
Sea to Japan. 336 
U.S. interests lie in unimpeded transit of both commercial 
and military traffic through the Indonesian archipelago, 
particularly in the absence of a naval base in Southeast Asia. 
Current economic constraints and defense cuts hinder the 
availability of U.S. resources to respond militarily to future 
334High level visits included U.S. Commander- In-Chief of the 
Pacific Admiral (ADM) Macke in last October, Vice Chairman of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff ADM Owens in March and Commander of Seventh Fleet 
VADM Clemins in February. 
335Kusumaatmadja, "Indonesia-U.S. Bilateral Relations," 398. 
336Valencia and Danusaputro, "Law Of The Sea," 474. 
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crises abroad. The U.S. must rely on its carrier battlegroup to 
show the flag and honor treaty commitments, using mobility as a 
deterrent. Control of and passage rights through archipelagic 
choke points are strategic naval interests especially regarding 
the U.S. fleet submarine force. Indonesia views American 
rejection of the convention as unreasonable, particularly in 
light of U.S. increased commitment to Southeast Asian regional 
security. The Law of Sea specifications complement the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) goals sought within 
ASEAN. ZOPFAN represents an important regional political and 
security agenda, strongly opposing the presence of foreign 
military bases and security alliances with external powers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a phenomenon through three 
types of movements: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism. 337 
Each group emerges in response to in-country conditions. Islamic 
fundamentalism is dynamic but not monolithic. A central control 
or unified organization that supervises all fundamentalist 
movements does not exist. Ties extended between Muslim countries 
are usually ideological except for allegations of the exportation 
337Patrick Bannerman, in his study of the Tunisia, classifies 
these movements into four "trends" of Islamic fundamentalism: (1) 
Popular preachers with large followings, normally with no axe to 
grind, and tolerated by their regimes; (2) Small socially active 
groups seeking to fulfill spiritual needs; (3) Politically active 
groups using constitutional means to achieve their aims; and (4} 
Radical extremist groups prepared to achieve goals through 
violence, some believing violence as a divinely ordained duty. See 
R.M. Burrell, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism (Great Britain: The Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1989), chap. 3. 
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of terrorism abroad through training and funding. Few 
fundamentalist movements favor violence. 338 Western concern 
over fundamentalism is irrational and exaggerated. 
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a pervasive 
universal phenomenon has confronted the U.S. with serious 
challenges. American response to fundamentalism has not been 
informed by a clear understanding of the Islamic religious ethos. 
Ineptitude on this matter runs the risk of harming U.S. strategic 
and economic interests as experienced with Iran. To ignore 
religious desires of Indonesian Muslims and concentrate only on 
the economic drives or secularized political motives limits the 
U.S. potential for stronger bilateral relations. While not a 
direct interest of the United States, the existence of religious 
diversities has a widespread impact on the regional security of 
Southeast Asia. Specifically, radical Islamic fundamentalism 
irritates the Buddhists and Christians in the region. 
The role of radicalism as a threat to ASEAN stability 
focuses on the political influences of Islam in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are sensitive to the role 
that Islam can play in the formulation and implementation of 
national policies. Indonesia in particular can act as an 
influential mediator for neighboring governments and radical 
Muslims. As a leading member of the Organization of Islamic 
338 For example, of Egypt's 60 million population, some 200,000 
were considered radicals with no more than 10,000 employing 
violence in 1993. Global Business White Papers, Islamic 
Fundamentalism, no. 7 (June 1993), p. 15. 
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Conference (OIC), it enjoys legitimacy as a Muslim nation and is 
trusted by radicals in the region. Additionally, in the 
interests of the U.S. and democracy, thus far, Indonesia has kept 
its political process separate from radical fundamentalist goals. 
IMET funding provides an invaluable mechanism which helps 
foster democratic values and respect for human rights in 
Indonesia, increasing U.S. influence as a whole. 339 The ABRI 
establishes what is permitted in Indonesia, dictating which 
individuals and groups are allowed to participate in official 
politics. Law and order in Indonesia is primarily the result of 
the Army's ability to suppress protests and prevent dissidents 
from speaking out. Repressive measures taken against enemies of 
the state, referred to as extremists, coincide with efforts to 
strengthen the pro-government factions within the political 
parties. 340 Enhanced human rights education and military 
(personnel) exchange programs with the U.S. provide the 
opportunity to further instill democratic values in ABRI's 
professional training. As such, IMET promotes better human 
rights policies by exposing ABRI junior officers to democratic 
values and initiates military cooperation with Indonesia's future 
leaders early on. During this time of rising global Islamic 
fundamentalism, U.S. relations with Indonesia, the world's 
largest populated Muslim country, remain crucial, regardless of 
339Human rights issues have been an important 
continuing dialogue and good relations with the 
government. State Dispatch, "East Timor", 214. 




its human rights record, and should be sustained not 
hindered. 341 As a matter of practical policy, there is no 
question that the United States should monitor carefully the 
progression of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesian society. The 
U.S. should keep in mind, however, that the fear of Islamic 
radicalism does not influence the formulation of current 
governmental policies. Mutual security and prosperity are 
achievable no matter which course President Soeharto pursues in 
dealing with his Islamic constituents. 
341Soeharto' s government 
international phenomenon to 
administrations. 
has been challenged by Islam as an 
a greater degree than preceding 
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APPENDIX A. INDONESIA TRIP REPORT 
Assessments. Islam is a sensitive issue to both the government 
and Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. There is a general 
distrust of foreigners and paranoia over outside (U.S.) 
perceptions of Islam in Indonesia. President Soeharto has been 
very cautious in exercising control over the emergence of Muslim 
extremism, the phenomenon labeled Islamic fundamentalism by the 
U.S. intelligence community. As a result, fundamentalist views 
are difficult to uncover given the fear of government reprisal. 
Internal security is of utmost importance to Soeharto. The 
government holds a tight rein over public dissent through the use 
of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI), namely the Army. It 
functions to suppress governmental opposition in any form. The 
military reacts quickly to political speeches made in conjunction 
with mosques or minor demonstrations. Despite these efforts, 
Islam easily generates political influence among the masses and 
can act as a disruptive force. 
For that reason, the government, Ministry of Defense 
(intelligence unit) and Ministry of Religious Affa~rs closely 
monitor Muslim travel to Middle Eastern countries, the annual 
pilgrimage and academic exchanges abroad. Individuals who return 
from the Middle East generally adapt a more radical view of 
political Islam. The extent to which Middle Eastern countries, 
particularly Iran and Libya, actively encourage Muslim extremism 
in Indonesia is unknown. However, members of the Komando Jihad 
extremist group are known to have received weapons and training 
from Libya. The mechanism exists for outside funding to Muslim 
radicals who seek it. 
A large-scale, politically organized movement seeking the 
establishment of an Islamic state has not existed in Indonesia 
since the Darul Islam (1965) . Following the Iranian revolution, 
rising Islamic awareness in Indonesia concerned the Soeharto 
government and the ABRI. Shortly after, the constitution 
implemented Pancasila as the national ideology, a concept 
contrary to the fundamentals of Islam which discourage a secular 
state. 
Pancasila was first introduced upon independence in 1945 as 
the five philosophical principles of nationalism, democracy, 
humanitarianism, social welfare, and belief in one god. Such 
principles were created to unify the major cleavages in 
Indonesian society: Islam and Christianity, aristocracy and 
peasantry, nationalist and Communist, commercial and agrarian, 
Javanese and outer island groups. Even today it provides a 
unifying moral framework for Indonesia's diverse population. 
The constitutional necessity for all citizens to believe in 
one God also legislates Indonesians to profess a faith from one 
of five officially tolerated religions - Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. This gives Indonesia the 
appearance of a religious state to those Muslims who challenge 
the ideological validity of Pancasila in a largely Islamic 





accept the fact that Islam is not the central feature of 
Indonesia's political system. 
Mainstream Muslim political and intellectual thought accept 
Pancasila as the means of achieving a stable and united country. 
The special province of Aceh in northern Sumatra is the 
exception. Acehnese Muslims already advocate a more pure Islam 
than found in Java, and several actively assist an ongoing 
insurgency in hopes of achieving a separate state. Unlike 
northern Sumatra, a large concentration of vocal, puritan Muslims 
does not exist in Java. 
Regardless, small extremist groups and several Muslim 
radicals remain scattered throughout Indonesia. Currently, those 
individuals reflect an insignificant or negligible threat to the 
political stability of Indonesia. This can change without 
warning. The constraints on political pluralism, an underlying 
resentment toward wealthy Chinese Christians, underemployment and 
governmental corruption provide fertile ground for the seeds of 
extreme Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. The crucial element 
lies in Indonesia's unknown presidential successor. 
The nature of Islamic fundamentalism and evolution of Muslim 
extremism in Indonesia remains uncertain pending the successful 
transfer of presidential power and, most importantly, legitimacy. 
President Soeharto has ensured political stability by exercising 
military-backed, authoritarian rule. As a result, Muslim 
extremism has been kept under governmental control. His 
successor may not be so adept. 
Conclusion/Action. The nature and political role of Islam varies 
in intensity in each Muslim nation. Collectively, the ASEAN 
region comprises one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in 
the world. Indonesia's approximately 170 million Muslims 
represent the world's largest Islamic population in a single 
country. The successful emergence of Muslim extremism in 
Indonesia could threaten U.S.and regional security interests. 
During my two week stay in Indonesia, I was able to 
interview government officials, Muslim intellectuals, and a 
"converted" Muslim extremist who was imprisoned from 1984-93. 
Prior to and following travel in Indonesia, I worked with JICPAC 
analysts and conducted research at University of Hawaii's East-
West Center (for Asia-Pacific Studies) . The information gathered 
from this trip will be compiled into my thesis and distributed as 
a final product to JICPAC, DIA and ONI upon completion. (See 
APPENDIX B. for detailed observations.) 
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED OBSERVATIONS IN INDONESIA 
JAKARTA, Capital City, Java: 
17 Jan - Tour of Istiqal Mosque, the largest mosque in 
Southeast Asia and second largest in the world. 
18 Jan - Roundtable with U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of 
Mission Ms. Barbara Harvey and Political Officer (Religious 
Affairs) Mr. Phillip Antweiler covered the issues of political 
stability, internal security, the military's political role, and 
Muslim extremists in Indonesia. 
Indonesia experienced much political instability during its 
early years of independence from the Dutch. Communist 
insurgencies and Islamic secessionist movements emerged 
periodically. The two dominant forces which united the country 
were the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), particularly the Army, 
and the president. The current Indonesian president, Soeharto, 
sought the goal of achieving political stability and economic 
prosperity. After eliminating Communism, he imposed governmental 
control over Islam's political role through the constitution, 
imposing a national ideology, and the military. It is the view 
of the DCM and Political Officer that there are few individuals 
who favor the establishment of an Islamic state. They are also 
of the opinion that the support or momentum for a massive, 
organized Islamic movement does not exist in Indonesia. Unlike 
the case of Iran, a charismatic Muslim leader who favors a 
drastic change in the form of government has yet to emerge. 
The occasional unrest that periodically appears in Indonesia 
has been correlated with 11 simple social rioting 11 not a threat 
instilled by radical fundamentalists. While groups or 
individuals may opt for using the Islamic banner for mass appeal 
in leading these riots and voicing dissent, by and large the 
government maintains tight control over the emergence of Muslim 
extremism. 
The military's gradual shift toward aligning with Western 
views indicates the beginnings of a diminishing political role in 
society. More than likely, this trend will not leave an opening 
in the political vacuum for Islam to fill. Although the recently 
(1991) established ICMI (Muslim Intellectual think-tank) borders 
on having a political agenda, the DCM is of the opinion that its 
primary function remains in the development of human resources. 
Indonesians are particularly sensitive toward the topic of 
fundamentalism. It was strongly suggested to avoid usage of the 
word by substituting with the terms 11 political Islam
11 or 11 the 
extreme right. 11 
- Interview with Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali. Member Supreme 
Advisory Council and former Minister of Religious Affairs. 
Munawir relayed the opinion that those who garner strong 
feelings toward the making of an Islamic republic should give up 
that goal. While the majority population claims to be Muslim, 
several eastern areas of Indonesia foster other religions, for 
example Bali is Hindu and East Timor is Catholic. Under the 
establishment of an Islamic state, the other minority (religious) 
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areas would notably be alienated and suffer. 
As long as there is a predominately Muslim majority in 
Indonesia, Pancasila will remain the state ideology not Islam. 
However, unlike the West, particularly the United States, 
Indonesia is not a secular state. Secularism rejects the 
involvement of the state in religious life. Contrary to this 
concept, the Indonesian government allows religion to be taught 
in schools starting at the elementary school level. Munawir was 
quick to stress that although religion is taught in all schools, 
it is taught according to the chosen religion of the student (not 
just Islam) . 
The mainstream Muslims accept that Islam should not have a 
political role. There is a negligible percentage of individuals 
who advocate an Islamic state. However, Munawir briefly 
discussed the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident which involved Muslim 
rioting inspired by dissent expressed in a local mosque. He 
stated that those individuals involved could not accept Pancasila 
as the state ideology resulting in their imprisonment. As acting 
Minister of Religious Affairs, he later received letters of 
"repentance" vowing agreement to the government's view of Islam's 
proper role. One of the formerly imprisoned Muslim extremists, 
Fatwa, is now a close friend of Munawir. 
Munawir claims that no extremists operate today. At the 
same time he acknowledged that the Darul Islam rebellion (Islamic 
movement following independence) existed and those few remaining 
individuals (who support Darul Islam or extremist ideology) are 
"nothing to be worried about." Later in a passing comment, 
Munawir joked that "Aceh (special province in Northern Sumatra) 
is the exception" to the mainstream Muslim thought that prohibits 
the establishment of an Islamic state. 
Author of the 1992 article, "Muslims' Interests Are Better 
Served In The Absence of Muslim Parties," Munawir's personal 
position is that the threat of an Islamic state no longer exists. 
He cites that since 1985, all socio-political institutions 
including Muslim parties and social organizations agreed to 
accept ''Pancasila" as the sole and only basis for the nation. He 
feels that with this acceptance, Indonesian Muslims have formally 
given up the idea of an Islamic state, eliminating the 
possibility altogether. He further states that democracy and 
close adherence to Pancasila will enable Muslim political 
interests and religious life to be better served. 
19 Jan - Interview with RADM R. M. Sunardi. Chief of Staff 
for Social-Political Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Security. 
The ABRI follows a doctrine of "National Resilience" which 
pledges loyalty to the people of Indonesia. Its principles are 
to aid in the development and management of socio-political 
problems. Sunardi perceives the military (and Defense Ministry) 
as a "mediator" of the ''frictions" that exist between the 
government and the people. 
Concerning internal security threats, Sunardi does not view 
Muslim extremism as a potential problem. Pancasila has instilled 
the principle of harmony among religions in Indonesia. However, 
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operationally speaking, this goal of national unity faces several 
impediments namely geographical separations between the islands 
and ethnic diversities. He emphasized the real threat to 
internal security as being Communism, the extreme left. To 
detect extremism, both military and state intelligence 
organizations exist such as the BIA and EAKIN. 
The primary focus of these intelligence units and the 
Defense Ministry remains internal as opposed to external; 
however, Sunardi stated that solid evidence was gathered proving 
the 1965 Communist coup attempt received funding from China. (A 
likely indication that intelligence assets are devoted to 
maintaining a watchful eye on China and its ties to the overseas 
Chinese living in Indonesia.) He acknowledged avid anti-Chinese 
sentiment exists among many Indonesians due to their dominance 
(apparent economic wealth) over the business sector. He also 
implied that the Ministry equates anti-Chinese sentiment with 
anti-Christian sentiment. 
Sunardi stated that the academic exchanges which occur with 
Middle Eastern countries do not present a threat of radicalizing 
returning students. He wanted to portray the image that the 
Indonesians studying abroad return shocked with all the violence 
in the Middle East and advocate a moderate (not radical) 
implementation of Islam in government. 
Of note, when questioned about possible Middle Eastern 
funding for extremists, particularly the group known as "Komando 
Jihad", Sunardi acknowledged the existence of approximately 100 
Libyan-trained insurgents (Muslim extremists) that remain spread 
throughout Indonesia. He stated that these individuals traveled 
to Libya via Malaysia. (Another indication of external 
intelligence, this time with the function of monitoring travel to 
and from Middle Eastern countries.) 
- Interview with Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher. Minister of Religious 
Affairs. retired RADM. 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs is unique to Indonesia. 
Its two main functions are: to encourage duty to religion and 
inter-religion harmony. The ministry was started solely for 
Islamic affairs shortly after independence to protect the 
governmental interests of religious harmony and an integrated 
nation. It provided a venue for the government to influence 
popular Muslim religious leaders and, in turn, the people. 
Religious instruction in schools is mandatory in both 
government sponsored and private institutions, from kindergarten 
through college. This religious education applies to all faiths. 
Islam is taught in pesantrens or madrasas, similar to Catholicism 
in seminaries. The minimum instruction lasts two hours a week, 
similar to the Christian concept of Sunday-school. 
Islamic studies abroad were primarily conducted in the 
Middle East and with the Arabs. Taher claimed that today Arabs 
now have "marginal influence." The ministry's present efforts 
encourage scholars to pursue studies in Pakistan, the U.S. and 
Europe. Its intentions are to allow a mixture of ideas to align 







views. Academic exchanges still occur with universities in Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Ministry 
fellowships or grants are given to students, sometimes fully paid 
for by the host country. 
Taher described the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident as tension 
and conflict which arose from a local mosque resulting in a 
security clash with the military. Several Muslims feared the 
subordination of Islam to Pancasila. He added that the 
uneducated population in the rural areas make up extremist groups 
such as the Darul Islam and Komando Jihad. Those groups lack a 
political basis or organization and number fewer than 100 
individuals. 
A specific directorate within the Ministry of Religion 
exists to manage the Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It 
requires four to six months of preliminary work covering 
immigration, passport, bank, accommodation and airline travel 
issues. Every one in a thousand Indonesian travels the 
pilgrimage. Indonesia sends the most pilgrims out of all Muslim 
countries. This May, a quota of 194,000 will be filled at a cost 
of $1000 per person. 
20 Jan - Meeting with Ms. Clara Yoewono, Assistant Director 
for Public Affairs and Mr. Harry Tjan Silalahi, Vice Chairman of 
the Board of Directors. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. 
Despite grievances with President Soeharto, his 
implementation of Pancasila as the national ideology is 
"heartening" to the minority religious groups. It forces the 
majority Muslim population to accept and tolerate other religious 
practices in Indonesia. Pancasila ensures the safety of 
minorities. Opposition to Pancasila seems virtually nonexistent, 
or is simply not voiced for fear of the government's 
reprisal/actions. An undertone still exists among the Muslims 
which favors the establishment of an Islamic state. Because no 
official statements can be made advocating negara Islam, 
remaining supporters use different strategies. Methods to aspire 
for the formation of an Islamic state are likely available 
through the channels of education, legislation and the mosques. 
Soeharto's support for the establishment of ICMI upset the 
Christians and other minority (religious) groups. It has tilted 
the balance of political power among groups in favor of the 
Muslims. Within ICMI, there are individuals who have a political 
agenda who can now exercise some leverage or influence over 
Soeharto. 
Regarding internal security threats, previous economic-
motivated anger toward the Chinese has shifted to religious-
motivated anger, reflecting an anti-Christian tone. Yoewono also 
pointed out that "radical splinters" of Muslims exist. For 
example, the Komando Jihad represents a splinter group of the 
Darul Islam. Silalahi indicated that fanatic sentiments are also 
alive among several Muslim intellectuals. Additionally, he 
believes that in order for Indonesia to become a successful 
nation amidst globalization, its predominately Muslim population 
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must learn to accept two things: the improved status of women and 
political leadership of a non-Muslim. 
- Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi, Director of Center for Political 
and Religious Studies, LIPI Indonesian Institute of Sciences. 
The history of Indonesia reflects the failure of Islam to 
exercise a constructive political role in Indonesia. As a result 
the mainstream Muslim intellectual thought agrees that the 
separation of Islam from politics and government is the most 
effective means of achieving a stable political environment, and 
religious harmony. Those individuals who advocate the 
establishment of an Islamic state abandon this goal as they 
become more educated and less ignorant. The percentage of Muslim 
extremists is negligible, if any exist. Pabottingi is against 
Islam having a larger political role. 
MEDAN, Northern Sumatra: 
21 Jan - Prof. Asma Affan, Senior Lecturer of Political 
Science, University of North Sumatra. 
Affan feels that Pancasila is not necessarily compatible 
with the teachings of Islam. In theory, Pancasila 1s an 
ingenuous concept that encourages national unity and good morals. 
In reality, it seems to foster materialism and individualism as a 
necessity of the globalization process of Indonesia. Since 1965, 
Indonesia has experience rapid development. Despite this, 
Sumatra has not experienced many benefits. There are less 
businesses (in Sumatra}, foreign investment remains hesitant, and 
skilled labor must be brought in from Java. Along those lines, 
politics center around Java regardless of the fact that valuable 
economic resources exist in the outer islands. Yet another 
criticism, the political system as it is does not allow members 
from outside its appointed circle to lead much less influence 
political change. 
Corruption within the government down to the village level 
remains a problem. Although the people are encouraged to 
communicate their problems to officials, corruption sometimes 
prevents common complaints from being aired. Communication 
between the lowest (village} to highest level also becomes 
hindered by geography. Affan stated that Islam can aid the 
government in solving future problems by instilling proper 
morals, encouraging widespread education and managing socio-
economic welfare programs among the people. 
22 Jan- Roundtable with Dras. Sri Minda Murni, M.S., 
Lecturer at Medan University and Idjah, M.A., Lecturer at 
University of North Sumatra. 
Islam in Indonesia is different from the Middle East in the 
sense that it seeks harmony with the other religions practiced in 
the country. Past cultural practices have allowed the absorption 
of Hindu and Buddhist influences in many Indonesian customs; 
however, Muslims recognize these practices as customs not 
religious obligations. The word "orthodox" denotes a negative 
connotation when used in regard to Indonesian Islam. A better 
description would be the phrase "pure Islam" which describes a 
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different level of devoutness found in every individual. 
The Islam found in Sumatra and Java appears different due to 
external influences the Javanese mixed in their teachings of 
Islam. Sumatra has the more "pure" Islam. The use of veiled 
dress by women is more prevalent in Sumatra. However, this is 
only one aspect of the comprehensive teachings of the Qur'an 
which the West chooses to associate with Islamic repression of 
women. Nuns in America choose to veil themselves according to 
the teachings and their belief of Biblical scriptures. Likewise, 
those Muslim women who have reached a certain level of devoutness 
and personal enlightenment believe in veiling themselves in 
Indonesia. The women who choose not to veil themselves are not 
looked down upon. Personal relationships with God vary according 
to the individual. 
- Tour of Mesjid Raya, the "Great Mosque" which is centrally 
located in the city represents the largest mosque in Sumatra. 
Before entrance into the mosque I was required to dress 
appropriately in veil. Several ritualistic motions were 
conducted during prayers which I observed both at a Muslim 
residence and the Mesjid Raya. Prior to conducting prayers all 
Muslims thoroughly cleansed themselves in a separate room/area. 
BANDUNG, Capital of West Java: 
23 Jan - Tour of the Asia-Africa Museum. Bandung is the 
third largest city in Indonesia with a population of 1.7 million. 
Its claim to fame came in 1955 when it provided the site for the 
Afro-Asian conference, commemorated by the Asia-Africa Museum. 
Leaders of third world countries met at Bandung, forming the 
early beginnings of the Non-aligned Movement. Today, Bandung is 
a big university town which is starting to attract high-tech 
business with its affluent intellectual environment and 
prestigious Institut Teknologi Bandung. 
24 Jan - Interview with Dr. Juhaya S. Praja, Lecturer, 
Islamic Studies Institute (EIEN) , and Roundtable with two EIEN 
professors and Dr. H. Ahmad Supardi, President of EIEN in 
Bandung. 
Juhaya feels that a new trend in Indonesia reflects the view 
that a Muslim political party no longer carries importance. The 
majority of the Muslim population accepts Pancasila as an 
ideology and adhere to Sunnism. Only a small group of Shii (less 
than 1000) exist in Indonesia and they remain quiet. Sumatra may 
appear to have a more pure form of Islam because animism and 
Buddhist/Hindu mixtures are not so readily accepted by Muslims as 
in Java. Efforts to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia 
dissolved around 1962. Today Indonesia Muslims are content to 
"agree to disagree" regarding religious beliefs. 
As a whole, they all expressed that ICMI does not threaten 
to imbalance political influence among the religious groups in 
Indonesia because each religion has its own intellectual think-
tank. ICMI represents a society of professionals who unite to 
further develop Indonesian science and technology. However, 
there is no question that ICMI has substantial political 
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influence under the supervision of Minister of Research and 
Technology Dr. Habibie. 
As expected with 87 percent of the population adhering to 
Islam, a minimum of 50 Islamic national organizations exist in 
Indonesia. The N.U. represents the greatest social, Islamic 
progressive organization. Its leaders defend the old teachings 
of the Qur'an and seek preserving Islamic traditions. The 
Muhammadijah also bases its formation on the Qur'an and 
traditions but originated as a result of Mohammad Abduh's 
reformist teachings in Egypt. An organization known as PERSIS 
also exists. Its theology originates from the Wahhabis (early 
fundamentalist group) in Saudi Arabia. 
Supardi pointed out that Islamic law exists in Indonesia; 
however, what is written in theory differs from what is 
practiced. Four court systems exist: homes affairs (civil), 
military, Islamic, and general (criminal). The general courts 
handle grievances of the other religions. 
There are 14 state Islamic Studies (university) Institutes 
throughout Indonesia. The one in Bandung accommodates 
approximately 7000 students. Seven faculties exist: two in 
Islamic law, two in Islamic education, theology, propagation/ 
preaching, and the faculty of letters. Islamic studies is a 
life-long educational process that begins at the pesantren level 
carried through elementary, secondary, and high schools to the 
university and higher learning levels. Before acceptance to an 
EIEN, two entrance tests are administered. The written tests 
examines the students' ability to read, comprehend and recite the 
writings of the Qur'an and other Islamic devotions. Four other 
areas are tested: general sciences, the English, Indonesian and 
Arabic languages. The oral test further examines familiarity 
with Islamic teachings and the Qur'an. Three outstanding high 
school students are selected yearly to attend the EIEN and are 
subjected to an oral review before entrance. 
- Visit to SURYALAYA Pondok pesantren. The pesantren plays 
a key role in providing Islamic education for many Javanese 
communities. It draws followers from various social strata, 
occupations and regions with the goal of improving spiritual 
needs of the less fortunate. This particular pesantren was 
founded by Shaykh Abdullah Mubarak in 1905. Kiyahi Abah Anom, an 
immediate relative of Mubarak, has acted as the head since 1956. 
The title of kiyahi signifies the cultural and Islamic leader of 
the pesantren who provides religious guidance (blessings) , 
supervision and personal counseling to members of the community. 
While at this pesantren, I observed the local Muslims' reverant 
behavior toward the kiyahi and his granting of blessings. 
Additionally, a delegation from Bandung met with Kiyahi Anom to 
present the construction plans for a new mosque (approved and 
funded by Soeharto's governmental programs and Pancasila). 
- Tour of the Bandung Army Museum, Darul Islam exhibit. 
The Museum was established by Indonesia's elite Army 
division, Siliwangi, which is headquartered in Bandung. The 
Museum commemorates the Siliwangi troops participation and 
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suppression of insurgencies and rebellions which have occurred 
throughout Indonesia's history. The Siliwangi colors are proudly 
displayed along with an extensive exhibit of the Army's struggle 
against the Darul Islam (Islamic rebellion) in West Java. 
Central Java: 
JOGJAKARTA was the center of resistance to the Dutch and 
acted as the capital city of the revolution against Holland 
following WWII. Today, Jogja is the cultural and artistic center 
of Java. Two great Buddhist and Hindu dynasties were located in 
Central Java until the rise of Islam carried sultans to power. 
26 Jan - Interview with Dr. Baroroh Baried, Distinguished 
Professor, American Studies Graduate Program at Gadjah Mada 
University, Jogjakarta covering fundamentalism and women. 
The reformist ideas of Mohammad Abduh (Egypt) entered in the 
early 19th century. Simultaneously Indonesia began changing its 
perception of women. Women can fulfill any or all of these three 
roles: as a homemaker, community social worker, and as a 
professional with a career. AISYIYAH is an Islamic organization 
that promotes the status of women in Indonesia. In accordance 
with the government and its attempt to improve the status of 
women, AISYIYAH encourages Pancasila as the way of life. It is 
separated into five levels: national, provincial, municipal, 
district and sub-district. Its emphasis centers around social, 
educational and religious activities and operates under the 
umbrella of the Muhammadijah organization. 
The evolution of new, modernist ideas has forced men to 
share in the duties of maintaining a proper home and caring for 
the family. Islam encourages the traditional roles in which the 
woman acts a mother and wife while the husband acts as the 
protector and leader. Only recently has a broader interpretation 
and application of these roles extended to advance the status of 
women in Indonesian society. 
Islam can play a key role in solving Indonesia's socio-
economic problems if it continues in the current direction. 
Islam must aid in managing two crucial things: the mastering of 
fields of knowledge in all subjects through the highest formal 
education possible, and encouraging Muslims to uphold morals by 
being good people. 
- Tour of Borobudur Temple, site of the 1985 terrorist 
bombing. Borobudur was one of the greatest Southeast Asian 
Buddhist monuments, abandoned shortly after its completion in 850 
AD. Nearly 1500 panels on its terraces illustrate Buddhist 
teachings and relay a tale depicted by over 400 Buddha images. 
The first restoration project was completed in 1983 at a cost of 
over US$25 million. A second restoration project (worth US$12 
million) was undertaken by the Soeharto government following the 
1985 Komando Jihad (Muslim extremist) bombing of the historic 
site. 
- Candi Pawon and Mendut Temple. 
time period of Borobudur. Worshippers 
Candi Pawon on their way to Borobudur. 
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Both built during the same 
purified themselves at 
Mendut has extensive 
galleries, terraces and a stupa on top of a pyramid-shaped roof. 
It is known for its magnificent statue of Buddha seated with two 
disciples. 
- Kota Gede Islamic Center. grave of Prince Senopati. 
Founded in 1579, Kota Gede was once the capital of the old 
Mataram kingdom. The grave of Senopati, founder of Mataram, is 
situated next to an ancient mosque. Other royal personages are 
entombed nearby the Islamic center. 
- Jogja Kraton. the palace compound of Javanese sultans. 
During the war for Indonesia's independence, guerilla commander 
Soeharto (current president) dressed as a kraton peasant to 
confer with the sultan on guerilla tactics to use against the 
Dutch. The walled fortified palaces of Javanese rulers were 
historic centers of political power and culture. The two most 
famous kratons reside in Jogja and Solo. 
SOLO, also called Surakarta, is the traditional, original 
capital of the Javanese kingdom. It is the only city that widely 
uses the Javanese written language today. 
27 Jan - Prambanan Hindu temple. The biggest .Hindu temple 
complex in Java containing the ruins of 224 temples. The central 
courtyard contains three large structures: a main temple 
dedicated to Shiva, flanked by those of Brahma and Vishnu. The 
largest of these, Shiva temple, has been restored and portrays 42 
scenes from the Hindu epic Ramayana. 
SURABAYA, Capital of East Java: 
The second largest city and major port in Indonesia. It was 
leveled on 10 Nov 1945 when the Dutch tried to reclaim the city 
after Japanese surrender. Surabaya's resistance symbolizes the 
country's determination to rid itself of colonial rule and the 
day is celebrated as National (Revolutionary) Heroes' Day. 
28 Jan - Gresik, tomb of the Muslim saint. Saint Sunan Giri 
is credited with introducing the religion of Islam to Java in the 
13th Century. 
- Interview with Prof. Dr. H. Mohammad Koesnoe. Director of 
Middle Eastern Studies Center, EIEN. Surabaya. 
Several varieties of Islam exist in Indonesia according to 
the different spiritual atmosphere of areas. Koesnoe stated that 
Sumatra may seem more "pure" but they are also more "vocal" in 
the nature of their Islam. Java is more emotional and inward 
looking. Different interpretations exist whereas Sumatra, 
particularly Aceh, practice an Islam that is more Arabic or 
Middle Eastern iri nature. When Islam arrived in Java, people 
were naive and blended their previous religious beliefs with 
those of Islam, essentially just changing names and terminology. 
Sumatra has had longer ties to the Middle East since Islam came 
straight to the island from Persia. 
In the later stage of Islamic development in Java, Muslim 
awareness increased as more scholars traveled abroad and made 
contact with orthodox (pure) Islam. Koesnoe believes that the 
difference between orthodoxy and unorthodox practice lies in 
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certain disciplines. Both schools of thought accept the 
fundamentals of Islam as being the Qur'an and the Sunnah (example 
set by Prophet Mohammad's life). The difference lies in the 
objectivity of interpretations. Orthodoxy requires an individual 
to follow the majority opinion of the Muslim community. On the 
other hand, an individual may achieve his/her own interpretation 
through analysis and use of reasoning. 
Pancasila was an amusing topic of discussion to Koesnoe. 
Although Pancasila exists as the nation's ideological and 
philosophical framework, it has yet to be stated in detail as a 
law. Pancasila is rather a tool of integration. Citizens of the 
U.S. live in peace and plurality under a "nation of law" and the 
constitution. Indonesia seems to be a "nation of culture." 
Muslim extremists choose to interpret the Qur'an differently 
as the government, in good faith, holds its own interpretation 
with the establishment of Pancasila. Individuals may be at odds 
with the government view but do not voice their opinions. 
Koesnoe admits that it is common for those Islamic students 
studying abroad in the Middle East to return with more radical 
views of the proper role of Islam, but the government monitors 
their activities closely. 
In closing, Koesnoe was of the opinion that Indonesia is a 
nation that is moving away from Islamic or Qur'anic teachings 
toward Western values. 
JAKARTA: 
29 Jan - Interview with A.M. Fatwa, "converted" Muslim 
extremist, former political prisoner from 1984-1993. 
Fatwa was arrested following the Tanjung Priok incident in 
1984. Muslim rioting occurred after a local mosque leader 
preached criticisms of the government. The military killed and 
detained people involved in the demonstrations. Fatwa gave a 
political speech implying that Pancasila was being used as a tool 
of persecution against politically active Muslims. Prior to 
Tanjung Priok, a petition was signed by 50 prominent citizens 
some of which were former military officers and intellectual 
leaders. Fatwa was one of the signatories to the petition, and 
as a result of his actions and views the Soeharto government 
arrested him. 
While jailed, Fatwa met Muslim extremists in various 
prisons, specifically the two located at Bogor and Cirebon. He 
stated that supporters of the Darul Islam exist today. While 
Fatwa was in prison, he was only allowed to receive mail and 
visits from his wife. He sought creative means to maintain his 
contacts. In addition to extensive beatings, the government 
moved him from prison to prison throughout Java to make such 
endeavors virtually impossible. 
Upon his release from prison in 1993, a forum was organized 
for Fatwa to give a speech. His current outlook praises the 
"cooperative, lenient" attitude the government and military is 
exercising toward Muslims. He feels that both the Indonesian 
intelligence organization and ABRI have learned from their 
mistake in the mishandling of the Tanjung Priok incident. 
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Of note, the interview with Fatwa was an interesting 
experience in itself. Since his English was poor, an interpreter 
(female) accompanied Fatwa. Her behavior was peculiar; she was 
extremely nervous and on edge. Not only did she refrain from 
offering a full translation of Fatwa's responses, but several 
times engaged in heated debate with him (in Indonesian) before 
paraphrasing his answer. Additionally, she chose to answer some 
of my questions herself instead of interviewing Fatwa. 
30 Jan - Meeting with Col. McFetridge. DATT, USDAO Jakarta. 
The government maintains tight control over the internal 
security threats such as the emergence of Muslim extremism. 
Regardless, there are individuals who remain in country and 
resort to violent means. Fundamentalism does exist in Indonesia 
despite the apparent mixing of Buddhist-Hindu religious cultures 
with Islam in Java. Sumatra's insurgency in Banda Aceh has an 
Islamic flavor; however, the people living there do not have a 
more outwardly Islamic appearance when compared to the rest of 
Indonesia. 
The Darul Islam rebellion officially ended around 1965 but 
elements of the same ideological view exist today. It can be 
expected that most supporters either permanently reside in prison 
or keep their views secret. 
Col. McFetridge also relayed to me that Soeharto has over 
played the importance of Pancasila. Once a month, every month, 
government and military officials rally together for the 
Pancasila indoctrination. Everyone gathers to chant the words in 
Indonesian, Arabic and sit through lengths of ceremony devoted to 
the makings and philosophy of the national ideology. In a sense 
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